The contribution of John Neville Figgis (1866-1919) to the religious thought of his period by Meisel, David Morrison
THE CONTRIBUTION OF JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS (1866-1919)
TO THE RELIGIOUS THOUGHT OF HIS PERIOD
by
Donald Morrison Meisel
THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF DIVINITY
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF EDINBURGH
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF REQUIREMENTS




Chapter I FIGGIS AS A MAN (1)
Chapter II FIGGIS AS A POLITICAL THINKER
"A Plea for the Group Person"
(27)
Chapter III FIGGIS AS A POLITICAL THINKER
"A Plea for the Group Person"
(Continued)
(95)
Chapter IV FIGGIS AS A THEOLOGIAN
"A Plea for Otherworldliness"
(136)
Chapter V FIGGIS AS A THEOLOGIAN
"A Plea for Otherworldliness"
(Continued)
(186)




FIGGIS AS A MAN
Now more than ever is it needful to have books—the work of
learned men, as in the case of Newman,—which shall get free
from all dullness and use every possible means of persuasion,
wit, sarcasm, eloquence, colour, good writing. Why should it
be supposed that a pompous condescending style is likely to
convert people.... Dullness has not yet been raised to the
rank of a theological virtue, though it seems too often to be
the chief virtue of theologians.1
Thus John Neville Figgis, C. R., concluded an article on "John Henry New¬
man" for The English Church Review in 1912, an article written in the
midst of the years of his greatest literary productivity. As liberal ex¬
cerpts from his writings in the pages that follow will show, the style
which he said typified Newman's work became the style of his own work.
But to fully appreciate these writings as meeting a need "to have books—
the work of learned men....which shall get free from all dullness and
use every possible means of persuasion, " the student must come to
know the life of the man who held the pen, a life as rich in "colour" as
his writings when at their usual best and as irregular at times as his il¬
legible script at its normal worst.
There was nothing dull about the life which began at Brighton
on October 2, 1866, and ended near Windsor on April 13, 1919* The events
of the intervening fifty-three years make an interesting study, including
as they did: an early life spent in the home of a father who was a Non-
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, "John Henry Newman," p. 262.
Note: Figgis's writings referred to in this chapter will be annotated in
full in the chapters which follow the biographical chapter.
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conformist minister; a sixteen year (1885-1902) young adult life of in¬
timate association, excluding brief interruptions, with Cambridge as a
brilliant student and lecturer, years which saw a shift in academic in¬
terests and excellence from mathematics to history, a shift in convic¬
tions regarding spiritual things from a college-bred agnosticism to a
decision to seek orders in the Church of England, years of association
at various stages with Creighton, Maitland, and Acton, who impressed him
xd-th their common passion for freedom and each of whom made his own strong
impression as an individual, and years of mounting reputation as a com¬
petent historian of political thought; five years (1902-1907) as rector
of a small country parishj* Marrihull, Dorset, where he had his first real
taste of intimacy as a pastor with common people and where his experience
deepened his religious insight beyond anything he had heretofore known;
and twelve years (1907-1919) lived as a probationer and then a professed
member of a religious order in the English Church, the Community of the
Resurrection at Mirfield. It was by repeated and frequent sojourns from
this retreat to lecture at various centers of learning in Great Britain
and the United States and to preach in various pulpits in London and other
parts of England that Figgis, who had won his reputation as a historian of
political thought, earned an even more distinguished reputation as one who
wrote and spoke with a passion for Christ and His Church in compelling words
for a new twentieth century audience to hear, words of "wit, sarcasm, elo¬
quence, colour," words which were as lacking in that dullness which "seems
too often to be the chief virtue of theologians" as was the life of the
man from whose pen and lips they came.
(3)
J. B. Figgis, who was born in Dublin,1837, had. been minister of
the Countess of Huntingdon's Church, North Street, Brighton, some six years
when the first of his three sons, John Neville Figgis, was born in 1866.
This church, which was the centre of J. B. Figgis's entire ministry until
his retirement in 1915, was part of the Countess of Huntingdon's Connexion,
the name given to the group of churches and chapels begun by Selina,
Countess of Huntingdon (1707-1791), under the strong influence and Calvin-
istic bias of Whitfield, a movement having many affinities in worship with
the Established Church while being essentially congregational in polity.
Figgis was a leading figure in the Connexion and enjoyed a reputation as
an outstanding preacher. Gladstone often attended both his morning and
evening services.
Neville Figgis's mother, whose family name was Chaffey and who
came from Winsham in the county of Somerset, married J. B. Figgis and came
to live with him at 132 Clifton Road during his first year at Brighton.
She was a devout woman, a good housekeeper, and a very active participant
in the life of the church the first years of her married life. But with
the birth of their third son, Samuel Bradley Figgis, who became a prominent
physician, she entered a long period of declining mental health. This
tragedy was quickly followed by another when the second son, William Chaffey,
died at the age of eight years. The vacancy in the home created by Mrs.
Figgis's long illness was filled for many years by Kiss Figgis, the eldest
sister of J. B. Figgis, and then by Miss Chaffey, the eldest sister of
Mrs. Figgis. "In her the two children found the care and council which the
(W
mother, owing to her illness, was unable to give." Walter Howard Frere,
Superior of the Community of the Resurrection, when Figgis made his pro¬
fession, writes: "To the deep religious influence of his home, Neville
Figgis owed much throughout his life.Recalling a normal boyhood, Figgis writes
I remember when I was a child, for some quarrel with ray brother
he had been forbidden to go that night to see some fireworks,
our annual joy. Proudly I said, though still allowed, "I shall
stay with him." That sounded very fine at 6, but at 8 o'clock,
it seemed dull and at 8:30 it looked simply silly, and at 8:ii5—
I need not detail the rest. I think that when my f ather said,
"So you went after all," there was expressed in it the spirit
of what our dear Lord must feel very often when He has to say
to His friends, "Could ye not watch with Me one hour?"^
And certainly it was with his own home much in mind that he wrote:
The youth longs to be up and doingj he is for casting off all
fetters. He is not going to do things just because his elders
do them; rather he will do the contrary. He will improve upon
the past. No dead hand of dry tradition shall interfere with
him. He will seek fresh woods, will change a hemisphere to
win an El Dorado; in reality rather that he may get away and
be free, than for anything he will get out of it.
And yet, and yet, all the while he has within him this other
desire. Some image of a quiet home, some spot where he can rest
in spirit, where the little pieties of the soul can gather, even
amid all his wanderings, something that draws him, not because
it is new, but because it is old, about which there clings that
immemorial pathos that belongs to whatever has touched life for
long. It may be thoughts of his parents, or the love of some
sister or younger brother whom perhaps he did not treat as well
as he might when they played together; or perhaps of the school
where he was bred, or those years to be remembered but not re¬
peated at college; or the church to which he went reluctant, or
the cadence of an ancient hymn; or even it may be the scents of
1. J. Westbury-Jones, M. A., Jesus College, Oxford, Minister of Lady
Huntingdon's Church, London, Figgis of Brighton, A Memoir of a Modern Saint,
(London, Marshall Brothers, Ltd., 1917), p. 23?. ~ ~~
2* Dictionary of National Biography, 1912-1921, ed. by H. ¥. C.
Davis and S. R. Weaver (OxfordJ.
3. Figgis, Antichrist, pp. 85-86.
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some old garden."*"
In thinking for himself of "those years to be remembered but not
repeated at college," Figgis's thoughts travelled back to his years as a
day student at Brighton College (Lent term 1881-Summer term 1885), where
he came after attending a private school in Montpelier Crescent. At
Brighton Figgis cut a rather odd figure because of his reluctance to as¬
sociate with his fellows, his unusually intense intellectual interests,
and his complete withdrawal from all atheletic activity. The fact is that
Figgis never really mastered the physical techniques of life. The year
before his death he related this ineptitude to his having absented himself
from things athletic during his school days:
...I believe that the Public Schools are among the best things
we have in England. It is a pity they do not stimulate more boys
to intellectual interest. But for myself, having been allowed
at school to be hopelessly unathletic and living forever after in
penitence for this sin of omission, I am the least disposed to
question the value of athletics....^
Any nostalgic references to college days refers the more, how¬
ever, to Figgis's years as a student at St. Catherine's College, Cambridge,
where he took up his studies in the Fall term of 1885, coming as a mathe¬
matics scholar from Brighton with an open scholarship. R. R. Conway, a man
with whom Figgis shared a house on Tennis Court Road for many years (1891-
1893, 1895-1897), writes:
.. .without any conspicuous enthusiasm for the study, he was placed
well up among the Senior Optimes. He then came up for a fourth
1. Ibid., pp. 87-88.
2. Martin Browne, A Dream of Youth—An Etonian's Reply to The Loom
of Youth, preface by Figgis, (London, Longmans, Green and Co.), p. x.
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year, read history, and obtained the solitary First class of
his Tripos, bracketed with a Girtonian... .1
Conway offers the best existing general account of Figgis's earlier years
at Cambridge, words which point not only to Figgis's excellence as a stu¬
dent but also to the breadth of his associations, in marked contrast to
the insular life of the day boy at Brighton:
...he did know his work, and besides this he had the priceless
gift of being interested in anything that was of interest to his
friends. This cut both ways; people would come to him and talk
to him about anything and everything; he forgot nothing that he
heard and so became a perfect mine of general information* and
this had much to do with his immense capacity as a teacher of
his subject. .... To a great proportion of his contemporaries
he was known, not so much for intellectual as for personal quali¬
ties; he had a genius for friendship and his vast circle em¬
braced men of every stamp and every pursuit. Many of them had
first met him professionally, but in his rooms you might meet
Blues of varied distinction, Union orators, politicans, classics,
a Senior Wrangler or two, representatives of every imaginable
tripos, and a swarm of those who might be described as "unlabel-
led." As a host he was perfect; he never allowed the most
timid freshman to feel out of it, he could talk on any subject
under the sun, he loved good cheer and saw that his guests had
it to......2
E. V. Lucas's Reading, Writing and Remembering contains a refer¬
ence to a meeting with young Figgis during the latter's fourth year at Gam-
bridge which is indispensable to any effort to gain insight into the un¬
usual characteristics and talents of "Figgis as a Man."
One recollection of those early Brighton days is concerned ob¬
liquely with Oscar Wilde and the odd manner in which I became
acquainted with his writings. In January, 1889, I chanced to
meet a youth, who later was to distinguish himself as a historian—
John Neville Figgis, whose father was a minister of the Countess of
1. R. R. Conway, 'tf. N. Figgis," St. Catherine's Society Magazine,
(September, 1937), P» 56.
2* Ibid., pp. 56-57.
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Huntingdon Chapel in the town, and who, as the author of daring
and satirical verses,displayed the brilliance that we associate
with the rebellious sons of the clergy. After surprising me by
taking orders and forswearing the world, he died—a loss to
learning—in middle age, but not before he had acquired as much
erudition, bulk, and untidiness as Dr. Johnson himself, whom he
resembled, to my eyes, far more than Chesterton is supposed to
do. .But to return to Oscar Wilde, on the evening on
which I met young Figgis, who was then about twenty, he had
come fresh from reading in the Nineteeth Century Wilde's essay
on "The Decay of the Art of Lying," and without a misplaced or
omitted word, he repeated large portions of this to the company.
The result of a single perusal. The stories of Macaulay's simi¬
lar feats of memory I had until then thought to be exaggerationsj
but I can testify that Figgis had the same astonishing gift.l
As indicated above, Figgis, after his third year at Cambridge,
p
turned from the study of mathematics to the study of history, a field in
which he distinguished himself from the very beginning. Following a brief
time out for travel and diversion after his fourth year for reasons of
health, Figgis returned to St. Catherine's and proceeded to win numerous
laurels in his recently chosen field in the form of the Lightfoot Scholar¬
ship in 1890, the Junior Whewell Scholarship in 1891, and the Prince Con¬
sort Prize in 1892, the same year in which he received his M. A. It is
with regard to submitting his paper in competition for the Prince Consort
Prize that Conway provides the following account:
The event of all others which is most deeply engraved on my
memory deals with a certain Saturday night forty-six years ago.
At midnight the dissertation for the Prince Consort Prize had
to be in the hands of the Vice-Chancellorj Figgis was offering
his views on the Theory of the Divine Right and had planned a
treatise consisting of a preface and five chapters: at lunch
that day he asked whether I would mind dinner at 6:30 instead
of 7J00 as he wanted to write the last chapter! As I never
1. E. V. Lucas, Reading, Writing and Remembering—A Literary Record,
(London, Methuen &. Co., 1932), pp. 56-57.
2. In a sermon entitled, "The Problem of Pain," Figgis wrote: "I
admit that to me the joy in mathematics is a little remote."
(8)
minded the nearer approach of a meal, I consented with pleasurej
the preface and the first four chapters had gone to the type¬
writers and things seemed fairly normal. At about 6:i;5 a par¬
cel arrived; they had typed the preface but regretted that they
could not read a word of the rest. ...... Figgis was in despair;
more to keep him quiet than anything else I said, "Go to the col¬
lege, find the two most intelligent people you can and bring them
here; we will copy out your (epithet) book." He went and returned
with two, one was A. B. Hoilman. the other, as far as I can remem¬
ber, Hall. We got down to it; while the author developed Chapter
V we drove through the rest. As I knew his little ways, I got
through I and IV, the others managed II and III, where there was
a page of Figgis's that might possibly be legible it was inter¬
polated, and by 11:30 or thereabouts it was done! But still it
had to be put together, a motto chosen, enclosed in a sealed en¬
velope, and all the rest of it. Midnight approached; I seized
the author, took hold of his arm, and ran (footnote: this is per¬
haps the only authentic instance in his career of such a mode of
progression) him by all the short cuts to Christ's. Peile was the
Vice that year; as the hour struck the parcel was handed to the
porter. There were three sequels to this thriller:
(a) "Figgis on the Divine Right" was the only exercise to
obtain favourable recognition
(b) The examiners expressed the opinion that the manner
in which Mr. Figgis submitted his work left much to be desired
(c) The triumphant author and Medallist entertained his
clerical staff at the best dinner the kitchens could provide:
needless to say we each had a book.l
Two men proved the inspiration that fired Figgis's initial zeal
for history and for particular phases of history as they relate to politi¬
cal problems and man's political freedom. One of them was Frederich
William Maitland, who in 1888 was appointed Downing Professor of the Laws
of England at Cambridge. Speaking of Maitland as a historian and of his
style as a writer of history, Figgis says:
His style was and is like that of no one else, compact of extra¬
ordinary Biblical and other archaisms, intensely individual, vivid
and striking, packed with allusions, sparkling with humour, and
suggesting even more than it stated—... It was a style like the
1. Conway, o£. cit., pp. 39-60.
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portrait of Monna Lisa, which all the thoughts and experiences
of the world seemed to have moulded, and it had,whether delivered
or written, an extraordinary quality, almost unique among his¬
torians—that of reproducing the atmosphere of the time he was
discussing. ...... Perhaps it was best expressed once in the
phrase of Mr. Andrew Lang, that he turned flashes of eletric
light on his subject.^-
The influence of a man like Maitland contributed much to Figgis's ability
as a historian, and wherein the student came to share something of the
master's talents, the following picture could be drawn:
...for many years we shared a house on Tennis Court Roadj when
I returned from a morning's labour I could see Figgis and his
pupils hard at it, the teacher buried in a vast armchair suited
to his Chestertonian build, waving a cigarette and with a pon¬
derous "original authority" on his knees, the pupil, or pupils,
writing at express speed and looking like shorthand reporters
of a speech by Lloyd George or some similar celebrity. "When they
came to the study of their hectic scribbles they found, as they
have told me themselves, that they had a perfect summary of the
work in question.2
The other name associated with inspiring and directing Figgis at
this stage of his development is that of Mandell Creighton, who became the
first Dixie Professor of Ecclesiastical History the same year in which
Figgis came up to Cambridge from Brighton. This li Anglican clergyman,
who, in 1890, became the Bishop of Peterborough and later Bishop of London,
did much to stimulate the study of history in a University in which it was
not the fashion. Creighton as a historian and even more as a man made a
deep impression upon Neville Figgis. In writing his tribute to him, Figgis
says:
As a lecturer, and still more as private tutor, the main cachet
1. Biggis, Churches in the Modern State, "Three Cambridge Historians:
Creighton, Maitland, and Acton," pp. 2i£-2ij6.
2. Conway, op. cit., p. $6.
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of Creighton's teachihg was the constant stimulus he gave to
thought and activity. What struck us most was the wide range
of his interests, his sense of the absolute importance of knowl¬
edge, and, as I once heard him say, "the appalling levity" with
which the members of the so-called educated classes deliver
opinions on every conceivable topic. It would be truer to say
that he tried to make men discipline themselves than that he en¬
deavoured himself to discipline them. Alike in religion, poli¬
tics, learning, he always inspected and believed in the individual.
His great object, indeed, was to make the individual believe in
himself; not, of course, in the sense of bang arrogant or self-
conscious. No one could be severer to anything of that sort.
But he tried to make his pupils see that there were tasks worthy
of their attemptingj that they ought not to be afraid of them,
and that they must be makers of their own lives. One of the
first lessons we learnt from him was the absurdity of worshipping
"the idols of the market-place" and the iniquity of satisfying
ourselves with plausible hypocrisies and conventional fallacies.
No one exposed more unsparingly the superficial sentimentality
which often mistakes itself for culture.^
Of the three men (Creighton, Maitland, and Acton), Creighton was
undoubtedly the greatest teacher of youth, and did much to save
from being mere dilettanti the interested "literary" youths who
abound at the Universities.2
And it was as Figgis began to perceive the intimate connection between
Creighton's character and achievements and his Christian faith that he
began to number himself as one among those "interested 'literary' youths
who abound at the Universities," whom Creighton "did much to save from be¬
ing mere dilettanti."
Never shall I forget the impression made on me as an undergradu¬
ate by being brought into touch with a great scholar who was
above all things a humanist, but the very depth of whose humanism
was due to his Christianity.3
Figgis referred to himself as having been an agnostic during these
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, "Three Cambridge Historians:
Creighton, Maitland, and Acton," pp. 231-232.
2. Ibid., p. 233.
3. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, p. 133?<( (Quoted again in
another context, infra., p. 209.
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early years at Cambridge,"'" and one of his friends recalls his having said,
"When I was an 'agger.' But this college-bred abandonment of the faith in
which he had been brought up could not long withstand the warmth of
Creighton'3 Christianity as it informed his conduct, sparked his interest
in young men, equipped him to see through sham, and provided the base of
his great intellectual insight and achievement. So profound was Creighton's
influence and the influence of certain events, so complete was the reversal
of Figgis's agnostic position, that he was not content with the single
step of confirmation in the English Church and the prospect of living the
Christian life as a layman. In 189^ he left the scene of his much ac¬
tivity as a history scholar, coach, and lecturer for Wells Theological
College. He spent only a short time there and later in the same year was
ordained a deacon at Peterborough by his much-loved teacher. He then
p
worked for the best part of a year as Assistant Curate at Kettering, after
which he was ordained a Priest in 1895, again by Creighton at Peterborough,
only to return to the academic atmosphere of Cambridge in the Fall of the
same year.
For all of the influence of Creighton's life and thought upon
Figgis's religious life, it was the death of another rosin that immediately
precipitated his decision to seek orders. Figgis once said that " a
1. Vide, Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, "John Henry Newman,"
p. 22U.
2. The story is told that shortly after he went to Kettering, a lady
met the Vicar on the street and said, "I have just met the new Curate. He
is asleep in my drawing room. He came in to make a call and while there
fell asleep. I had to go out, so I thought I had best leave him there."
(12)
personal experience is better than a volume of argument,and it was the
sudden death in 1893 of a promising young Cambridge friend of great per¬
sonal charm, Edward Moule, a Trinity man and an I. C. S. Cadet, whose
passing Figgis felt deeply, that transformed a leaning into an immediate
resolve to leave Cambridge for theological training. This experience of
personal loss always remained a vivid memory and a continuing factor in
Figgis's religious expression, as evidenced in various portions of his
writings:
The partial, relatively superficial, character of intellectual
processes is revealed in a flash at the crises of life. To one
who is straining eyes through the gates of death for his friend
who has passed beyond them, how unreal seem all studious delights!
'What a futile mockery in the face of fact are all men's specula¬
tive projections of reality. We may dwell at other times in an
abstract world and make ourselves happy with conceptions. But
life crashes in with "its wonder, its beauty, and its terror"—
our house of cards tremblesj and we are kicked as it were from
the rational to the real, from the surface to the depths.2
Just as the supreme argument for immortality is the spectacle of
some strong and noble character, dying in early life—for we feel
that all cannot be over with it—so against the sight of nature
and all her cruelties, what is there to be said except that hu¬
man hearts will not acquiesce in a world whose sole meaning is
that it has none? This is the final ground of all religious
belief 3
It is all but impossible to credit that some great character cut
off in the height of power, or some youth noble and heroic killed
in fight, has gone out into the dark for ever. If the world be
not meaningless, we must think of them as alive. That is the
real argument for an eternal world which shall ratify all that is
noble in this: w
Figgis, in deciding to seek ordination in the English Church, re-
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Heeds, p. x.
2. Ibid., p. 39.
3. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, pp. 218-219.
U. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, p. l)|?|.
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moved the possibility of his affiliating himself with his father's church,
j
the Countess of HuntingdonSConnexion, a step which probably never presented
itself as a real alternative. After Neville's decision to enter the Es¬
tablished Church, J. B. Figgis wrote:
Need I say what a joy it was to me? There was just a tinge of
regret in the joy that he did not adopt my churchmanship. But
he greatly cheered me in this, by saying so filially, "I am
sorry that I cannot come and help you."1
The son came to enjoy a renewed respect for that for which his father stood
and regarded his own and the Church of England's views as a development of
the implications of Evangelical piety.
The writer would not knowingly, in either this or any other book,
speak in any terras but those of affectionate reverence of that
Evangelical piety which is to him hallowed by every sacred memory.
This need not mean but that we ought to fill out the system by
developing its implications and by bringing it into closer rela¬
tion with the sacramental and institutional sides of religion.2
The question is raised as to just how far Figgis digressed during
his college days from his boyhood faith before seeking first confirmation,
then ordination in the English Church. M. G. Tucker, in his excellent bio¬
graphical chapter of his little book, John Neville Figgis, suggests that
the agnosticism to which Figgis avowedly subscribed for a time "meant a
distrust of the intellect as an instrument for grasping the final meaning
of life and of purely logical approaches to religion.
It is the opinion of this writer that agnosticism for Neville
Figgis meant a much more drastic departure from faith than Tucker's words
1. Westbuiy-Jones, o£. cit., p. 238.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, p. ix.
3. Maurice G. Tucker, John Neville Figgis, A Study, (London, S. P. C.
K., 1930), p. 6.
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would imply. Nothing less than a complete divorce in his allegiance from
anything even resembling the Christian faith suffices to explain words
written in retrospect years later:
It is amazing how often we leave out of account the obvious fact
that in our age, just as in Judaea nineteen hundred years back,
there are very many people who are hostile to Christ because they
dislike him. They despise His ideal of gentleness. They hate His
ethics of love and self-denialj and they have no sense of sin,
from which the Cross can deliver them, and neither belief nor in¬
terest in any way of life which is mainly dependent on the reality
of the Otherworld. All of us know many people like this. Most of
us have passed through phases in which it represented our own view.l
R. R. Conway, to whom, as has already been seen, the student is indebted
for so much valuable and intimate information about Figgis, says:
....there was no violent change in his spiritual outlook but
rather a steady development.2
But in concluding a letter to this writer, he also says:
He (Figgis) was a many-sided man with a vast circle of friends
and also quite unrivaled in the art of suiting his conversa¬
tion to hia company, so I never had any theological discussions
with him..
Figgis's whole digression into agnosticism and away from the
faith in which he was nurtured was another example of the not uncommon
incident of a young intellectual turning against the expression of his
childhood faith as inadequate to his intellectual categories. He must
have had his initial revolt and his subsequent return to faith, although
with a difference, in mind when he said in a sermon entitled, "The Ideal
of a University Life":
However, this boisterous effort to deny our parentage is little
1. Figgis, Love of God, p. 58.
2. Conway, 0£. cit., p. 58.
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more than the naughtiness of a boy in his teens who votes his
family a mistake: and we know these rude ways will pass as he
grows to the age when he can at once comprehend his ancestry
and yet go beyond it. -
Figgis returned to Cambridge in 1895 as Curate of Great Saint
Mary's under another well-known historian, Dr. Cunningham, whom Figgis ad¬
mired and at whose invitation he came. The record of the services held at
Great Saint Mary's indicates that Figgis took a very active part in the
life and worship of that University Church during the time of his respon¬
sibility there, which extended from October 1895 to February 1898. From
I898 to 1900 Figgis served as Chaplain at Pembroke College, and from 1899
to 1901 he performed a similar service for his own College. Over this en-
0
tire six-year period, he was occupied as a lecturer at Saint Catherine's;
from 1897 to 1899 he also served as editor of the "Cambridge Review," and
from 1900-1901 he was Birbeck Lecturer at Trinity College.
It was coincidental with Figgis's return to Cambridge in an of-
f>tj fhi*\ Lvrd-
ficial capacity that Sir John Edward Dalberg^Acton was appointed to the
Chair of Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge. Acton was the
third of the three Cambridge professors who had such a determining influ¬
ence upon Figgis's life and thought. Figgis's description of Acton as a
lecturer also suffices to describe the nature of the strong impression
made upon him by this liberal member of the Roman communion.
No one could listen to him without being convinced of the tremen¬
dous issues which lie in political choice, or of the absolute dif-
1. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, p. 191.
2. He was not a "don" in the strict sense of the word in that he was
never appointed a fellow by his college, although he was later made an
Honorary fellow.
(16)
ference between right and wrong doing. It was this burning
conviction of the eternal distinction between good and bad,
and the immeasurable gulf that divides expediency from justice,
that gave to his lectures, his writings, and his life their
peculiar significance. His whole life was, in fact, a protest
against the principles of Machiavelli—that is, of purely
utilitarian morals, whether in Church or State.
With the years of Figgis's second extended period of work at
Cambridge in mind, R. R. Conway writes in a letter:
He then seemed to have settled in permanently, did much work
in history and soon collected a large group of undergraduates
who were ripe for theology: his Sunday evening gatherings in
St. Catherine's were great occasions, proceedings being varied
by a supper.
No major period in Figgis's adult life was without some marked
element of spiritual crisis and upheavel. The years of his many-sided
activity in Cambridge from 1895-1901 were no exception. The thing that
gives an air of life, relevance, and intimacy to so much of Figgis's
religious writings is the fact that he is speaking, hardly without excep¬
tion, from the depths of his own experience. His own words, therefore,
give the best account of what he went through during the period under
consideration. In the middle of his first address in the University Church,
as Hulsean Lecturer for 1908-1909, he looked down from the pulpit, which
had been moved to the center of the nave, upon his attentive, black-
gowned audience and said, referring without question to his years among
them after he had been ordained:
And if for this faith I stand to-day, I ask you to believe
that it is not to make vain show, or to shatter in argument a dis¬
dained opponent. To others faith is the bright serenity of un-
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, "Three Cambridge Historians:
Creighton, Maitland, and Acton," p. 259.
(17)
clouded vision; to me it is the angel of an agony, the boon of
daily and hourly conflict. In these years as God's priest I
have felt the pressure of crowding doubts, and learned in bit¬
terness that to give up agnostic views may yet leave one far
from the Kingdom of God—farther, save by Sis grace, than ever
before.^
Writing years later of the "new Baal" of non-miraculous Christianity and
of the dangers to faith inherent in treating as irrelevent individual
miraculous elements in the Christ narrative, he said, pointing back to
the period of his own allegiance to the new cult:
Slowly almost everything crumbled. Faith in the sacramental
presence was not so much denied as practiaally forgotten.
Harder and harder of credit became the great Christian doctrines—
a dominant intellectualism seemed to cut away everything, not by
argument, but by detaching faith from all living interest. No¬
thing indeed seemed to remain, except an unreasoning resolve to
move the mind on. All meaning in life seemed to be vanishing;
religion tended to become mere humanitarianism, for it is surely
worth while to lighten people's lot, and to hang on to one's
work, until the contrary is clear. All this is now expressed in
a far more clear-cut fashion that it was lived; it is of ten¬
dencies, surmises, presuppositions rather than of dogmatic state¬
ments that I speaic. let all seemed to follow by a development,
imperceptible but inevitable, living rather than logical from
breathing that atmosphere, to which these apparently minor beliefs
were akin.
Slowly change came. Penitence became real. After long years of
struggle, pardon was sought in the sacrament, of peace. Freedom,
never given up as a belief, was seen to involve far more than had
been thought. That notion of development which made miracles im¬
possible was seen to be mechanical; the immanental philosophy was
seen to be, if pushed to the extreme, a Pantheism identifying God
and the world. So the glorious liberty of the children of God
seemed given; and all the world grew younger day by day, as it
does still. And may God never take from me, as I deserve, that
grace so richly granted.2
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. 15.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the mystery, "Modernism Versus Modernity,"
pp. 29U-295.
(18)
But to speak of the change that came is to speak of what took
place, not in Cambridge, but in Marnhull, in the County of Dorset. It was
in 1902 that Figgis, following a nervous breakdown, left Cambridge to be¬
come Hector of Marnhull, a country living in the gift of his College.
We are in Hardy country here, for close to the church stands a
thatched wavy-roofed Inn, the "j^hre firop" of Tess of the
D'Urbervilles; the club-walking field is nearby, and down a
little green lane stands the cob-walled thatched cottage that
was the home of poor, ill-fated Tess.l
Marnhull is a large and scattered village with some thirty miles
of roads within its parish. Figgis was often to be seen walking these
roads, making some abortive effort to cover them on a bicycle, or cutting
across the fields for some poor parishioner's house. It made no difference
whether or not a person belonged to his church, for he looked upon all of
the people as belonging to his parish. Not infrequently he attended and
acted as chairman at various functions in the village's Methodist Chapel.
Here in Marnhull Figgis was struck with the simple piety of the people,
and much of his previous training in a strongly Evangelical home came to
the fore in this homely setting. He was especially attentive to his people
in their times of difficulty and illness, and it is said that for a period
he took care of one man who was suffering with small pox. He was recalling
the value of his pastoral work in Marnhull when he wrote:
Lately some one has been saying that visiting is an impertinence.
That is not my experience as a parish priest. Personal work, it
is said, we must set aside in favour of boards and committees.
Doubtless personal work has its dangers. If it had not, it would
not be much good. But at least it is the method of our Lord. The
1. Dorset Year Book 1948-1949, p. 150.
(19)
other is not. It has always been the method of those who in the
common opinion have been most like our Lord, a S. Francis, a
Fenelon, a Father Stanton. With the example of Jesus' ministry
before him, it is little short of amazing that any Christian
teacher should deprecate personal individual work, and ciy up
system.^
The Confirmation Roll at Marnhull numbered sixty-one boys and girls in
190li and sixty-three children in 1907. This experience in catechising the
young was very valuable to Figgis and played an important part in the re¬
turn which his years at Marnhull aaw from some form of philosophic ideal¬
ism to something resembling orthodox Christianity, from a kind of personal
mysticism to an allegiance to the Christ who invaded and who continues to
invade history.
Teaching children in the country taught me much: I learnt then
how impossible it is to identify Christianity with a mere philo¬
sophic idealism; and the facts of the Gospel and its dogmas (pro¬
vided simple words are used) are quite natural to the young.
Dogma, it is said, should not be taught to children; but it would
be truer to say that it is the only thing you can teach them.2
Figgis's years at Marnhull, for all of his attention to his parish,
were years of considerable intellectual activity. There he wrote his im¬
portant article for the third volume of the Cambridge Modern History, re¬
vamped his Birbeck Lectures, From Gerson to Grotius, and prepared them for
publication, worked with R. V. Lawrence on the extensive task of editing
Acton's writings, wrote his little volume, Christianity and History, and
withal, had time to coach various students who came to study under him
from time to time, and to give special lectures in Marnhull, Pakestone,
Gittingham, and Dorchester, the proceeds from which he contributed to the
1. Figgis, Some Defects in English Religion, p. 89.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, pp. 167-168.
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fund for the repair of the church tower.
MaraboH's fine early-English church with its Norman features was
often the recipient of gifts purchased from Figgis's own pocket, including
several pairs of candlesticks, alms bags, an altar cross, a brass lecturn,
and a small oak prayer desk for Hussey Chapel."'"
In spite of the fact that Figgis had learned much and matured
greatly at Marnhull, his association there was not an altogether happy
one. Among other things, he was sensitive to the feeling that some of his
2
people did not approve of his being unmarried.
Figgis's parishioners were both charming and dull—charming as
offering a man who had lived too much of his life in an academic world the
friendship of refreshingly simple people, tiresome or dull for being com¬
pletely ignorant of the things which this brillaint mind and conversation¬
alist knew best. The "Vestry Meeting Records" of the Marnhull church for
April I4., 1907, suggest something of the charm and the lack of an innate
1. Figgis was famous for his generosity, but he was not always as dis¬
creet in his giving as in his gifts to the church. He once brought toy
soldiers home from Europe for the gardener's daughter} and on a similar oc¬
casion he purchased a gift for Conway's child, for whom he had stood up as
godfather. The gift was a sharp, two-edged dagger with a point like a
needle. Figgis described it as a "nice present for a little boy which I
■\ picked up at a village fair in Germany." To add to the incongruity of it
all, Conwayfe child, like the gardener's, was a girl.
2. As far as it is known Figgis never seriously contemplated marriage.
One gathers that he did not especially approve of matrimony for clerics:
"Social complacency is the worst of all qualities in our Church. A quarter
of our ineffectiveness comes from this irritating vice among the clergy, and
a full half from it in their wives, I do not believe we shall ever get out
of it until the marriage of priests becomes the exception instead of the
rule." Figgis, Some Defects in English Religion, p. It7-
(21)
sense of propriety on the part of the people whom Figgis served these
five years:
Mr. Kenard then said a few words regretting the loss the Parish
was sustaining in the departure of the Rector. The Rector briefly
replied and stated that he was only taking the step because he
believed that it was a clear duty and because he believed at this
moment the Church of England needed this kind of service. He had
learned much in Marnhull, especially his own shortcomings. Mr.
Alfred Drew, the sexton, then asked that fresh cord might be sup¬
plied for the bell rope: — the meeting then adjourned.
The "clear duty" to which Figgis felt a call at this time was to
the Religious Life, the life of a monk. It was not so much that he had
grown tired of the church at Marnhull as his concern for what he believed
to be civilization's progress down the road towards destruction, his alarm
at man's worship of the things which cannot endure, his turning against
the slackness of his own intellectual Liberalism, and his revulsion at his
laxness as a person which provided an irrestible pull in the direction of
the more austere, disciplined life of a Member of the Community of the
Resurrection at Mirfield.
The Community of the Resurrection came into being in 1892, when
its founder and first Superior, Charles Core, and five other men made their
profession in the Chapel of Pusey House at Oxford. After some moving about,
all the members moved to a home in Mirfield, which became the Mother House
of the Community. Walter Frere (afterwards Bishop of Truro) succeeded
Gore as Superior in 1902.
Figgis joined the Community over the objections of his father,
but through much correspondence on the subject, they came to an understand¬
ing. The father wrote to the son:
(22)
It was good of you to spend all this time for making things
clear to me. Now we will say no more about these subjects
which divide, but about the many and far greater subjects
which unite us I think your idea of poverty beautiful
and your self-sacrifice in embracing it wonderful.
Describing the incidents surrounding the arrival and the early
impressions made by Figgis in Mirfield, a fellow member of the Community
wrote at the time of Figgis's death:
Such power to learn and grow only comes with humility; and in¬
deed under the little childlike and almost attractive vanity
that played upon the surface, there was in him a deep and rev¬
erent humility. Coming to the Community as a marked character,
forceful, explosive, eccentric, but eminently human and lovable,
he set himself with amazing simplicity to learn the ways of life
which he had come to try. The legend may or may not be true that
he first appeared in a silk hat, but had it removed from him in
the ball, and a biretta substituted by an eagle-eyed brother, who
had observed his arrival from an upper window, and descended in
shocked haste to save the situation, but in any case, it is a
true parable of the spirit of the newcomer.2
Figgis did enter wholeheartedly into his new way of life, a way of life
not intuitively attractive to a man who had a well-cultivated taste for
the niceties and luxuries of life.^ He,like the others, rose at 6:15 and
saw the first light of new day on Winter mornings through the windows of
the Community Church (not completed until well after his arrival), during
Mattins and Prime.^ Figgis, like the others, helped to clean the sanc-
1. Westbuiy-Jones, o£. cit., p. 235*
2. The Quarterly Chronicle of the Community of the Resurrection,
(St. John Baptist Day, 1919), PP* 1-2.
3. He once said while conducting a retreat at Mirfield, a work which
he often did, "The man who says he does not enjoy a good dinner is either
a liar or a fool."
ll. He sometimes resented the frequent interruptions of his studies
caused by required attendance at the canonical hours, which, during week
days, included: Mattins and Prime, 6-50; Holy Communion, 7-15 J Terce,
9-0; Sext, 1-0; None, U-30; Evensong, 7-0; Compline, 9-b5«
(23)
tuary of the Community Church on Friday afternoons and was responsible for
tending his own fire, which included carrying coals up the often-counted
thirty-seven steps to his little room in the House of the Resurrection.
It was to this drafty retreat three flights up that probationers
(later called novices) assigned to his care and students for the ministry
from the adjoining College of the Resurrection would come four or five at
a time to draw in close around a roaring fire and to learn much in an in¬
formal way from a man who was tremendously interested in encouraging every
sincere interest, every sign of ability which his discerning eye could de¬
tect in young men.
Every alternate year Figgis gave a course in apologetics at the
College. In his relations with the College the events of one evening are
especially remembered by those who were there at the time.
No one who heard it will ever forget the lecture on "G. K. Chester¬
ton." He brought down to the College a huge black leather bag,
almost shapeless, and proceeded to extract from it probably every
published work of Chesterton's. A large paper slip marked the
place where a desired quotation was to be found. The arrangement
of the books on his table was a fascinating prelude to the lecture.
He was just going to begin when a second round of applause broke
out. There he stood, his head on one side, stroking his hair with
that palm of strange convexity, blushing slightly, and obviously
pleased. He rejoiced in the favour of youth. And then the lecture,
making it impossible for any self-respecting person who heard it,
ever to pass a cheap or superficial criticism of Chesterton again.
He made us want to read: he kindled the fire while he talked and
at the end he broke every rule the library ever had, lending the
books upon the spot without any account taken of the borrower or
any pledge that they would be returned. It was one of his greatest
nights at the College.
These years at the Community were years of great literary pro-
1. B. Horner, The Quarterly Chronicle of the Community of the Resurrec¬
tion, (St. John Baptist Day, 1919)} pp. 7-8.
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ductivity. During this time Figgis wrote for no less than seven lecture-
, tVl\ til*
ships/' wkieh writings shall be the subject of much that is to be considered
**s<re A.e[!a5 /ectn^<s
in the pages ahead, and which lectureships ho doliverod in such centres as
Cambridge, Oxford, and Gloucester (to the clergy), and in the United States,
at Harvard, General Theological Seminary in New Xork, and Lake Forest Col¬
lege in Illinois. While at the Community he also wrote many articles and
reviexjrs for the "Guardian" "English Historical Review," and other religious
and historical journals. He also wrote and delivered many sermons while
at Mirfield. He was not an uncommon figure in various London pulpits and
in churches throughout the country. A number of cloth and paper-bound
collections of his sermons indicate the considerable extent of his preach¬
ing activity. Longmans, Green and Co. was always ready to print his ser¬
mons. They would take them down as he preached them, give him a copy to
check, and then, with his approval, would proceed to print them. It was
said of his preaching ability in the "Guardian" following his death:
Dr. Figgis was an attractive preacher; his graceful style, his
gift of epigram, his devotion, combined with his remarkable in¬
tellectual power would fill the University Churches at Oxford
and Cambridge when he preached in them.l
Figgis's pulpit efforts have been described as falling somewhere
between the formal theologizing tf Gore and the arresting, lively method
of Chesterton. His preaching manifested his xri.de acquaintance with modern
literature. His sermons cannot be described as "exegetical" in the ac¬
cepted sense of the terra. They show the influence of Creighton, who is
said to have advised that a sermon should be written on a subject and the
1. "John Neville Figgis, In Memoriam," Guardian, (April 2h, 1919).
(25)
text chosen after its completion! Wherein Figgis' sermons were exegeti-
cal, they were exegetical of his own vital religious experience. He has
been recognized as something of a master of the "teaching-sermon." He did
not have a commanding voice but was able to get his message across and to
hold his audience. He struck something of a comic pose in the pulpit with
his finger to his head, pincer glasses at an angle, reading from his notes,
throwing out flashes of wit ana sober instruction.
Figgis had been too long at Cambridge ever to lose touch with
its life. In 1906 he came up from iiarnhull to act as a Lightfoot Scholar¬
ship examiner, and in 1909 he came down from Mirfield and examined for the
historical tripos. As already noted, he was Hulsean Lecturer at Cambridge
for 1908-1909, and by his performance in delivering these lectures it is
safe to say that he won his recognition as an important religious figure.
Also in 1908, he was awarded his Litt. D., and in 1909, he was made an
Honorary Fellow by Saint Catherine's College."'" Figgis was much sought after
during his Mirfield days by the Cambridge Church Society to preach for Sun¬
day evening services at Great Saint Mary's. Still another side of his
Cambridge activities in these later years was his work with the Oratory of
the Good Shepherd, consisting of a group of young Cambridge men who ob¬
served a rule of life while carrying on their regular activities. During
vacation the men would come to live together and Figgis would stay with
them. He was their first Director, and during these vacation periods he
1. The only degree Figgis had, insofar as the records show, which he
did not receive from Cambridge was the D.D. degree which the University of
Glasgow conferred on him in 1913.
(26)
guided their life together.
The Community of the Resurrection's most colourful and perhaps
most widely known figure would return from his many scenes of activity to
describe to his fellows with a childlike delight the brilliantcolours of
the hoods in the academic processions attending the receiving of his most
recent degree, or if he had prepared a lecture for some learned society,
he was always ready to repeat it to a small audience in the Common Room
of the Community House, and that "with all the keeness with which it had
been delivered elsewhere." Likewise, if he was to preach in the Community
Church or in the Quary,^" he took as much pains with the sermon as if it
A
o
had been for a University congregation."
One might think that these rich years as a member of the Community
and as a much read and much sought after spokesman of sound religious thought
might have been relatively free from that element of religious struggle
which characterized so much of his experience heretofore. But they were
not. While a member of the Community, he once said to Keble Talbot, "I
pray that a year from now I shall still have my faith." Talbot later wrote
of him:
One might say that like Newman, to whose spirit in many ways his
was so akin, he had "a skin too few" to protect him from the smart
which life could inflict on him. But his sensitiveness was the
condition of his most piercing insight, and of the sympathy with
which he could understand and help many whom a tougher nature
could not touch.3
1. An actual stone quary on the grounds of the Community used as an
amphitheater for out-door services and functions.
2. Horner, o£. cit.,
3. Talbot, "The Coirmiunity 1892-I9lt2," p. 16.
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Following closely after an operation on his knee late in 1917,
Figgis sailed in late January, 1918, for a number of preaching engage¬
ments in America. But on Sunday morning, June 27th, the Cunard liner,
"Andania," on which he was one of some forty passengers, was struck by a
torpedo off the Ulster Coast. Figgis spent some hours in an open boat,
but was picked up and put to shore in an Antrim coast town by late the
same afternoon. Before the day was out the message arrived at the Com¬
munity, "Saved—probably home tomorrow—Neville." Saved, yes, but the in¬
cident was not without its ill effects. The torpedoing became something
of an obsession with him and contributed significantly to the mental de¬
cline which had begun to set in even before he had started for America,
for the last time. Figgis's brother placed him in Holloway Sanitorium,
Virginia Water, where he showed some signs of improvement. The prospects
of his imminent return to the Community seemed good, but then he collapsed
quite suddenly on Palm Sunday, 1919. His body was brought to Mirfield and
following suitable services was buried in the Community of the Resurrection






Words which Figgis wrote in 1916 provide the best commentaiy on
what this unusual man of great talents, great devotion, and great capacity
for friendship went through during the last stage of his life on earth:
It is only as we are willing to suffer the Cross as a means of
(28)
realizing our Love of God, that there is any hope for us to
attain that union which is its end. We cannot have it at any-
cheaper rate. All who have knowledge of the mystical way tell
us this, that the soul must pass through its dark night before
she reaches her divine bridal; that rift of friends, help,
comfort, even interior peace, she must realize herself in ut¬
ter loneliness, and then and then only, goes on to her'Divine
and ineffable union."1
1. Figgis, Love of God, p. 32.
(29)
CHAPTER II
FIGGIS AS A POLITICAL THINKER
"A Plea for the Group Person"
Before Figgis won recognition as a theologian, he was known as
a historian of political thought. So it was that Raby, one of the first
in more recent years to point to Figgis's contribution to religious
thought, in recalling Figgis's presentation of The Gospel and Human Needs
at Cambridge in the form of the Hulsean Lectures, began by saying:
The present writer is certainly not the only one of those under¬
graduates of 1908 on whom the sight of the author of The Divine
Right of Kings and From Gerson to Grotius made a lasting impre-
sion.3-
The books mentioned are the two from the hand of the master
turned monk which he had written while at Cambridge. They had earned him
his reputation as a student and a discerning historian of political
thought of a time which, in regard to its political significance, had
often been misunderstood. It was the author of these two books whose
religious views the Cambridge faculty and student body gathered in the
University Church to hear.
But they came not only to hear a historian of political thought
turned theologian. They came to hear a man who had a reputation as a po¬
litical thinker in his own right, a man concerned with the political issues
of his own day, and a man concerned with the history of political issues as
1. F. J. E. Raby, "John Neville Figgis, Prophet," Theology, XL,
(191*0), p. 32*.
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it had meaning for the present and for the future. In his introductory-
chapter of From Gerson to Grotius, Figgis makes it clear to the reader from
the very outset that as a political historian he is not so much concerned
with the past as such as with the past as it relates to modern problems.
He writes:
It is not to revive the corpse of past erudition that I have any
desire, but rather to make more vivid the life of to-day, and to
help us to envisage its problems with a more accurate perspective.
A comment by Lord Acton, one of Figgis's teachers, on the occasion of Acton's
becoming Regius Professor of Modern History at Cambridge, reveals xfhat was
also Figgis's presupposition as he poured over -thaasando of original texts
having to do mainly with the intricacies of political developments in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries:
The science of politics is the one science that is deposited by
the stream of history, like grains of gold in the sand of a river;
and the knowledge of the past, the record of truths revealed by
experience, is eminently practical as an instrument of action and
power that goes to the making of the future.2
1. J. N. Figgis, Studies of Political Thought from Gerson to Grotius,
(2nd ed.; Cambridge, University Press, 1916), pp. 2-3.
2. J. E. Acton, Lectures on Modern History, ed. by J. N. Figgis and
R. V. Lawrence (London, MacMillan, 1933)? p. 28. The first edition is
dated 1906. This work is the first in a series of four books representing
the major writings of Acton as edited by Figgis and R. V. Lawrence. The
others were: Historical Essays and Studies (London, MacMillan, 1908), The
History of Freedom and Other assays, (London, MacMillan, 1909), Lectures
on the French Revolution (London, MacMillan, 1910), With the completion of
these four major efforts to preserve the important works of a man whom Figgis
described as "never producing any one work to which his admirers could
point", this Letter-to-the-Editor by Acton's son appeared in "The Times" on
November 8, 1910, on page 11+: "Sir, The publication by Messrs. MacMillan
of my father's collected writings in four volumes being now complete with
the issues of his Lectures on the French Revolution, I wish to express my
heartfelt gratitude to the editors, Dr. Figgis, and Mr. R. V. Lawrence, for
having undertaken and successfully concluded their editorial labours. Eight
(31)
Knowing that Figgis was something of a political theorist as well
as a historian of political thought and realizing that the historian almost
invariably leaves the imprint of his own thought upon the object of his his¬
torical inquiry, one is not surprised to find in all of Figgis's historical
works abundant evidence of his own political views. His works bear out the
truth of another statement made by Lord Acton, which appeared later in the
same inaugural lecture:
Whatever a man's notions of these later (the last four) centuries
are, the man himself will be. Under the name of history, they cover
the articles of his philosophy, his religion, and his political
creed.-'-
The fact that Figgis's reputation as a historian of political
thought with a mind of his own in matters political served as an introduc¬
tion to Figgis the theologian, the fact that his political thought was in
years ago Mr. Lawrence generously offered to devote his leisure to this task
of seeing the books through the press, and he was subsequently assisted by
Dr. Figgis, who accepted the work of collaboration in the same unselfish
spirit and became principal editor. The undertaking was no easy one; for
besides the selection, from a large number of essays, of the most suitable
for publication in a permanent form, and the task of bringing them up to
date, it was necessary, in the case of the French Revolution lectures, to
evolve a homogeneous text from two different manuscripts, portions of which
were fragmentary only. The result achieved is the more remarkable if it be
remembered that, from the nature of the case, the editors were only able to
treat the work as a second charge on their literary time. I venture to hope
that they will recognize in the tribute they have paid to the memory of the
Professor whose favoured disciples they were, a partial reward, at any rate,
for their labour of love. Your obedient servant, 'Acton'. British Legation,
The Hague, November U-" Figgis and Lawrence also undertook to organize Ac¬
ton's letters for publication. Th^y appeared in 1917 under the title: Se¬
lections from the Correspondence of Acton (London, Longmans, Green and Co.,
1917). Ihs significant role thatTiggis played in the editing of Acton's
political works and correspondence constitutes a significant part of his
contribution as a political thinker and a historian.
1. Ibid.
^ ' f k<_ fd ysv. 0.—.1C c
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no small measure determining of his thought regarding the relations of
church and state, that for which he is perhaps most widely known in re¬
ligious as well as political circles, plus the fact that his political
thought had a strong influence on a subject as essentially theological as
the problem of authority within the church, makes it imperative that any
estimate of The Contribution of John Neville Figgis to the Religious Thought
of His Period dwell at some length upon the subject of "Figgis as a Politi¬
cal Thinker."
The object of this chapter will be to present an overall view of
Figgis as a political thinker. It will begin with a basic statement of the
thought which captured his Imagination as a political thinker and to which
he gave his allegiance from approximately the turn of the century until his
death in 1919. This done, the progress of Figgis's political thought as set
in the context of his political-historical studies will be traced. Follow¬
ing this, the final stage of his political theorizing will be studied in the
context of his views about the relations of church and state. We shall see
that his theories about the relations betireen the body ecclesiastical and tie
body politic are germane to much intelligent thinking on the subject in our
own day. The last part of this chapter will deal with the bearing of Figgis's
political thought upon his convictions regarding the problem of authority
within the church, with special reference to the Church of England.
A sentence from A. R. Vidler's book dealing with the subject of
church and state serves to introduce Figgis as a spokesman of that political
thought "which captured his imagination as a political thinker and to which
he gave his allegiance from approximately the turn of the century until his
(33)
death in 1919."
Gierke in Germany urged that recognition of the fact of "group
personality" marks a great advance in sociological understanding;
Haitiand, and especially Figgis, have given the conception a cer¬
tain vogue in Ehgland.^-
Gierke, a German jurist born in l8ifL, was an outstanding spokes¬
man of the School of Historic Law which arose in Germany at the end of the
eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nineteenth century as a
strong manifestation in the field of law of the Romantic Movement. It
numbered among its earlier proclaimants men like Herder, Justus, Moser,
Hugo, Fichte, Niebuhr, Eichorn, and Savigny. The School taught that law
is the historic product of the "people's mind":
Law, on this view is essentially "Volksrecht": it is the product,
in each nation, of the national genius.2
In its negative emphasis, the School waged war against the foreign non-
indigenous influences in Germany's national life and in particular against
the reception of Roman Civil Law in Germany, which occurred about 1000 A.D.,
concurrently with the Rennaisance and Reformation, and which had had, ac¬
cording to Gierke and his followers, a stranglehold on German legal thought
for the three centuries which ensued. The movement strove to rediscover
that which had been the genius of German life and legality before it had
largely succumbed to the heavy hand of Roman law.
The major fault the School of Historic Law found with the influ-
1. A. R. Vidler, The Orb and the Cross, A Normative Study in the dela¬
tions of Church and State with Reference to Gladstone's Early Writings,
(London, Society for Promoting Christian ImowIeHge7-T9lI$77~PP• 56-57-
2. Otto Gierke, Natural Law and the Theory of Society, trans. by-
Ernest Barker (Cambridge, University Press, 193U), p. 1 (roman numeral).
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ence of Roman law on German life was that it bore the stamp of the
...unassociative habit of the Latin...absolutistic in its con¬
ception of the State; individualistic in its treatment of the
members of the State.-*-
Absolutism and atomism as enshrined in Roman law tended to overlook and to
militate against the liberty of associations within a given society, allow¬
ing them to exist only by the fiat of the state and permitting them to have
no inherent rights of their own. The representatives of the new school of
law asserted that more realistic Teutonic conceptions were waiting to be
rediscovered in existing law which was seen to be an amalgam of Roman and
Teutonic elements and more particularly in what had been the genius of Ger¬
man community life before the reception.
The genius of Teutonic social life was seen by Gierke and others
to be:
...the "Genossensehaft," the company of brothers, linked by the
right hand of fellowship, and knit together by a spirit of
fraternity, who pursued the common interest of their group
(whether based on profession, or occupation, or the simple foun¬
dation of voluntary association), and vindicated its common
honour with a common ardour. The further you went back, the
deeper seemed the idea and the closer the cohesion of this
"Genossenschaft," or (as we may call it in a word which carries
the same medieval flavour) this system of Fellowship. It runs
back to early tribalism; it has the very savour and warm inti¬
macy of the tribe...2 The fellowship...did it not deserve a
legal redognition of its true nature, which might be found by
a return to the past and a study of old Teutonic law? To lift
the disguising veil of imperial Rome, and to find, in an inner
shrine, the figures of truth—old German truth, and comradeship,
and attendant honour—this became a sacred duty of the new
philosophy. In the cause of liberty of association, there must
be a return to the past; ancient realities must again be revealed:
1. Ibid., p. lix.
2. Ibid., p. lviii.
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the being, the mind, the person of the group—the local commun¬
ity, the fellowship—must be awakened from their long slumber.
Thus it was under the heading of "Genossenschaftsrecht" that the
liberty of association was rediscovered and made explicit in Germany and
presented as a guide to the future thinking of legal minds. The work was
accomplished in large part by Gierke, whose influential four-volume work
is entitled, Das Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht.
Gierke championed Das Genossenschaftsrecht as recognizing the
real personality of associations of people united in the pursuit of some
common good. Associations of human beings are declared to be persons in
much the same sense that an individual is a person. Gierke and his dis¬
ciples disavow the Fiction theory, which contends that when a group acts
as a single person and avails itself of the rights of a single person^it
is only a "persona ficta," — a fictitious person created by the state for
the sake of legal convenience.
Behind the legal Group-person there is therefore a real Group-
1. Ibid., pp. lix-lx. It should be observed that Soman law had so
long been a part of Germany's history that certain members of the Historical
School, like Savigny, pled for its preservation in Germany's legal code as
part of the national genius. As Maitland wrote: "...it is true that in
the Historical School there were those who were historically minded Roman¬
ists who thought it their duty to take the 'Corpus Juris' very seriously
and to withdraw concessions that had been made to German influence some
will say to natural life and modern fact; others will say to slovenly
thought and slipshod practice. The end result of the efforts of the His¬
torical School as embodied in Germany's new civil code of 1896 indicated
that both Roman and German influences remained, neither to the exclusion
of the otherj however, Gierke's efforts were all in the direction of turn¬
ing the balance on the side of Germanism." 0. Gierke, Political Theories
of the Middle Ages, trans, by F. W. Maitland (5th ed.; Cambridge, The Uni-
versity Press, 1938), Introduction p. xiv.
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being, just as there is a real individual human being behind the
individual legal person. Legal group-personality is the shadow
cast by real group-personality: it is the reflection of reality
in the mirror of the law.l
Maitland, the Cambridge historian and the translator of Gierke,
presented to English minds the broad scope of Gierke's thought in his in¬
troduction to his translation of a chapter section of Das Deutsche Gen-
nossenschaftsrecht entitled, "Staats und Korporationslehre." Conscious
that English law had also, in some measure at least, been influenced by the
absolutism and atomism of Soman law, Maitland wrote:
However be it noted that even in England a certain amount of
foreign theory was received and by far the most remarkable in¬
stance is the reception of that Italian theory of the corpora¬
tion of which Dr. Gierke is the historian and which centres
around the phrase "persona ficta."2
Maitland further indicates, however, that England, under the
guise of trusts, had recognized in fact what she had not recognized in
theory: the "Genossenschaftsrecht," the right of fellowship, the right of
the association to act as a person.
For the last four centuries Englishmen have been able to say,
"Allow us our Trusts, and the law and theory of incorporations
may indeed be important, but it will not prevent us from joining
and maintaining permanent groups of the most various kinds:
groups that, behind a screen of trustees, will live happily
enough, even from century to century, glorying in their unin-
corporatedness...If Pope Innocent and Roman forces guard the
front stairs, we shall walk up the back.3
Thus indicating that Trusts are overworked, he says:
It seems possible that some new thoughts or some renovation of
1. Barker, o£. ext., p. lxvii.
2. Maitland, o£. cit., p. xiv.
3. Ibid., p. xxix.
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old thoughts about the personality of the organized group might
show us straighter ways to desirable and even necessary ends.l
This plea is much less impassioned than Figgis's plea for a more
logical approach to group life; for while Maitland was more or less quietly
confident that the swan song of the Concession theory had been played and
that the Trusts would carry the burden until everyone realized it, Figgis
saw the Fiction and Concession theories as the instruments of great in¬
justice, requiring instant condemnation and the working out of a theory
which would fit the facts of group life and be a guide to lawmakers.
To discover the basic affinity of Figgis's thought with that of
Gierke and Maitland, the student might turn to any one of fifty references
in Figgis's historical as well as his articles and more popular works,
A
which give expression to his political thought. One such quotation is
found in that article about the Cambridge scholars who had a lasting im¬
pression on his life, "Three Cambridge Historians: Creighton, Maitland,
and Acton," which he contributed to the "Guardian" in the year 1907. In
the section in which he describes Maitland and confesses his indebtedness
to him, he writes:
That book, the Deutsche Genossenschaftsrecht. he once declared to
me to be the greatest book he had ever read; and it is possibly
through Gierke's influence more than any other, that Maitland
came to demolish—no weaker term can be used—the old conception
of the position of corporate bodies in the State. That conception
makes all clubs, associations, communities, religious, political,
or economic, the mere creatures of the omnicompetent modern State
(which inherits its claims from Imperial Rome), with no right to
exist, except on concession, express or implied, and no powers of
1. Ibid., p. xxxv.
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action beyond, what the State (in theoiy) delegates to them. This
theory (which if it does not depend on, at least is connected with
the canonist doctrine of Innocent IV, that the corporation is a
"persona ficta") it has been the work of the German school of
"realists" to overthrow. Gierke, and men like him, looking back
from Roman to Teutonic origins, and looking out into the facts of
the world to-day, have seen the absurd chaos into which this theory
would land us, and its utter falsity to life as actually lived,
for it makes the world consist of a mass of self-existing individ¬
uals on the one hand and an absolute State on the other; whereas
it is perfectly plain to anybody who truly sees the world that the
real world is composed of several communities, large and small,
and that a community is something more than the sum of the per¬
sons composing it—in other words, it has a real personality, not
a fictitious one.^
If Maitland looked upon Das Deutsche Genossensehaftsrecht as the
"greatest book he ever read," Figgis looked upon Maitland's contribution
in presenting Gierke1s theories to English minds as one of the most im¬
portant contributions of modern times to English thought on matters per-
O
taining to the philosophy of law.
Something of the basic nature of that movement in legal philoso¬
phy, commonly recognized as the one which, at its core, contends for the
recognition of the "real personality" of groups making up society, has
been here given with a mind to presenting the important common demoninator
of the political thinking of Gierke, Maitland, and Figgis. It must be added,
however, that just as Figgis was identified with and yet not completely of
the "Dux Mundi" school of the English church, so he had an identity of his
1. J. N. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, (2nd ea.; London, Long¬
mans, Green and Co., 1911;), Appendix II, pp. 2l;9-250.
2. The last footnote of Maitland's, "Translator's Introduction," in¬
dicates how familiar Figgis was with Maitland's work; "I owe my thanks
for many valuable suggestions to Mr. J. N. Figgis whose essays on The
Divine Right of Kings (1896) and 'Politics at the Council of Constance'
will be known to students." Maitland, o£. cit., p. xlv.
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own in the school which struggled for the recognition of the freedom and
the personality of associations. His own specific emphasis will be con¬
sidered later in this chapter.
It should not be supposed that Neville Figgis was always the
advocate in political thought of the same line of political thinking
which made Gierke and Maitland famous. His political convictions were
not static. Perhaps it would seem out of character if the man who be¬
lieved so strongly in the theory of development, who evidenced very real
stages of development in his religious life, had not also evidenced a
definite progress and change in his political outlook. Figgis as a his¬
torian of the political thought of the years preceding and following the
Reformation had a talent for dealing with revolutionary happenings against
the backdrop of a certain continuous and more or less orderly development.
The student discovers in Figgis's political thought a similar history of
revolution and evolution.
What was the revolution in Figgis's political thought? In brief,
it was a shift in discipleship from Austin to Gierke. It was a complete
about-face from a belief that "there must be an ultimate superior, a
sovereign in every individual political society, and that positive law
must be viewed as derived from the will of that sovereign," to the con¬
viction that the question of sovereignty in any given society is of little
consequence as compared with the importance of the recognition and well-
being of the group persons within that political society. A certain shift
in his thinking as to what should be considered to be the most important
political-historical developments, contrasting comments in his historical
(Uo)
works, and direct explanatory remarks dealing with his shift in sympathy
all point to the revolution in Figgis's thought.
Figgis said something of the historical interests of his much-
learned teacher, Mandell Creighton, that he might well have said of him¬
self:
It is the theatre of European statecraft at the period of transi¬
tion from the dream of mediaeval unity to the reality of modern
nationalism that Creighton loved to gaze upon, and so to raise his
readers above the narrow and insular view of history which is
characteristic of so many Englishmen.
The scope of Figgis's second major historical work, From Person
to Grotius, might well be defined by what he pointed out to be Creighton's
main sphere of interest. His first historical work, The Divine Right of
Kings, although chiefly concerned with the development in England of that
political theory named in the work's title, was also concerned with the
"period of transition from the dream of mediaeval unity to the reality of
modern nations."
In choosing first to present a thorough study of The Divine
Right of Kings, the political theory which was ascendant in England dur¬
ing a large part of the period of his and his teacher's special political-
historical interests, Figgis chose the political theory which, to his
mind, was, in the day of its supremacy, the embodiment of the sanest of
political viewpoints—that which recognizes a sovereign power, some one
authority, whose acts are subject to no legal criticism. Indicative of
the importance which he ascribed to the theory, he writes:
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, p. 2i;2.
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...the history of the doctrine serves to bridge the gulf between
mediaeval and modern thought.-*•
Although Figgis never minimized the political-historical im¬
portance of the doctrine of Divine Right, in his later works a shift is
detected in his estimate of the most important political-historical de¬
velopment during this great period of transition. In From Gerson to
Grotius he points to the Conciliar Movement, that fifteenth century ef¬
fort to establish limited sovereignty and to realize a "communitas
communitatum" within the church, and says, indicating a shift in his
thinking as to what must be considered as the most important political-
historical development:
The Conciliar movement forms the watershed between the mediaeval
and the modern world.
That there was a revolution in Figgis's thought is somewhat more
conclusively shown when one reads from the first edition of The Divine
Right of Kings, which appeared in I896:
The State is sovereign. It may legally do what it pleases.
No coequal jurisdiction exists.
and then reads from his article, "Respublica Christiana," which appeared
in the "Transactions of the Royal Historical Society" in 1911:
The theory of sovereignty whether proclaimed by John Austin or
Justinian, or shouted in conflict by Pope Innocent or Thomas
Hobbes, is in reality no more than a venerable superstition.-^
As if the above were not evidence enough of revolution in a man's
1. J. N. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, (2nd ed.; Cambridge, Uni¬
versity Press, 19lli), pp. 15-16.
2. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, op. cit., p. 31.
3. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, Appendix I, p. 22k.
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thinking, there are Figgis's own words on the subject in Churches in the
Modern State;
I have come to different notions about the juristic nature of
the state, the church, and the individual from those which at
one time seemed so clear
and from the preface to the second edition of The Divine Right of Kings,
which was published in 1911i:
On the theory of sovereignty and the relation of small groups to
the State, and the notion of "higher law" the opinions of the
author have undergone much change; nor has he all in vain heard
the wisdom of masters like Acton and liaitland or read the great
works of Gierke.^
But, as has already been indicated, there was evolution as well
as revolution in Figgis's political thought. The change did not come sud¬
denly. A comment in the preface to Churches in the Modern State offers a
valuable key to the stages in his thought which form the background of the
revolution.
The author has been led to his present views...by long brooding
over the Austinian doctrine and the perception forced on him at
last through Maitland and Gierke, that it is either fallacious or
so profoundly inadequate as to have no more than a verbal justifi¬
cation. One begins by thinking Austin self-evident, one learns
that many qualifications have to be made, and finally one ends by
treating his whole method as abstract and theoretic.3
First of all, attention will be given to Figgis's writings which
evidence the assumption that Austin^is"self-evident." A brief summary
statement of the ground covered in each book or article concerned will be
1. Ibid., p. xi.
2. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.; p. viii.
3. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, pp. ix-x.
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made so as to present the growth of Figgis's political thought in the con¬
text of his political-historical works.
The Divine Right of Kings was first written in 1892 in competi¬
tion for the Prince Consort Prize at Cambridge. It was expanded and re¬
written in the next four years and first published in 1896. The book rep¬
resents a plea for an understanding of the doctrine of the Divine Right
of Kings.
Before political life can free itself from what may be called
the theocratic stage, it must assert for itself a coequal right
to exist with theology. It must claim that politics have a proper
and necessary function to perform in the developement of the human
race, and that therefore their independent existence must be as
much a part of the Divine plan for mankind as is the science of
theology or the organization of the Church, ^hat the state is
the realization of a true idea, and has a necessary place in the
world, is the claim, which was explicitly or implicitly denied by
the Papalist, and only made good through the theory of Divine
RightA
Figgis took the much-ridiculed theory of Divine Right and con¬
tended forcefully that its great service was the assertion of the inde¬
pendent authority of secular governments, making Divine Right, in its
essential meaning, a doctrine of liberty, proclaiming the freedom of
political societies from subjection to an ecclesiastical organization.
He ushers the student through the important stages of the doctrine's
development: in its first and probably most important stages it was what
the above quotation has shown it to be, a doctrine of the right of secular
governments to be free from clerical interference. The seventeenth cen¬
tury saw the doctrine in its second stage:
1. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd. ed.; pp. 298-2^9.
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In the political conflicts of the seventeenth century, in which
religion played so large a part, the Divine Right of Kings had been
the form in which expression had been found for men's reverence for
tradition and for their instinctive sense that progress can never
come by trampling on old institutions. Thus the theory was the
bulwark of the restored monarchy, by rallying sentiment around the
King, as the ancient centre and symbol of national life. It had
preserved the continuity of the constitutional system, and was
probably a main cause of the tranquility, which marked the English
alone among the Revolutions of history.
Speaking of the doctrine's last stage, its romantic stage,
Figgis writes:
From 1688 the Stuart cause is the expression of the "Passion of
the past"; and the theory that supports it suffers a like change.
All men's hatred of what is new because it is new, their dislike
of conquering ideas because they are winning, their love of the
antique for no reason than that it is not modern, will draw- them
to the side of the "king over the water". The Divine Sight of
Kings has reached its last stage.^
Although Figgis makes it clear that the Theory of Divine Sight
had reached its last stage following the Sestoration, yet he points out
that the doctrine has had lasting and beneficial effects in moulding
English sentiment:
Again, if the theory be regarded on its purely political side,
the conceptions which it enshrined are become part of our common
heritage. To the sense of the organic character of the state and
of the duty of obedience are due the existence of "law abiding
citizens" today and that dislike of all violent breaks with the
past, which has ever been the peculiar glory of England...3
It was the believer in the lasting contribution of the Theory of
the Divine Sight of Kings^ to England's heritage who, as a young ordinand,
1. Ibid., p. 168.
2. Ibid., p. I67.
3. Ibid., pp. 263-26U.
U. In his estimate of the service performed by the theory of Divine
Sight in seventeenth century England, Figgis was criticised by one of his
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having returned to Cambridge from Wells Theological College and Kettering,
preached before the Mayor and Corporation of Cambridge at Great St. Mary's
on June 20, 1897, in recognition of the Golden Jubilee of Queen Victoria's
reign. His sermon began:
"A land of settled government,
"A land of just and old renown
"Where Freedom slowly broadens down
"From precedent to precedent."
And if the cause be partly in the English character, with its
hatred of extremes, its capacity for compromise, its sense of
justice, it is no less largely the character of her, who has
understood and accepted so faithfully the varying developments
of the national life, and has been in so true a sense the rep-
resentative of the English race and its manifold activities.^
The assumption that Austin is self-evident reoccurs throughout
the author's treatise on The Divine Right of Kings. In the first chapter
on "Early Ideas of Kingship" he comments:
If, then, it be borne in mind that no theory of sovereignty was
or could be held by Bracton, (because there was no developed
state), it will not be surprising to find him ascribing to the
king rights, which apparently amount to little less than com¬
plete sovereignty, while in set terms the king is declared to
be under the law. Many passages there are which to modern ears
sound inconsistent, such as the statement, that the king is under
no one but God, and yet is not above the law. Where then is the
source of law? Whence iS its sanction derived, if neither the
King nor any other person or body of persons are above it?^
reviewers: "And if we wish to know why the Divine Right Theory, after do¬
ing its work in bolstering up King against Pope, became so important in the
seventeenth century in England, it is in the facts of English history that
the explanation must be sought. If it was not a recrudescence of theoeracy,
in the interest of reactionary kings against Parliament and free institu¬
tions, then history will have to be rewritten." Review of "Theory of Di¬
vine Right of Kings," The Nation, LXIII, No. 1631.
1. J. N. Figgis, "Wisdom the Source of Rule", a sermon preached before
the Mayor and Corporation of Cambridge and the Church of St. Mary's the Great,
June 20, 1897. The original is found in Cambridge University Library.
2. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.; p. 32.
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In the chapter on "The Holy Roman Empire and the Papacy," the
reader discovers these words:
The ideal of the Empire, with Christ as its King and His two vice¬
gerents upon earth, was that of a theocracy. This is the explana¬
tion of the otherwise strange fact, that men should ever have be¬
lieved in so unworkable a theory, as that of two equal heads of
the State."*"
And in the chapter dealing with the French development of Divine Right as
well as theories of popular rights, he points to Languet, the writer of
Vindiciae contra Tyrannos, which contained the ideas that were at the bot¬
tom of all theories of popular rights until the eighteenth century, and
says:
The author shares with the great Whig philosopher the inability
to see that in any developed state there must exist some ultimate
supreme authority to whose action no legal limits can be affixed.2
Figgis's next significant work was entitled, "On Some Political
Theories of the Early Jesuits," and appeared in 1897, one year following
the printing of The Divine Right of Kings. The main purpose of the article
seems to be twofold: to present the political aspect of the rise of the
Jesuits in relation to similar schools of thought which both preceded and
followed the Counter Reformation and to show what was commendable about
the Jesuit position. In giving expression to the latter aim, he says in
the article:
The evil which Jesuits did has assuredly lived after them. I
have tied to bring to light something of the good which has too
long been interred in their bones.3
-*-• » P» 39-
2. Ibid., p. llU.
3. J. N. Figgis, "On Some Political Theories of the Early Jesuits,"
Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, XIC, (1897), Book 1, p. 112.
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Recognizing two main views of the state which men have entertained since
the time of Hildebrand, Figgis points to the Jesuits as supporters of the
one which recognizes "the need of remembering that the State was made for
man, not man for the °tate, and setting due limits to the action of the
latter," the other view being that which recognizes only "the omnimpotent
and transcendent worth of government."-^
By their fundamental determination to establish limits upon the
absolute sovereignty of the state, by their purely secular theory of the
civil state, fcy their conviction that the state should be limited in its
powers especially in religious matters, and by their admission that op¬
pressed people have the right to rebel, Figgis recognizes in the Jesuits
a certain affinity with the thinking of two men as widely separated in
history and thought as Hildebrand and J. S. Mill.
The more immediate predecessor in political thinkihg of the
Jesuit tendency to place limitations upon the sovereign state is seen by
Figgis to be the school of thought which found much of its origin and ex¬
cellence of expression in the Gonciliar Movement. Gerson and Zabarella,
leaders in the Gonciliar Movement, insisted that the church is not an ab¬
solute monarchy, that general councils are superior to the Pope and may
depose him, that a mixed government is the best. In time the Jesuit
thinkers substituted the xrord "church" for the word "state," the word
"king" for the xrord "Pope," and proceeded to use that which had been un¬
successful in compromising the "plenetudo potestates" of the Pope to break
1. Ibid., p. 90.
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the backs of the sovereign rulers of the national units which had made the
Holy Roman Empire little more than a fiction.
The developed theories of the Jesuits are also shown to have
been a conspicuous link with later important developments in political
thought:
With the Revolutionary Whigs, the connection of Jesuit doctrines
is direct and obvious. Their theory of natural rights, of an
original contract and of a utilitarian basis to the state, differs
but little from the Jesuit doctrine. Thence the transition is
easy to Bentham and the greatest happiness of the greatest number.
From him to his disciple, Mill, is but a step. So it may be that
between the mediaeval Papacy and the modem publicists there
exists a closer tie than is apparent.
What was chiefly commendable about the Jesuits, according to
Figgis, xiras their having taken an important step by insisting that the
civil state has no right to decide matters relating to faith at its own
pleasure.
By insisting on the necessary distinction between temporal and
spiritual affairs they performed no unimportant service to the
cause of truth...2
Although Figgis, in his discussion of the Jesuits, looks back
upon the doctrine of Divine Right and acknowledges that its danger lay in
the direction of Erastianism, the control of all interests, including re¬
ligious, in the interest of the state, yet he remains, in principle at
least, a disciple of Austin. This allegiance is especially evident as one
reads Figgis's criticism of Jesuit dependence on the idea of natural law:
The stress upon natural law made it possible to conceive of a
1. Ibid., p. 9h.
2. Ibid., p. 111.
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state of society in which contracts had binding force, although
positive law did not exist. This seems nonsense to us, as
Austin showed.1
Earlier in the same article he mentions Vasquez, the Jesuit apologist,
who makes natural law independent of God:
The occasion is curious. Natural law must be regarded as in¬
dependent of God the sovereign, as being the embodiment not of
caprice but of reason. It is thus used as a sort of fetter on
the divine action, in the same way that law conceived as tradi¬
tional is regarded as independent of any human sovereign. The
advocates of the common law of England in the seventeenth cen¬
tury, the believers in fundamental laws abroad, apparently had
a similar reluctance to face the idea of sovereignty.
As has been noted in his article, "On Some political Theories
of the Early Jesuits," Figgis shows the intimate connection of the Con-
ciliar Party, the Jesuits, and the Whigs, with an emphasis on the Jesuit
contribution. In his article on "Politics at the Council of Constance,"
he travels over much of the same ground only emphasizing in more detail
the specific contribution of the Conciliar Movement to political thought.
He held that the Council had a three-fold significance.
The principle of utility is exalted by the fathers to the level
of divine ordinance. The superiority of limited monarchy and in
the last resort of popular sovereignty, is affirmed, and pure
politics appear for the first time on the largest scale.3
Most political issues of the Middle Ages centred around the con¬
test between civil and the spiritual authority. It was only when this prob¬
lem was not central that an approach to political problems on a more or
less purely political basis became a possibility. The Council of Constance
1. Ibid., p. 106.
2. Ibid.,
3. J. N. Figgis, "Politics at the Council of Constance," Transactions
of the Royal Historical Society, XIII (read May 18, 1899), p. loS"^
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provided such a setting.
The contest between the authority, which was directly or indi¬
rectly from God, comes here in a different sphere, in fact, in¬
stead of being between civil and secular it is for the first time
between monarch and people. Divine Right is claimed for the
Council versus the Pope, before it was ever extensively claimed
for people versus king.-*-
The Conciliar Movement was in the direction of limited monarchy and ul¬
timately popular sovereignty in that:
It is the sovereignty of the Church as a whole that is ultimately
indefectable and inalienable. The Pope is the minister, the in¬
strument of the church, and his power in ordinary cases is, of
course, paramount. But the church is by no means a pure monarchy.
It is besides compounded of aristocracy as represented by the
College of Cardinals, and representative democracy as exhibited
in the Council.^
The principle of utility is exalted to the level of divine ordinance be¬
cause that which in the church is in order to expediency is considered to
be the same as that which is in order to salvation.
In times of crisis the law of conscience, expediency, utility,
salvation is the final arbiter.3
If the Pope were to interpret the command to Peter to "feed my sheep" as
the gift of an authority to starve them, then, according to Fathers at
Constance, he could be resisted on the ground of expediency. In this
connection, Figgis goes on to observe:
It is curious that about a century before Machiavelli was to win
for himself a "welt-historisch" reputation as the annihilator of
of the foundation of morality, the theologian reformers of Con¬
stance should have elevated the principle of utility into the
position of the highest religious importance, and made it part
1. Ibid., p. 110.
2. Ibid., p. 109.
3. Ibid., p. 112.
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of their political system."1'
Although in his article on the Council of Constance Figgis deals
with the event in political history which he later recognizes as contain¬
ing the important elements of his later political views, when he wrote ihis
article he was still the disciple of Austin. Admittedly, he makes no men¬
tion of the Austinian theme that law, to be valid, must have the sanction
of someone who is above the law; but on the whole subject of sovereignty,
he is still more Austinian than anything else. Although in favour of the
Conciliar Movement's emphasis that sovereignty lies with the church rather
than with the Pope, or, politically interpreted, with the state rather
than the king, Figgis makes no digression from the Austinian insistence
that the ultimate sovereignty must reside in the state. In his article
he passes over certain important aspects of the Conciliar Movement, in¬
cluding significantly enough its Gallicanism, i. e., its federalism,
which became central to his estimate of the Conciliar Movement's contri¬
bution to political thought in his later thinking. With nothing more than
a passing reference, he moves on to say:
But after all, these matters were subordinate. The vital question
was that as to the government of a unitary state.^
"Whatever may have been the chief concern of those gathered at Constance,
such at least was Figgis's chief concern at this stage of his political
thought. Commenting on the failure of the Conciliar Movement to curb the
"plenitudo potestatis" of the Popes, Figgis wrote:
1. Ibid.
2. Ibid., p. 108.
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Indeed, the attempts to stem the flowing tide of Papal autocracy
by damning it (with both spellings) by that amiable and not too
liberal sensualist, Felix V, was like trying to stop an express
train with a scarecrow.
In 1900 an article by Figgis appeared in the "Journal of Theo¬
logical Studies" entitled, "Erastus and Erastianism." The question it
asked: "How far was Erastus an Erastian?" After dealing with Erastus at
some length biographically, with special reference to the important years
spent at Heidelberg (1557-1576), Figgis returns to the central problem of
the Erastianism of Erastus. The contention of this article is that if
Erastianism, as commonly employed, is taken to represent the theory that
religion is the creature of the state, then Erastus was not an Erastian.
...Erastus did not write directly in support of the State, but
had the object of crying down excommunication.^
Excommunication, as it came to the fore in Heidelberg, under the aegis of
Calvinism, was repugnant to Erastus in both theory and practice. He at¬
tested that in a state in which only one religion was sanctioned (he never
suggested that more than one should be allowed) excommunication had a civic
aspect.
It is not calculated to advance a man's prospects in this life
to tell his neighbours that his prospects are unpleasant for
the next, if they believe you.3
"If they believe you" in the state sanctioning only one religion, the ef¬
fect is the defamation of character, a kind of coercion which legiti¬
mately lies with the state and not with the church whose function is that
1. Ibid., p. 105.
2. Figgis, The Divine Hight of Kings, 2nd ed.; "Erastus and Eras¬
tianism, " p. 319-
3. Ibid., pp. 326-327.
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of persuasion and not of government.
Erastus's great contribution, according to Figgis, was his ef¬
fective polemic against what, to,Figgis's mind, was the greatest danger
to popular liberty and civil power in the sixteenth century, the cleri¬
calism of the Calvinists:
...but for Erastus and his followers, .. there might have been—
there nearly was—an agelong enslavement of human thought and ac¬
tion to a system in some respects more narrow because more com¬
plete, less broadly human, less careful of culture and intellec¬
tual enlightenment, than was the system of the mediaeval world
taken at its worst.*-
The main consideration which Figgis singles out to show that
Erastus was not an Erastian in the commonly accepted sense of the term
is that according to Erastus the magistrate has no power to transgress the
Word of God. Being a magistrate in a state in which the ruler and the
ruled are of the same religion ana making his decisions in matters affect¬
ing things religious under the guidance of the church, the magistrate is
not in a position to be an Erastian in the sense that religion is the
creature of the State.
Referring to this article in the preface to the second edition
of The Divine flight of Kings, to which "Erastus and Erastianism" is an ap¬
pendix, Figgis confesses:
It shares with the main body of the book the defect of being
written beneath the shadow of the Austinian idol.^
The following quotation illustrates the fact:
It is the impossibility of two-co-equal jurisdictions in a State
1. Ibid., p. 3U2.
2. Figgis, The Divine flight of Kings, 2nd ed.; p. ix.
(5U)
which strikes Erastus. And this is obvious. One of them must
be final, so far as the State be united.
Speaking of the arrival of the day of toleration which Erastus had not
envisioned, Figgis says:
To employ a familiar method, toleration was the higher unity
in which were resolved the contrary, but complementary ideals
of secular authority and spiritual independence.^
Although it is a "higher unity" of which he speaks, unity of
whatever kind within the state is still championed by Figgis. The fore¬
going book, The Divine Right of Kings, 1896, and the foregoing articles,
"On Some Political Theories of the Early Jesuits," 1897, "Politics at the
Council of Constance," 1899> and "Erastus and Erastianism," 1900, were all
"written beneath the shadow of the Austinian idol" and belong primarily
to that period in his thought which he described by saying, "One begins
by thinking Austin self-evident."3 But Figgis had gone on to say, "one
learns that many qualifications have to be made.This middle stage in
his political thinking is less easy of definition. As late as 1900, with
the writing of "Erastus and Erastianism," he labels his work as being
"written under the shadow of the Austinian idol," and as soon after that
date as 1905 he identifies the article of his published in that year,
"Bartolus and the Development of European Political Ideas," with "present
views,"meaning views entertained in 1913 and therefore largely reflective
of that last stage in his thought which he labeled by saying, "one ends by
1. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.;"Erastus and Erastian¬
ism," pp. 333-33U.
2. Ibid., p. 3I4I.
3. Supra, pp. VA,
U. Ibid.'
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treating his (Austin's) whole method as abstract and theoretic.
The three main articles written by Figgis between 1900 and 1905
were 'William Warburton," 1901, "John Wyclife," 1902, and "Political
Thought in the Sixteenth Century," written about 190l|. The latter was
Figgis's contribution to the third volume of the great work edited by
Acton, The Cambridge Modern History, and, as its title indicates, was
entirely devoted to political thought; whereas the other two articles
were concerned with things political only in the context of an estimate
of the total contribution of the two men under consideration. In
"Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century," Figgis writes:
We may have our own opinion of the society which the cleri¬
calist desired to maintain. But it is not to be denied that
the fundamental principle of eccliesiastic protangonists, the
recognition of other societies beyond the State, so far from
being an unwarrantable encroachment of civil rights, is the
best preservative against the practical dangers which may,
and sometimes do, follow from an acceptance of the undiluted
conception of legal sovereignty...there are bonds of association
which do not spring from the fiat of positive law, and may not,
save in minor matters, be controlled by considerations of
political expediency, justified by an abstract theory of sov¬
ereignty. For the true conception of the State it is needed first
to realize the idea of sovereignty, and afterwards to realize
its practical limitations.
This is certainly in the spirit of that stage regarding his views on
Austinian sovereignty wherein "one learns that many qualifications have
to be made." This article, and the earlier articles on "William War-
burton" (1901) and "John Wyclife" (1902) are more to be identified with
Figgis's subsequent works and the views for which he is best known,
1. Ibid.
2. J. K. Figgis, "Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century,"
Cambridge Modern History, III.
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rather than with earlier views. In them we begin to hear of Professor
Maitland's work, about "Genossenschaftsrecht",and about the personality
of groups. It should be further noted that From Gerson to Grotius,
the book on political thought for which Figgis is perhaps best known,
first published in 1907, was initially presented in the form of The
Birbeck Lectures at Trinity College in 1900, only to be revised about
190ii in the direction of Figgis's later views on law and sovereignty.
The revision was much in keeping with the spirit contained in "Political
Thought in the Sixteenth Century" and only slightly more severe with the
Austinian point of view.
If the revolution in Figgis's political thought were to be pin
pointed, one would pick the year 1900, the year of the publication of
Maitland's work, but would be under compulsion to show two things: that
the revolution had been brooding for some years,and that Figgis relin¬
quished the old categories somewhat reluctantly even after the revolu¬
tion had taken place. As early as the article on the Jesuits, he had
realized that unlimited sovereignty must be qualified in matters of
faith and conscience:
The first step towards freedom of conscience is to take away
from the civil state that power which is backed up by physical
force, the right of deciding at its own pleasure what shall be
encouraged and what shall be suppressed. It is a real advance
when anybody possessing purely moral authority claims to de¬
cide these questions, to make its decisions binding on the
State. Now that was the action of the Jesuits. They did not
argue for toleration. Who did? But, like Knox and Goodman,
they demanded that the civil state should not touch matters of
faith apart from the spiritual power. They claimed freedom of
faith - true - it was freedom for one faith only - but that was
far better than the theory of Hobbes, which makes the State for
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its own ends the teacher of truth, The danger of the
theory of Divine Right of Kings, true and useful as it was in
many respects, was in the direction of Erastianism. Against
this the Jesuits set up a protest. They denied any power in
the state as such to decide religious matters.
Certainly one detects here a difference in tone from that which predomi¬
nates in the Divine Right of Kings.
The article on "Erastus and Erastianism" also insists that the
sovereign shall be limited in his control of things ecclesiastic:
For assuredly there is no less reasonable view than that which
permits a magistrate to set up a Church on purely political
grounds and to prohibit all others.
That Figgis found it difficult to forsake the original Austinian
theory of sovereignty and that this period of "seeing that many qualifi¬
cations have to be made" extended well into those works which were
written after 1900, the year which has been recognized as the probable
year of revolution in his political thinking, may be seen in excerpts
from several of his "post-reformation"works. Referring to Bodin in
"Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century," he writes:
He developes the notion of sovereign authority, inalienable,
inprescriptable, incapable of legal limitation, very much as
through Hobbes, and Rosseau, and Austin, it has come down to
us. He has the qualities of all who perceive with any clear¬
ness the fact of sovereignty and also their defects. ... For
the true conception of the State it is needed first to realize
the idea of sovereignty and afterwards to realize its practical
limitations.3
1. Figgis, "On Some Political Theories of the Early Jesuits,"
pp. 110-111.
2. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.; "Erastus and Erastian¬
ism," p. 339.
3. Figgis, "On Some Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century,"
p. 739.
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And writing in 1905 on "Bartolus and the Development of European Political
Ideas," which he labeled as representing the views which he held in 1913,
he says in admiration of Bartolus:
He clearly holds the usual maxims that whatever the sovereign
permits he commands and sovereignty is inalienable. But - and
here comes in the positive quality of Bartolus's mind - law is
one thing and fact another.
One detects here a certain affinity, if not a certain nostalgia, for the
old established categories of sovereignty; yet the cold facts of the de¬
mise of the unitary state, if indeed it ever truly existed, compelled the
compromise of old allegiances and ultimately, in Figgis's case, there
arose a strong revolt against them. In summary, then, that period in
Figgis's thinking described by "one learns that many qualifications have
to be made," invades both the first stage wherein "one begins by thinking
Austin self-evident" and the third stage wherein "one ends by treating
his whole method as abstract and theoretic."
Figgis's third and last stage in political thought as represented
by "one ends by treating the whole Austinian method as abstract and theo¬
retic" coincides, from the positive standpoint, with his having become a
disciple of the "Genossenschaftsrechtheorie," which contends for the rights
of groups to live and grow in any given society on the ground that they
are real persons. By definition, the "Genossenschaftsrecht" is at odds
with the Austinian theory of sovereignty, the main tenents of which are
given by Hearnshaw:
1. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.;"Bartolus and the De¬
velopment of European Political Ideas," pp. 356-357.
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...the ultimate sovereignty must reside, and ought to reside in
the State. For the State represents the community as a whole,
and, as the world is at present constituted, it is the only in¬
stitution that does so. Hence, however large an autonomy the
State may leave to Churches, to trade unions, to universities,
and to other voluntary associations of a sectional kind, in
the last resort its authority must, in the interest of the com¬
munity as a whole, override them all. So long as the primaiy
division of mankind is the present division into nations, so
long must each nation, organized as a State and acting through
its Government, be supreme within the territorial limits of
its jurisdiction in all causes ana over all persons.
From that time which has been labeled as the revolution in his
thought, Figgis makes common use of such terms as "single society," "one
society," "two societies," "societas perfecta," and "communitas communi-
tatum." When he speaks of "one society" or "single society," he is de¬
scribing the state or the political theory which is the embodiment of
Austinianism, the state or theory which recognizes or contends for the
recognition of only one sovereign power in any given state. Ho group
within the state is recognized as having any inherent rights, any per¬
sonality, of its own. Groups exist by the consent, the fiat, of the
single sovereign power. When he speaks of a state as having "two so¬
cieties," he is speaking of the state in which Austinianism has been
compromised, the state which recognizes in fact or theory that at least
one group other than itself and within the state, usually the church, is
a society in its own right, a social entity, existing by virtue of its
own irrepressible living personality and which does not exist simply be¬
cause the society which is the state grants its permission. When Figgis
1. F. J. G. Hearnshaw, Some Great Political Idealists of the Christian
Era, (London, George G. Harrap & Co., 1937), pp. 236-237.
(60)
refers to the thought which argues for the recognition of the church as
a social unit complete in itself and independent, a principle championed
in essence by Jesuits and Presbyterians, he refers to it as contending
for the recognition of the church as a perfect society, a "societas per-
fecta." The term, "societas perfecta," it is to be observed, may be used
to describe any political bocfy which is recognized as having an inherent
life of its ownj therefore, the state, as well as the church or any other
social group, may be referred to as a "societas perfecta." In the pref¬
ace to the second edition of From Gerson to Grotius, Figgis writes:
I feel, however, bound to set down here ray gratitude to the
Rev. T. A. Lacey for a suggestion respecting the Church as a
"societas perfecta," which more than anything else has helped
to illuminate the subject, and is the main ground of any im¬
provement there may be in the present form of the lectures
on that in which they were delivered.3-
The expression, "communitas comrnunitatum," is that which for Figgis de¬
fines the ideal state, the state which is recognized in theory for what it
is in fact, a community of communities, a community made up of any number
of "perfect societies." Figgis's political-historical works, as written
after 1900 under the prevailing conviction that Austinian notions of
sovereignty are "abstract and theoretic," are fundamentally a study of
the rise and fall of two fundamentally conflicting conceptions of the
state as suggested by these various key expressions: the "two society"
as against the "one society"\ the theory which recognizes two or more
kinds of "societas perfecta" in one state as opposed to the "single so¬
ciety" conception of the statej the "Genossenschaft" as opposed to the
1. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. vi.
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"Herrschaftsverband"; the view of the state as a "ccramunitas communita-
tum" as against the theory of a sovereign power possessing "plenitudo
potestatisj' whereby all lesser societies within the state exist by its
permission only. In the pages to follow, Figgis's major works written
after 1900 will be considered in the light of his preoccupation with
this basic conflict of political ideas.
Attention will first be focused on From Gerson to Grotius, which
was originally published in 1907- This was Figgis's first major work re¬
lating to things political which was published after the revolution in his
political thinking. This work, it should be recalled, was initially pre¬
sented in the form of the Birbeck Lectures at Trinity College in 1900
and, according to the book's introduction, revised appreciably about
190i|. From Gerson to Grotius is presented in "capsule form" in the third
volume of the Cambridge Modern History under the heading, "Political
Thought in the Sixteenth Century.""^
The Conciliar Movement, the movement with which Gerson's name is
identified, is the first historical development having important political
implications to which Figgis turns the reader's attention in his From
Gerson to Grotius. As in the original article, "Politics at the Council
of Constance," he lauds the work of the Council in exalting the principle
of utility to the level of a divine ordinance; in asserting the superiority
of limited monarchy; in contending ultimately for popular sovereignty;
and in providing the setting in which pure politics, politics not beset
1. Reference shall henceforth be made to those works of lesser signi¬
ficance written between 1900 and 1907 only as they contribute to an under¬
standing of Figgis's preoccupation with the conflict of the unitary and Ro¬
man as opposed to the federalistic and Teutonic conceptions of the state.
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with the problem of the primacy of the civil or spiritual authority,
could be discussed. The treatment of the subject in the article as com¬
pared with its treatment in the book differs chiefly in this: in the
article he places his emphasis on the Conciliar Movement's effort to es¬
tablish a limited monarchy; in the book he emphasizes its tendency to
limit sovereignty. This distinction may not be an obvious one; indeed,
it may be an artificial one in that what does limit monarchy also tends
to limit sovereignty; but for the purpose of showing Figgis's changing
emphasis, it remains a helpful distinction. In the article he writes:
The reiterated assertion that the whole must be greater than
the parts (orbis major urbi) goes to the real gist of the Con¬
ciliar Movement.1
The emphasis here is that unlimited sovereignty does not lie in any one
individual in the state but that it does reside in all the people who
make up the state. This, however, does not serve to limit state sov¬
ereignty. Sovereignty is still contained in the single unit, the state,
and remains unitaiy, though not resident in any one individual.
In From Gerson to Grotius he writes:
Had the Conciliar Movement secured lasting success, the prin¬
ciples which were symbolised by the division of the Council
into nations and in the Concordats with which it closed might
have been fruitful in the future. As it was, alike in England
and abroad, the notion of a single omnicompetent social union
set over against a mass of individuals became the normal idea
of the State. The "Communitas Communitatum" becomes a mere
collection of units.2
...Even when pure monarchy was not regarded as an ideal, it
1. Figgis, "Politics at the Council of Constance," p. 113.
2. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. Ii5.
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only gave way to a notion of the unlimited sovereignty of the
State, however constituted, which is false to the facts of
human life, and creates an unnecessary chasm between the in¬
dividual and the supreme power, instead of bridging the gulf
by the recognition of other and smaller societies, with in¬
herent powers of life, not the result of the fiat of govern¬
mental authority. Constance and Basel saw the last, the most
splendid, and in the event the most unfortunate of all the
many medieval attempts to limit the sovereign power.
Here the emphasis is upon the federal aspect of the movement as in the
division of the Councils into nations which actually tended to limit
sovereignty. Sovereignty is not unitary but multiple, with each group
having an inherent life and claim to a measure of sovereignty of its
own. In the article Figgis lauds the appeal to the sense of corporate
unity in place of the stress on individual exclusiveness (of the Pope),
wherein the rights of the whole group are protected against the en¬
croachment of the individual in the position of power. In From Gerson
to Grotius, Figgis's appeal is to the federalistie aspect of the Con-
ciliar Movement wherein the rights of groups within the larger group are
recognized and protected. In brief, the earlier work shows Figgis to be
thinking of the state as being principally a single society, whereas in
the later work he is thinking of the state as a "communitas communitatum."
From what has been said, however, it ought not to be assumed that limited
monarchy was in his mind in direct opposition to limited sovereignty. The
appreciation of the one was an important step toward the appreciation of
the other.
That the state through the Middle Ages, including the time of
the Conciliar Movement, was consistently looked upon as a "single society"
1. Ibid., p. U6.
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and that the church and state were not looked upon as separate societies
are thoughts constantly reasserted in From Person to Grotius and other
works.
The medieval struggles between Popes and Emperors are wrongly-
regarded as a conflict between Church and State, if by that is
meant the relations between two societies. The medieval mind,
whether clerical or anti-clerical, envisaged the struggle as
one between different officers of the same society, never be¬
tween two separate bodies.I
Figgis devoted an entire paper entitled, "Respublica Christiana," which
he read to the Royal Historical Society and which was published in that
Society's Transactions in 1911, asserting that the medieval state was a
"single society." By insisting that such was the case, Figgis was at
variance with a man whose historical and political judgment he greatly
admired—William Maitland.„ Maitland wrote in his Lectures on Consti¬
tutional History:
While we are speaking of this matter of sovereignty, it will be
"well to remember that our modern theories run counter to the
deepest convictions of the Middle Ages—to their whole manner
of regarding the relation between Church and State. Though they
may consist of the same units, though every man may have his
place in both organisms, these two bodies are distinct
the general conviction is that the two are independent, that
neither derives its authority from the other. Obviously, when
men think thus, while they more or less consistently act upon
this theory, they have no sovereign in Austin's sensej before
the Reformation Austin's doctrine was impossible.2
Figgis's contention, on the other hand, is that if one is considering the
ruling thought of the Middle Ages, it is by and large impossible to de¬
scribe the mediaeval outlook as anything other than Austinian or something
1. Ibid., p. ij.3.
2. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, "Respublica Christiana,"
pp. 193-195, quoting Lectures on Constitutional History, pp. 101-102.
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very like it.
Nobody in the Middle Ages denied that the king was God's minister,
or that the bishops were great lords in the commonwealth. Pope
and emperor, when they quarrelled, quarrelled like brothers, as
members of the same society, the "Civitas Dei.
The major exception to the rule of Austinian sovereignty during that per¬
iod was the fact of the feudal commonwealth, an aspect of the life of the
Middle Ages which was the genius of much of Gierke's "Genossenschafts-
theorie."
The importance which Figgis ascribed to the Conciliar Movement
may be detected from his words:
Probably the most revolutionary official document in the history
of the world is the decree of the Council of Constance asserting
its superiority to the Pope, and striving to turn into a tepid
constitutionalism the Divine authority of a thousand years. The
movement is the culmination of medieval constitutionalism. It
forms the watershed between the medieval and the modern world.3
It formed "the watershed between the mediaeval and modern world" because,
in its expression, it gave voice to constitutional principles which would
be called upon in the future to limit autocracy in the State. It heralded
the day when discerning men would look upon the state as "communitas com-
munitatum." In its failure, it perpetuated and accelerated under new
forms the "single society" concept of the state.
Figgis held that the failure of the Conciliar Movement was ac-
1. Ibid., p. 199.
2. Figgis's interest in the Gonciliar Movement was aroused in no small
part by Mandell Greighton, of whom Figgis wrote: "His most profound research
lay in a period scarcely known to Englishmen, yet worthier of study
than many of the more picturesque epics of Church history—the period of
the Conciliar Movement." Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, "Three Cam¬
bridge Historians: Creighton, Maitland and Acton," p.
3. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. 31.
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countable in no small part for the rise of the Protestant Reformation.
We may condemn as we will the violence of the Reformation, but
it was a catastrophe rendered inevitable by the failure of milder
methods. Cautery succeeded to physic.^ ... Their failure
(the principles of Constance) marks the beginning of the modern
world. It paved the way for Luther and Machiavelli in the State,
for Ignatius Loyola and Manning in the Church.^
In speaking of Luther, Figgis insists that he championed the
idea of civil and ecclesiastical authorities as co-workers within a
single societjr, thus perpetuating a condition which had, in Figgis's eyes,
typified the Middle Ages. What was revolutionary in Luther's approach to
the "single society" was that he, as well as Zwingli, and Anglicans like
Witgift and Hooker, circumscribed the unitary church-state within the
bounds of the nation or territorial estate with the balance of power in
the hands of the state authorities, whereas in the Middle Ages the single
church-state was as wide as all Christendom, with the balance of power more
often than not in the hands of the church.
Or, to phrase it again differently, the medieval mind conceived
of its universal Church-State, with power ultimately fixed in
the Spiritual head bounded by no territorial frontier; the
Protestant mind places all ecclesiastical authority below the
jurisdiction and subject to the control of the "Godly Prince,"
who is omnipotent in his own dominion.3
Figgis thus shows that Luther and those who shared his ideas about church
and state, however they may have differed in other matters, were, in
matters of church and state, both dependent upon and independent of the
major emphases of the Middle Ages. Figgis emphasizes that the continu-
1. Ibid., p. 32.
2. Ibid., p. 33.
3. Ibid., p. S>5•
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ing notion of the state as a "single society" was a carry-over from the
Middle Ages and explains the comparative ease with which the halo was
shifted from the sacred to the secular head. Such was the reasoning
which caused Figgis to dispute Maitland's idea of "two societies" in the
Middle Ages.
...if we accept^Maitland's view, we should be left with no in¬
telligible explanation of certain phenomena in the sixteenth
century, to say nothing of existing controversies and modes
of thought.1
The subject of From Gerson to Grotius is asserted to be:
...those changes in men's thoughts about politics which bridge
the gulf between the medieval and the modern world.
The most significant aspect of that revolution was represented to Figgis's
mind by the transition from the sole authority of the church to the sole
authority of the state. The Reformation was seen to be largely produc¬
tive of this change, especially because of the influence of Luther.
Luther and his followers were guilty of what to Figgis had be¬
come the mortal sin of political thought and practice: they denied the
inherent right of groups within the state.
Their doctrine was that all coercive authority was vested in
the prince by Divine Right; that the power of the state was
absolutely vested in him; that no other separate organization
could exist except ty his fiat, or by his delegation....no real
social units are to exist apart from the State. The medieval
notion of a "communitas communitatum" gives way to the civilian
doctrine of the omnicompetent State set over against a mass of
individuals. ... The unity and universality and essential
Tightness of the sovereign territorial State, and the denial of
every extra-territorial or independent communal form of life,
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, "Respublica Christiana," p.
2. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. J,.
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are Luther's lasting contribution to politics."'"
In the third chapter of From Person to Grotius , Figgis links the
names of Luther and Machiavelli. Although it is not suggested that Luther
would have sanctioned a Machiavelli, yet it is implied that in giving
first place to the Prince, even though his motive was to obtain freedom
from the spiritual and political tyranny of the Papacy, and in his insist¬
ence on passive obedience, Luther prepared the way and played in the hands
of one who would enshire "Reason of State" as the guiding light of state
action.
Figgis also identified Luther, in part, with the "Politiques,"
a sixteenth century French political party made up largely of Catholics,
which developed to the fullest extent Luther's passive obedience and
Machiavelli's making of the state an end in itself. After Luther, the
"Politiques" are assailed to have been the most enthusiastic supporters
of Divine Right. The difference between them lay in the fact that whereas
Luther would not tolerate any other religious bodies, the "Politiques"
would and did for the sake of the unity of the state. The motive for re¬
ligious toleration among the "Politiques" is further described by Figgis:
The new religion (the Protestant religion) may be all its
enemies declare it to be. But it is a fact. It is here. We
can only get rid of it at the cost of deluging the country with
blood, or replenishing the population of our enemies. Religious
uniformity is a blessingj it is of the "bene esse" of a State.
But it is not of the "esse," and in case of need, we can live
without it.^
1. Ibid., pp. 69-70.
2. Ibid., p. 100.
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In spite of a limited kind of toleration, it is clear that the "Politiques"
were as much the exponents of the state as a "single society" as was
Luther.
But the Reformation was not only contributory to and productive
of the omnipotence and unity of the modern state. Another result of the
Reformation was popular freedom.
...it is only some moral or religious motive that can in an age
like the sixteenth century be at all available against the domi¬
nant tendencies.^
The dominant tendencies were all in the direction of establishing the uni¬
tary sovereign state. After the Rennaisance, Reception, and Reformation,
the power of Canon Law was undermined, the Holy Roman Empire became only
the shadow of a reality, and feudal rights practically disappeared, all
of which in their day of strength had served as checks on the complete
realization of the "single society" national state.
The conditions for a full theory of sovereignty existed and
were active. There was a very real danger that this discovery—
for it was a discovery—of a power that could not be bound by¬
law because it could make law—would produce a more enduring
tyranny than aay hitherto known...
It was only a zeal inspired by religious conviction that could resist
either unto martyrdom or toleration.
It must be noticed however, Figgis emphasized, that the religions
which in their political ramifications were productive of freedom were al¬
most without exception desirous that the state should persecute in the
name of the one true religion rather than tolerate any other. And yet, by
1. Ibid., p. 117.
2. Ibid., p. 120.
\
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virtue of the determination of each religious body not to be destroyed and
to either obtain or maintain control in a state where more than one re¬
ligion was fighting for control, a tolerance and freedom came into being
which had never been their object as such to establish.
What they desired, was not liberty or tolerance, but domination
and independence. Happily the power of the State proved every¬
where too strong for their desire (except perhaps for a brief
period in Scotland); but though they did not gain dominion,
they secured, what has been better, tolerance. Political lib¬
erty is the residuary legatee of ecclesiastical animosities.-1-
Figgis then proceeds to be more explicit:
The two religious bodies which have done the most to secure
"the rights of man" are those two which really cared least
about individual liberty...the Roman Catholic Church and the
Presbyterian.2
First,with regard to Calvinism:
Calvinism was what neither Lutheranism nor Anglicanism nor
Romanism was, a republican if not a democratic system. Prac¬
tically it doubtless meant the oligarchy of the preachers or the
tyranny "worse than Papal" of ruling eldersj certainly it did
not favour individual liberty; but it was opposed in theory to
secular interference, and by its own methods to monarchical
power. Hence in spite of itself Calvinism in France, in the
Netherlands and Scotland became either in the world of thought
or in that of practice the basis of modem liberty.3
In the writings which preceded the revolution in his own thinking, Figgis
is adamant in his assertion that Calvinism, as such, holds no brief for
freedom. In The Divine Right of Kings he had written:
But in regard to one ecclesiastical system other than the Roman,
the taunt of Jesuitism is more truly justified. Presbyterianism,
as exhibited in Geneva or Scotland, veritably claims, as did the
1. Ibid., p. 118.
2. Ibid., p. 118.
3. Ibid., p. 119.
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Papacy, to control the state in the interests of an ecclesiastical
corporation ... "new presbyter is but old priest writ large" is a
maxim of deeper import than is sometimes imagined. It is the
felicitous expression of men's sense of the danger still to be ap¬
prehended from clericalism. The same mischievous claims to place
secular governments under the heel of an ecclesiastical organiza¬
tion, as had led to so much conflict in the Middle Ages and were
only finally overthrown by the Reformation, had reappeared in a
yet more irritating form in the Presbyterian system. The condi¬
tion of Geneva under Calvin was an object-lesson, which heither
statesmen nor patriotic churchmen were likely to ignore.1
In terms of the Important distinction which became in large part Figgis's
measure of a political viewpoint's merit or lack of merit, Figgis held that
Calvin, Knox, and most of the other spokesmen of Calvinism shared with men
as diverse as Luther and Laud the error of treating church and state as
merely different departments of the one great society. But unlike Luther,
they placed the state at the disposal of the church.
Brief attention should be given to Figgis's account of those
three essentially Calvinistic movements in France, Scotland, and the
Netherlands, which, to his mind, were productive of though not pursuant
of freedom. In those nations not ruled by Calvinists, Calvinists could
not share Calvin's insistence on passive obedience, whereby government
of whatever form is to be obeyed as a religious duty, and still survive.
Speaking of the Scottish Reformation, Figgis says that:
...it affords, perhaps, the most complete and consistent expression
of the duty of rebellion, alike in theory and practice, which we
possess outside ultramontine pamphleteering. In each case there is
a similar claim in the background for an ecclesiastical independence
which may mean supremacy. John Knox, while he allows his monarchs
to play the part of Josiah, did not desire to tolerate any idolaters;
and had he been powerful enough would certainly have made a "right
1. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.; pp. 186-187.
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faith" as much a condition of legitimacy as did the Counter Reforma¬
tion ... his sense of the value of the particular religious society
was as strong as that of the Jesuits, and like them he employed the
means recommended by Machiavelli to attain his endsj among those
means murder and rebellion had a natural home in the Scotland of
1555-80.1
The Hugenots, following the masacre of Saint Bartholomew, made a
significant contribution to the cause of liberty. Du Plessis Kornay in
Vifldiciae contra Tyrannos gave the best expression to their cause.
He submitted that:
Between the Almighty on the one hand and king and people on the
other there is an original contract.... This contract is on
God's side one of protection, on that of the nation, maintenance
of the true religion... A prince who persecutes the faith is
a rebel against God. no more a lawful sovereign than is a Pope
deposed for heresy.2
The author of the Vindiciae, Figgis points out, postulates a second con¬
tract between king and people:
which makes allegiance depend on good government, and places
civil rights on a firmer basis than that of royal grant.3
This idea of second contract, Figgis suggested, served the cause of free¬
dom against the claims of kings who, possessed with an exalted notion of
sovereignty, looked upon all civil rights as matters of grace, not of
right.
It is against this claim that the idea of contract proved so valu¬
able - for it gave to the public the consciousness that their
rights were no less rooted in the constitution of the courts than
were those of the king.b-
1. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. 127.
2. Ibid., p7T3U.
3. Ibid., p. 135.
h. Ibid., p. 135.
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Though the Vindiciae was indicative of the spirit of the Hugenots and but¬
tressed the very spirit of liberty, yet it was not, Figgis shows, a demo¬
cratic movement.
All resistance on their part (the part of individuals) is rigidly
condemned, prayers and tears are to be their weapons. Resistance
must be orderly, directed by those estates which represent the
kingdom rather than the king; or by those persons whose position
is of public not private character. In this last provision we
see how deeply the aristocratic spirit dominates the writer; ...
The Hugenots ceased in any sense to be the disciples of liberty. With the
death of the Duke of Avignon in l58It, they abandoned their theories of con¬
tract and found their cause to be better served by becoming supporters of
legitism.
And then with regard to the pre-eminently Calvinistic Netherlands:
...it was rather in spite of themselves than for any other cause
that the Dutch possessed the influence they did. Their supreme
object was their own independence of the foreigner, and the preser¬
vation of their own religion and of local rights. The first ob¬
ject had nothing to do with D political liberty proper, for it
is secured equally well and often more effectively under a national
absolutism. The second in no way meant the toleration of other
forms of faith, and even in their h'ours of direct distress, the
Prince of Orange had the utmost difficulty in securing decent
treatment for the Catholics. The third, indeed, had a connection
with liberty and may have been the main cause which prevented a
thorough absolutism. Certainly it helped towards a theory of fed¬
eralism. ^
Speaking of Althusius who, along with Grotius, ciystallized into a system
the principles of the Dutch movement, Figgis writes:
But the point to notice here is that this federalistic idea is
to be found in Althusisus and through him connects itself with
the medieval theory of community life. There is not much dif-
1. Ibid., p. 137.
2. Ibid., p. 171.
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ference between that idea of the "communitas communitatum" which
the Middle Ages meant by the commons, and Althusius' notion of
the State as above all else a "consociatio consociationum." He
definitely protests against those who refuse to consider the
smaller associations such as the family as anything but economic.
The novelty in him is his view of the State as entirely built up
on the principle of associations.^
Figgis reveled in the realization that the Dutch, in pleading the cause of
the "Selbstandigkeit" of societies, were on the battleground of this cen¬
tury's fight for freedom; but he registers his disappointment in their hav¬
ing failed to apply the principle to the relations between church and state.
He saw Althusius and Grotius to be strong adherents of the Erastian view,
the view of the sovereign state as having ecclesiastical among other min¬
isters.
In Althusius, despite his federalism, we have no hint of any
sort of independence for the Church; it is not envisaged as a
separate society. Its officers are merely a part of the gen¬
eral machinery of the State.^
Only laterly did Figgis recognize in certain Presbyterian writ¬
ings the basic elements of a "two society" system. This was in contrast
to his earlier working presumption that, wherein Presbyterianism was in¬
strumental as a force in bringing "two society" systems about, it was only
due to the historical accident of their having found themselves in states
where the sovereign power was at variance with them in the matter of
religion. This recognition of "two society" tendencies among certain Pres¬
byterian thinkers is incidental in From Gerson to Grotius, quite explicit
in the article, "Respubliea Christiana," published in 1911, ana still more
1. Ibid., p. 179.
2. Ibid., p. 183.
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explicit in "Aaron's Rod Blossoming" or "Jus Divinum in I6I4.6," which was
delivered in May of 1913 as a lecture at the University of Leeds. Giving
a reason for the inclusion of the latter article in the preface to the
second edition of The Divine Right of Kings, Figgis writes:
...I wrote the pages on Presbyterianism (in The Divine Right of
Kings) without understanding how deeply its exponents (at least
from'the days of Cartwright and Andrew Melville) were imbued with
the doctrine of the two kingdoms.1
Speaking of the political scene following the Reformation and more at
length of "two society" leanings among Presbyterians, he writes:
But where either prince or people were not able to make their
own religion supreme or universal within the territorial State,
the conception of two distinct societies tended to grow up. It
is really not in the thought of Calvin. .. I do not think that
Knox, any more than the other reformers, had any real notion of
this distinction. But towards the end of Elizabeth's reigh it
is certainly to be found in Cartwright and the whole English
Presbyterian movement. Andrew Melville developed it in Scot¬
land; and Robert Browne, the originator <f the Independents, was
inspired by this notion in the pamphlet "Reformation Without
Tarring for Any."^
A
In "Jus Divinum in l6i|6" Figgis quotes Melville:
"Therefore, Sir, as divers times I have told you, so now again I
must tell you there are two kings and two kingdoms in Scotland,
that is King James the head of the Commonwealth, and there is
Christ Jesus the King of the Church, whose subject King James VI
is, and of whose kingdom he is not a king, nor a lord, nor a
head, but a member.3"
In keeping with Figgis's matured conviction that the state is a "communi-
tas communitatum" and should be recognized as such legally, Figgis says
1. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.j pp. vii-viii.
2. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, "Respublica Christiana,"
pp. 216-217.
3. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.; "Jus Divinum in
I6k6}" p. 286.
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of the Presbyterian contribution toward "two society" thinking:
They were right in asserting that there were two kingdoms;
where they were wrong was in denying that there might be
twenty-two.1
In the final analysis, from Figgis's standpoint, the only reason
that Calvinism was productive of freedom in some few places, as it had not
been in Geneva, lay in the fact that in states like France, where they
fought for control, they succeeded at least in gaining recognition and a
right to continue to exist.
The Jesuits were the representatives of the iioman-Catholic
Church, who, in company with the Presbyterians, made up "the two which
cared least about individual liberty and yet which had done the most to
secure the rights of man."
With a few changes in the direction of the third and final
stage of Figgis's political thought, the chapter on the Jesuits in From
Gerson to Grotius makes many of the same observations about them as did
the previously mentioned article. Both take note of the secular character
of the Jesuit conception of civil power.
The point to notice is that they conceive the civil power as
purely secular; and to a certain extent as independent. This
is at once similar to the view of Presbyterians like Cartwright
or Melville.2
In the article Figgis compared the Jesuits to one group of Presbyterians:
Knox, Goodman, Bucham and Cartwright held a theory of the sub¬
jection of the civil to the ecclesiastical power hardly dis-
1. Ibid., p. 290.
2. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. 157.
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tinguishable from the Jesuit one."'"
In the article Figgis is associating the Jesuits and Presbyterians in
their common insistence on a freedom of conscience in religious matters in
the face of sovereign powers disinclined to tolerate them; whereas, in the
referring to them in From Gerson to Grotius, he is associating them because
in their common recognition of the secular character of the state they also
tended to recognize a certain independence of the state from the church.
In the later work the common ground of the two groups is their progress
toward the recognition of the state to be what the Jesuits early assumed
the church to be—a "societas perfecta."
Figgis writes describing his later estimate of the Jesuits con¬
tribution:
In a word, the relations of Church and State are international;
the Pope is no longer the head of one great community, of which
the kingdoms are the provinces. Whether Bellarmine quite saw
this is doubtful, whether he even meant more than a verbal con¬
cession to the other side cannot be proved; but taken in con¬
junction with their view of the different origins of civil and
religious power, and the facts of the case in regard to Roman
Catholics in England or Germany, and the depression of the Holy
Roman Empire in favour of national States, there can I think be
little doubt that the Jesuit view was really paving the way for
a great change. No longer was Christendom a whole. That had
disappeared absolutely with the religious peace of Augsburg and
would be recognised finally in 16U8. No longer was the great
Church-State with its twin heads even an ideal. But (and this
is true even of Catholic States) there are now a multitude of
communities possessing within themselves complete independence;
only"the liberty of each must not hinder the liberty of all,"
and so the Pope as head of one of these communities must inter-
1. Figgis, "On Some Political Theories of the Early Jesuits," p. 93.
Cartwright's name appears in both quotations, but in the first case he is
assumed to be identified with the strongly "single society" assumptions of
Calvin and Knox while, in the latter, Figgis has discovered there was much
in his thought which was apology for "two societies."
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fere where necessary for his subjects. (True, that in this case
the members are scattered throughout the other communities, and
are identified with the same physical persons as the subjects of
the civil states.) But we have henceforth two communities brought
into relation^ no longer, as in the medieval view, one community
with separate departments.^
The theory of the indirect power of the Pope wherety he inter¬
feres in state life not directly as a monarch of the world but simply as
guardian of the religious interests of the people is said, by Figgis, to
mark this important change from the idea of a commonwealth with different
offices to the modern conception of the church and state as two distinct
social entities.
Figgis's works are primarily concerned with the "one society"
and "two society" conceptions of the state as they manifest themselves on
the stage of European politics in the era which, it may be said, serves to
divide the medieval from the modern worldj however, in a number of places
he does trace the movement of these concepts both previous to and follow¬
ing the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries.
The history of the "two society" concept which tends to recognize
the inherent rights and personality of at least one social unit other than
the state is shown to be meager both before the Gonciliar Movement and
after the Reformation. Pointing to one historical antecedent he writes:
The analysis of forms, begun by St. Thomas on the Aristotelian
basis (Aristotle advocated a limited monarchy), set on foot the
habit of reasoning about political societies.^
The same habit was carried on in the Conciliar Movement when Ger-
1. Figgis, From Person to Grotius, p. 159.
2. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, "Respublica Christiana,"
p. 215.
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son and others (also with the Aristotelian ideal in mind) did some sig¬
nificant thinking about political societies. This step was in the di¬
rection of thinking of churches as one among political societies, "one
society" in a "two society" state, one group in a "communitas communi-
tatum." Figgis's only reference to even earlier "two society" thinking
is a reference to the period of persecution of Christians by the Romans:
When it (the conception of a religious society as distinct from
the State) did dawn upon some men's minds, what was the univer¬
sal response? "Christiani ad leones." Sir William Ramsay has
made it clear that the persecution of the early church was a
matter of policy, and that it was directed against this very
notion, the claim to be a separate society, while still remain¬
ing Roman citizens. It was the Church as upholding "a new non-
Roman unity" that men feared.^
The "two society" movement, which had reached nothing more than the court¬
ing stage with the Conciliar Movement, is seen to disappear from the
scene, for all practical purposes, after Warburton.
Warburton...developes explicitly and in set terms, in his Alli¬
ance between Church and State, the doctrine that the two are
independent organisms consisting of the same individuals, but
existing for different ends, each to be treated as a'borporate
personality." His theoiy comes at the end, not at the beginning
of the development I have been describing...^
The death of this development came at the hands of the "damnosa hereditas,"
the powerful "single society" tendency in history which does not a bide the
life of a competing or even companion society alongside that of the uni¬
tary state.
In presenting a brief history of "single society" thinking, Figgis
1. Ibid., p. 202.
2. Ibid., p. 218.
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attempts to show that viewing the state as a "single society" is not a
modern political phenomenon but dates back to pre-Christian times.
Back to Plato go all those high conceptions of the unity of
civic society which value it as the ideal, and would sacri¬
fice all or nearly all to that end.^
It must not be forgotten that in the ideal system which rose
out of the Greek City-State the fact of the family as a real
entity disappears; and Plato would allow a community in wives. 2
The conception of a religious society as distinct from the State
had not dawned upon the unified civilisation of Greece and Rome.
The primitive church was a society distinct from the Roman state, and for
that reason the church was persecuted. It was only with Constantine that
persecution ceased, and that, because he and his followers succeeded in
absorbing the one social unit, the church, which had insisted unto martyr¬
dom on a degree of real independence. The "single society" had triumphed
again.
After Constantine granted the peace of the Church, it was not
long, at most three-quarters of a century, before the old con¬
ception ruled again of a great unity in \fhich civil and ecclesias¬
tical powers were merely separate departments. ... finally
the Catholics conquered under Tneodosius the Great. Arianism
was made a crime; Paganism was suppressed; and the world was
ripe for that confusion of baptism and citizenship which ruled
the Middle Ages. True, there were many struggles between the
different authorities, and their issues varied with time and
place. But neither emperors nor prelates were treated as rul¬
ers of rival societies. The Code of Justinian was compiled
subsequently to the De Civitate Dei of St. Augustine. The whole
spirit of both tends to identify Shurch and State, although nei-
1. J. N. Figgis, "Ideal Politics," The English Church Review, V (I9ll|.),
pp. i4.87-l4.96. (A lecture delivered at the vacation term of Biblical Study
for Women on July 28, 19114-).
2. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, p. 73-
3. Ibid., "Respublica Christiana," p. 202.
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ther quite realised this.1
One of the last pieces of work which Figgis undertook was the
delivery of the Pringle Stewart Lectures at Oxford in 1918. With the
final revision of the lectures having been made by a Mirfield associate
after Figgis's death, they were published in 1921, under the title: The
o>
Political Aspects of Augustine's City of id. The book deals with Augus-
A
tine's very determiningeffect on the body of political thought during and
following his time.
Figgis makes it very clear that he appreciates the fact that De
O
Civitate Dei is first and foremost Christian apolgetic and theological:
£~
2
It is not a treatise on polity whether ecclesiastical or civil.
Nevertheless, he assures his readers, the work had great implications for
political thought. He also fully appreciates the fact that Augustine did
not identify the "Civitas terrena" with the state and "Civitas Dei" with
the church.
The primary distinction is always between two societies, the body
of the "reprobate" and the"communio sanctorum"; not between Church
and State. ... On earth these two bodies are intermingled, and
always will be. Only partly and for certain purposes is the
"Civitas terrera" represented by any earthly polity. The Church
represents the "Civitas Dei" by symbol rather than by identifica¬
tion. ... All earthly distinctions are but the symbols, never
adequate, of the final grouping into sheep and goats. Members
of either body are found, and always will be found, in the
terrene representative of the other.3
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, "Respublica Christiana,"
pp. 203-20li.
2. J. N. Figgis, The Political Aspects of Saint Augustine's City of
God, (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1921), p. 29.
3. Ibid., pp. 50-52.
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Augustine goes out of his way to say that kings and princes
cannot make the City of God, which comes by the calling of
souls. ....this non-political interpretation of the symbolic
kingdom is seen to be that which is in accordance with the mind
of St. Augustine, if we take the book as a whole. ... Augustine
does not think of the civil and ecclesiastical authorities as
two coordinate powers occupied in governing. Even in dream he
had not the great vision of medieval imagination, the one common¬
wealth of Catholic Christians, with its twin heads of Pope and
Emperor.1
But if the medieval Church-State were not Augustine's dream, Figgis con¬
tends that, nevertheless, such a commonwealth of Catholic Christians was
the product of Augustine's influence. Figgis does not go quite as far as
Gierke, who claimed that the logical development of the Augustinian doc¬
trine was the Bull "Unan Sanctum," the complete subjection of the state
to the church, although he does single out certain aspects of Augustine's
thought which make such an interpretation tenable. Whether or not the
medieval Church-State with the balance of authority on the side of the
priestly officers was an altogether logical development, it was the prac¬
tical result of "Dei Civitas Dei." The work is seen, therefore, to be an
important link in the continuing chain of "one society" thought.
Speaking summarily of the history of the "single society" con¬
cept, Figgis writes:
In its modern form it goes through the medieval canonists to
Renaissance thinkers like Bodin, thence through Hobbes and the
supporters of Divine Right to Austin.2
And from Austin the modern world fell heir to that prevailing theoxy of sov¬
ereignty which, to Figgis's mind, was the "aamnosa hereditas" from the Civil
1. Ibid., pp. 7U-76.
2. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, "Respublica Christiana," p. 195.
(83)
Law of the Roman Empire, of which Stubbs once said that:
whenever it had been dominant, it destroyed any real idea of
civil and religious freedom.
Attention will soon be turned to Figgis's concern with modern
times as involved in the "single society" and "two society" struggle, free¬
dom being threatened by the "single society" presuppositions and safe¬
guarded only as the "two society" or "communitas communitatum" approach
succeeds in taking the field of politics and law.
Thus ends that part of this discussion which, under the general
heading of the third, the anti-Austinian stage of Figgis's political
thought, examines his historical works as evidencing this anti-Austinian
trend and his predilection for the "communitas coramunitatum" approach to
things political and legal.
No account of Figgis's political-historical works would be com¬
plete as even dealt with in brief without mention of the subjects of
natural law and theory of contract on one hand and the problem of ethics
in the realm of politics on the other. Before attention is turned to the
application of his major political emphasis to the problems of church and
state, reference shall be made to these subjects, presenting themselves as
they do in the broad span of his political writing.
In The Divine Right of Kings and in From Gerson to Grotius and in
the writings which surround these two major works, the reader comes repeat¬
edly upon Figgis's objection to the theory of the "original contract," the
device used almost invariably by political thinkers in the often unsuccess-




to set bounds to the"parvenu"and overweening renascence State.
Chief among the failings of the theory of original contract, according to
Figgis, is its tendency to reduce the state to a mechanical instrument that
may be destroyed and manufactured afresh with ease on the occasion of the
breach of contract. It fails to appreciate what the theory of The Divine
Right of Kings realized: that the state has an organic character, a qual¬
ity of life, the power of internal development, and that instead of being
a necessary evil, political society is natural to man and government and obe¬
dience are necessities of human nature.
The logical issue of the popular theory is to treat the state as
a lifeless creation of the popular will with no power of develop¬
ment and with no source of strength in sentiment or tradition. No
theory of government was ever more untrue to the facts of life
than is that of Locke, and the difference between him and Filmer
in this respect is all in favour of the latter.2
Furthermore, original contract thinking is unhistorical:
Not only does history afford no evidence of it, but of even a
tacit contract the general consciousness in our own or any
other age is unax^are. 3
Figgis admires the profundity of deeper-thinking Jesuits like
Suarez and Molina, who stand out among the theorists of popular sovereignty
as evolving sovereign power from a community
...by the mere fact of its existence without any deliberate
pact, thus preparing the way for the true theoiy of corpora¬
tions, in which authority and self-dependence are inherent es¬
sentially, and not dependent on any agreement, since they arise
1. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, pp. 120-121.
2. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.j p. 2^2.
3. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. 129.
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from the nature of the case."*"
With Suarez and Molina political power is the inevitable result
of the determination of men to live in a society. In fact po¬
litical authority arises out of the nature of a community as
such. It is a contradiction in terns to talk of joining a com¬
munity and giving it no power. If men live in a community, the
community must essentially possess certain powers of organiza¬
tion. In other words a corporate body is something more than
the sum of its members.^
These men thus avoided faults common to the propagators of the original
compact. They avoided the artificial as well as the unhistorical approach,
whereby governmental authority was thought to be the product of an actual
decision of men at a particular time to surrender certain of their rights
3
by deliberate choice.
They also avoided the individualistic approach whereby the life of
any social group is limited to being thought of in terras of the lives of
the individual members who compose it, with no life or personality recog¬
nized in the social unit as such.
Another major objection, according to Figgis, to the conception
of the original contract is that it does not face up to the idea of sover¬
eignty.
If government is the result of a contract, what can make the con¬
tract binding, when there is "ex hypothesi" no sovereign authority
to do so?^
1. Ibid., p. 177.
2. Ibid., pp. I5i;-155.
3. Figgis points out that monastic orders may have been in part the
cause of artificial and unhistorical theories about the state: "The arti¬
ficial theory of the State may have owed something of its prevalence to those
bodies, in some respects states in themselves, which did arise by deliberate
choice and contrivance." Figgis, The Divine Fight of Kings, 2nd ed.j p. 155.
U. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. 129.
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Austin shows how untenable is the notion, that a compact can
be binding with no sovereign to enforce it. ... The theory
that government and obedience result from a binding compact
could only be credited by men, who instinctively regarded law
as anterior to the state.
Law was indeed thought to be anterior to the state, and natural
law especially was seen to be the real basis and authority of all laws by
the early supporters of popular rights. This was especially true of the
Jesuits by whom law is regarded not so much as dependent on the will of
the law giver, as an attempt to realize under political conditions of
natural law, the ideal to which all states should conform and to ensure
the reign of general utility and justice. Natural law was considered
to be anterior to positive lawj the power which made promises binding
was, therefore, anterior to positive rules and as such provided the nec¬
essary background to theories of original contract.
The fundamental basis of the whole system of Grotius is the
claim that men are in a society bound together by a natural
law which makes promises binding. This i| also at the root
of the doctrine of the original contract.
The stress laid upon natural law made it possible to conceive of
a state of society in which contract had binding force, though
positive law did not exist. ihis seems nonsense to us, as
Austin showed.3
So closely allied were the concepts of the original contract and natural
1. Figgis, The Divine Night of Kings, 2nd ed.j pp. 2kh-2b5- it is
interesting to note here that Figgis objects to original contract because
it recognizes no sovereign to enforce it, both in his major work which
preceded and in his major work which followed the revolution in his
thought. Perhaps it is indicative of a remark Figgis made: "As a mere
verbal theory I do not know that this view of sovereign power is assail¬
able." Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, p. 1&.
3. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. 186.
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law in the sixteenth and seventeenth century apologies for limitations
upon absolute state sovereignty", one might expect Figgis to find the latter
sharing many of the shortcomings of the former, which he did.
The advocates of natural law were also unhistorical in their
approach. They spoke in terms of an unhistorical state of nature. Be¬
sides being unhistorical, such an effort to find an immutable doctrine of
government runs amuck of one of Figgis's favorite themes:
No system of politics can be immutable. It is impossible in fram¬
ing a doctrine of government to lay down eternal principles, which
may never be transgressed. A Universal theoiy of the state is a
chimaera, for historical development and national character are
the most important of all considerations in investigating the laws
of political development.
Natural law theorists also missed the true idea of sovereignty:
One side (the believers in the supremacy of law) has ever before
it this vision conceived as a system existing by Divine Right,
its origin lost in the past, independent of circumstances and
men's caprice, superior to Kings, and controlling Parliament.
The other side lays stress on the conception of a sovereign
raised above all laws with power to abrogate them, who alone
can give binding force to enactments and invest custom with
legal sanctions.^
Along the same line, Figgis accuses the advocates of natural law of confus¬
ing law positive and law natural. To say that positive decrees of the law¬
giver are not law because they are not in harmony with natural law is
simply to overlook the facts.
Although Figgis consistently looked upon the theories of original
contract and natural law as deserving of most every possible objection, that
of being unhistorical, oblivious to the meaning of sovereignty, as well as
1. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.; p. 153.
2. Ibid., p. 233.
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abstract and doctrinal, yet in From Gerson to Grotius he is more tolerant,
understanding, and appreciative of the work of these related theories.
The idea of contract did serve to put necessary limits on the
sovereign power and to place civil rights on a firmer basis than that of
royal grant:
The claim of kings, who had recognized the significance of sover¬
eignty, was not so much to thwart the actual exercise of the na¬
tional customs, as to claim that they were matters of grace not
of right. It is against this claim that the idea of a contract
proved so valuable—for it gave to the public the consciousness
that their rights were no less rooted in the constitution of the
country than were those of the king.l
It is not surprising to discover a certain regard for the theory
of contract in Figgis's later writings, for as he pointed out in both The
Divine Right of Kings and in From Gerson to Grotius, the theory of contract
was a legacy from the days of medieval feudalism. Medieval feudalism, in
turn, was exemplary of much that the advocates of the "Genossenshaftsrecht"
theory were trying to recapture, important among its virtues being the
recognition that certain basic rights are to be enjoyed not only as a
grant from the sovereign power. This idea was carried into the newer
world of politics through the medium of original contract thinking.
Nor was the idea of natural law to be scorned altogether. Not
only did natural law form the necessary background for the original con¬
tract; it was also the foundation stone of international law.
The basis of both the original contract and international law is
the same. Both ideas have their necessary roots in the belief
in the law of nature. Only so in those days could the idea of
1. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. 135-
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right be justified against reason of stated
Through the original contract in intra-state affairs and through inter¬
national law in inter-state affairs, natural law served to put right
before utility in both spheres. Right could only be justified try
legality in the days when men were primarily of a legalistic mind and
found it inconceivable that a thing could be legally wrong and morally
right. While Figgis thought it wrong not to be able to rebel on moral
grounds, yet he did say:
The confusion between ethics and law may be erroneous from
the theoretical, yet from the practical standpoint, their
entire separation was equally dangerous. It was sense,
that law was in its nature more than a mere command, that
it implied justice and a right recognised but not created
by it.2
Figgis would be largely at one with Ernest Barker's expres¬
sion of the need to look upon law as both the historical product of the
life of a people and as in need of being built around a core of justice.
...it is not enough to hold that law is simply an historical
product, evolved in this cr that direction,under this or that
set of contingencies, by this or that peculiar people. To
hold such a view is to be content with a law which is merely
an empirical fact, and has no anchor in the flux of history.
Social thought, as it operates in time, is indeed a basis of
justicej but the mind of man will always demand that the core
of justice shall be beyond time and space—"quod semper, quod
ubique." The Natural School of Law had some sense of that
timeless and spaceless core. That is why, as Gierke writes
in a noble passage of his work on Althusius, the undying
spirit of Natural Law can never be extinguished.3
In turning to Figgis's view of the place of ethics in state-
1. Ibid., p. 135.
2. Ibid., p. 7.
3. Gierke, trans, by Barker, 0£. cit., p. 1 (roman numeral).
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craft, it is understood from what has gone before that he had high re¬
gard for those elements in the theories of original contract and
natural law which held up an ethical code which was not at the mercy
of pure utilitarianism. Writing early in his first book on political
thought, he recognizes his own time as:
An age in which all political theory is confessedly utilitarian.^
Certain in his own mind that liberty does not long survive in the at¬
mosphere of political utilitarianism, Figgis points to a militant
concern for the inalienable rights of human character, historically
championed by religious bodies, as the only effective antidote for the
utilitarianism that rides roughshod over persons in the name of ef¬
ficiency:
It can hardly be said that any of the religious bodies really
believed liberty as we conceive it - but they believed in the
transcendent importance of character as moulded by their own
religious system. For this reason and this reason only was it
impossible for them to be overcome by the general trend in
favour of despotism and the utilitarian arguments of writers
like Barclay, who asked whether any suffering caused by a
tyrant was equal to that of civil war. The answer is in the
negative, and it is only as liberty is seen to have its true
approval in the inalienable right of human character to be its
best that there were or ever will be adequate defence against
the claim of organization to consider only efficiency in the
desire of administrators to think of order before righteous¬
ness. 2
Figgis, though fully cognizant of all the dangers inherent in the thought
of Nietzsche, yet admired Nietzsche's scorn of mere utilitarianism.
From the mean streets of modern civilization he calls men to
1. Figgis, The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.j p. 12.
2. J. N. Figgis, Christianity and History, (London, James Finch &
Co., Ltd., 1909), pp. 69-70.
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Alpine heights of danger and triumph, despising above all
things utilitarian democracy and the optimism of inevitable
progress, with its gospel of the sofa-millenium.-*-
In comparing Acton with Maitland and Creighton, Figgis singles Acton
out for his complete rejection of utilitarian morals:
Less suggestive than Creighton, less enthralling than Mait¬
land, less humorous and unexpected than either, he excelled
them in moral passion and dignity and weight of eloquence.
No one could listen to him without being convinced of the
tremendous issues which lie in political choice, or of the
absolute difference between right and wrong doing. It was
this burning conviction of the eternal distinction between
good and bad, and the immeasurable gulf that divides expedi¬
ence from justice, that gave to his lectures, his writing,
and his life their peculiar significance. His whole life was,
in fact, a protest against the principles of Machiavelli—
that is, of purely utilitarian morals, whether in Church or
State.^
It is interesting, however, that in the dispute which arose between
Acton and Creighton following the publication of Creighton's second
two volumes on the Papacy, Figgis sided with Creighton in allowing
statesmen the defects of their qualities, in allowing certain strata¬
gems of diplomacy in a state of things bordering on war to protect
the rights of national individuality, and in judging the morality of
an act according to the prevailing ethic of the age which was the set¬
ting for any given act. Creighton gave expression to his more or less
lenient view in the third and fourth volumes on the I-Iistoiy of the
Papacy. Acton expressed his opposition to these views in an article
in "The English Historical Review" and in a personal letter to Greighton.
1. J. N. Figgis, The Will to Freedom or The Gospel of Nietzsche
and The Gospel of Christ, (London, Longmans, Green and Co., 1917), p. 92.
2. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, pp. 2^8-259.
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In the letter he wrote:
I really don't know whether you accept them (people in author¬
ity) because of their rank, or of success and poxtfer, or of
their date. The chronological plea may have some little
value in a limited sphere of instances. It does not allow
pf our saying that such a man did not know right from wrong,
unless we were able to say that he lived before Columbus,
before Copernicus, and could not know right from wrong.
...I cannot accept your canon that we are able to judge Pope
and King unlike other men, with a favourable presumption
that they did no wrong. ... There is no worse heresy than
that the office sanctifies the holder of it You
would hang a man of no position like Ravaillac, but if
what one hears is true, then Elizabeth asked the gaoler to
murder Mary and William III ordered his Scots minister to ex-
terpate a clan. Here are the greatest names coupled with
the greatest crimesj you would spare these criminals for
some mysterious reason. I would hang them higher than
Haman, for reasons of quite obvious justice, still more,
still higher for the sake of historical science The
inflexible integrity of the moral code is to me, the secret
of the authority, the dignity, the utility of history. If
we may debase the currency for the sake of genius, or success,
or rank, or reputation, we may debase it for the sake of a
man's influence, of his religion, of his party, of the good
cause which prospers by his credit and suffers by his disap¬
proval. Then history ceases to be a science, an arbiter of
controversy, a guide of the wanderer, the upholder of that
moral standard which the powers of earth and religion itself
tend constantly to depress. It serves where it ought to ^
re'ign; and it serves the worst cause better than the purest.
In one of his letters of reply to the objections of Acton, Creighton
wrote:
...I admit that I hestitate to find men so villainous as in
your scales of r©ral judgment they would be. I like to stand
aside as much as possible, and content myself with the
humble part of a chorus in a Greek play. I try to put myself
in the place of my personages I think that in history
as in private life, I hope I try to find out man's good quali¬
ties before their bad ones, their good intentions before their
evil means. The statesman always seems to be in a non-moral
position, because he has to do what is possible as well as
1. J. E. E. D. Acton, Historical Essays and Studies, ed. by J. N.
Figgis and R. V. Laurence (London, MacMillin and Co., 1908) pp. 50l|-5>0£.
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what is best, and the compromise isrecessarily pitiable.^
Figgis's stand in relation to these opposing views is best expressed
in a statement found in his chapter on "Luther and Machiavelli" in
From Gerson to Grotius:
In later days when his smaller works are forgotten, it will
probably be found that the most enduring of all Acton's
claims to greatness was his passionate insistence on the
need of moral law in the lives of nations and Churches, no
less than in those of individuals. The protest which he made both
in season and out of season on this subject is his real contri¬
bution to his time. But along with this there went an absolute¬
ness of statement which the subject will not bear. He too had
the defects of his qualities—and in order to ensure that we
should not fall into the common error of average humanity and
condone too readily the crimes of statesmen because they were
successful, or those of Churchmen, because they were sincere;
he sweeps into one net of indiscriminate and unrelieved condemn¬
ation Newman and Fenelon, Hosmini and Dupanloup, and prophesies
for them with certainty a future, of which he will not even
profess to be assured in regard to the vilest and most criminal
of mankind. With a deep reverence for the utteror of these
condemnations, and for the general principles that guided him,
I cannot but think that this extremity of overstatement injures
the very causes he desired to promote and has a tendency to make
it the ground of the too easy and too lasting Victory of Mashia-
velli, over all his adversaries. In human judgment it is, I
think, undoubted that the statesman and the ecclesiastic must
be allowed to have the defects of their qualities. While we are
never to assert that these defects are merits (which is to justify
Machiavelli) or that they ought not to have been avoided; or that
right ought not to rule in politics as elsewhere; we are bound
to admit that amid the innumerable temptations to which human
nature is prone, there are certain more peculiarly dangerous
to every condition of life, and that in considering the conduct
of our fellows, we should be less rigid to ihose faults, what¬
ever they may be, which are natural and incident to their posi¬
tion.^
This thole discussion is of special interest not only because any state-
1. Selections from the Correspondence of the First Lord Acton, ed.by
J.N.Figgis and H. Laurence, I (Longmans, Green and Co., London,1917),
pp. 309-310.
2. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotuis, pp. 90-91.
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ment by Figgis regarding things ethical has a close bearing on his
religious thought, but also because it shows Figgis expressing himself
in relation to the thought of Creighton and Acton, two of the men who
had the greatest influence on his own thought.
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CHAPTER III
FIGGIS AS A POLITICAL THINKER
"A Plea for the Group Person"
(Continued)
There is a sense in which all that has gone before in this
discussion of Figgis as a political thinker has been a preparation for
what is to follow. It has formed the necessary background for the
consideration of his thought about the relations between church and
state and the problem of authority in church life and in the life of
the Church of England in particular.
The reader of Figgis's historical works recognizes that he
is on familiar gound when he comes upon the following sentences in the
first chapter, "A Free Church in a Free State}' in the author's
Churches in the Modern State, the main body of which book was delivered
in the form of lectures to the clergy in Gloucester in June 1911s
What really concerns us is...whether or no it (a religious
body) be conceived as possessing any living power of self-
development, or whether it is conceived either as a creature
of the State, or if allowed a private title is to be held
rigidly under the trust-deeds of her foundation, thereby
enslaved to the dead. Not indeed that all change should be
taken as admissible, but that those changes sanctioned by
the constitutional authority of the Church, and declared by
them to be in accordance with the spirit of their society,
should be accepted as such by the Courts, and no further
question asked. In other words, is the life of the society
to be conceived as inherent or derived? Does the Church
exist by some inward living force, with powers of self-
development like a person; or is she a mere aggregate, a
fortuitous concourse of ecclesiastical atoms, treated it
may be as one for purposes of convenience, but with no real
claim to a mind or will of her own,except so far as the civil
power sees good to invest her for the nonce with a fiction of
(96)
unity?1
The "daranosa herfditas," the "single society," the doctrine of the
single uniform all-absorbing power, the unlimited power of the law¬
giver in the state deduced from the notion of its unity, the Roman
theory of sovereignty which in England found its classical expres¬
sion in John Austin, with its entire distinction between public and
private whereby no corporate life can be pleaded against its author¬
ity, is seen to be wrecking its havoc on the relations between church
and state in Figgis's day. Figgis saw the legal minds of his time to
be captives of those theories about sovereignty and law which he had
come to recognize as abstract and theoretic, inconsistent with the
facts of social life, and dangerous to and destructive of freedom.
The result was that they did not recognize the church as an independ¬
ent entity and refuted any claim on the part of the church to an in¬
herent life of her own.
When we find English secular lawyers in the twentieth century
endeavoring to decide between legitimate and illegimate "de¬
velopments" of the Westminster Confession, we feel ourselves
almost like Alice in Wonderland. Only it is the wonderland
of fact—that strangest of all realities, the legal mind.
Here Figgis is referring specifically to the case of the Free Church
of Scotland Appeals, which, for him, was the modern example "par ex-
% cellent" of the lawyers' adherence to Austinianism and their con¬
comitant oblivion to the inherent rights of group life and in par¬
ticular the group life of the church. This Scottish case was a
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, pp. 39-h0.
2. Figgis, Ibid., p. 357"
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favourite subject with Figgis, frequently referred to in his books
and, according to his associates, a frequent topic of conversation.
The Free Church, which grew out of the Disruption of l8ii3> had
voted to join with the United Presbyterians. The union was resisted
oi mi i-vpri in fKi Cf
by tha "Wilis Freeej" who said the amalgamation was "ultra vires." They
claimed that the rigid Calvinistic doctrine of the formularies of the
Free Church were being loosely interpreted and that the identity of
the Free Church in the United Free Church would be lost. They al¬
leged also that Chalmers and those of his group had declared that
they were in favour of the principle of Establishment and that, there¬
fore, the voluntaryism of the United Presbyterians was contrary to
the original intent and purpose of the "Woe Frees." The "Wee Frees"
won their case. The active union was on these grounds condemned as
"ultra vires" by the House of Lords, and all the property of the Free
Church was declared to belong to the small group of the "Wee Frees.""*"
As a result of widespread opposition, however, an Act of Parliament
was passed whereby an equitable apportionment of property was made
between the two groups. In spite of the remedial action taken by
Parliament, Figgis insisted that the initial action of the House of
Lords revealed the legal mind for what it was: the captive of Austin-
1. It is interesting to note P. T. Forsyth's estimate of the
decision: "....it is the most conspicuous instance of the absolutism
of the State to be found in the West outside France or Germany. It is
the long survival, in a particular instance, of the State paganism of
Greece and Home. It is the worst example of Byjfantinism that our re¬
cent history has to show." Peter T. Forsyth, theology in Church and
State, (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1915), p. 172.
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Ian concepts.
This (the Act of Parliament), however, does not alter the
fact that the Judgment of the House of Lords expressed the
mind of English lawyers on a topic of such importance, and
shows us how they would regard all claims to independent life
on the part of a religious body.l
If we try to get behind the judgment to the minds of the judges
and the conception of law which dominates them, I think it will
be found that its failure to harmonise the facts lies above all
in this—that in their view the Church did not exist at all,
i.e., the Church as a living social union of men bound together
by specific ties, recruited by definite means, and acting by
virtue of an inherent spontaneity of life which is not imposed
but original, which though it may be regulated by the civil
authority is not thrived therefrom. That that was the conception
of the Kirk in the mind of Chalmers is unquestionable: it is
indeed the very irony of fate that a body formed for no other
purpose but to maintain a passionate sense of corporate free¬
dom should be declared by the Courts of Law to be lacking in
that very quality of spontaneous life which the fathers of the
Disruption had gone into the wilderness to assert. Now this
conception is not merely the claim of the Scots Free Kirk; it
is the notion of every religious sect which claims for itself
toleration. None can really admit that its entity is derived
from the State.2
Apart from any special or technical points, what we find in
this case is that the lawyers refused to consider the body as
a Church; i.e., as a society with a principle of inherent
life, but bound it rigidly by the dead hand of its original
documents... The actual decision could only be paralleled
if an English Court had chosen to adjudge all the property of
the English Roman Catholics to someone who had refused to sub¬
mit to the Vatican decrees on the ground that they were "ultra
vires," and if the judgment had been given after a discussion
in court of the meaning of the creed of Pope Pius V.3
Further evidence of the same bent of the legal mind in its at¬
titude toward the churches was offered by Professor Dicey in his objection
to the Divorce Act of 1857 whereby an incumbent is compelled to allow
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, p. 20.
2. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
3. Ibid., p. 33.
(99)
the use of his church for the marriage of divorced persons, but he
may refuse to perform the ceremony. Figgis quotes Dicey:
"A clergyman of the Church of England is, after all, an of¬
ficial of the national Church) but under the Divorce Act he
is allowed to decline to solemnize the marriage of any person
whose former marriage has been dissolved on the ground of his
or her adultery. Thus a clergyman, while acting an as official
of the State, is virtually allowed to pronounce immoral a mar¬
riage permitted by the morality of the State. 1
Figgis comments:
It is clear that the writer deprecates the notion that the
Christian Church can have a higher law than that of the
State) indeed he would appear to go farther and to identify
legal with moral right. ....ethics no less than religion
is the creature of the State.
Figgis concedes that part of the problem may arise from the
very fact that the Church of England is an established church and that
a clergyman of that allegiance is an official of the state. He agrees
with that part of Warburton's thought which recognized that an estab¬
lished church does have certain responsibilities to the state and
somewhat less freedom from her sway than clergymen having a different
allegiance. But he insists that the larger problem is not in the
least peculiar to established churches. The Scottish Church case
(whereby the state placed its heavy hand on what should have been
recognized as the inherent rights of a church not established by law)
was strong to support this contention.
It is the boast of the Free Churches in this country that they
have secured the recognition of this right (the recognition of
their spontaneous life), while we are debarred from it, and in
1. Ibid., pp. 1U-15.
2. Ibid., p. 8.
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their view justly debarred, by the accident of establishment.
But in this case (the Scottish case) shows how illusory is
this notion. I think indeed that we must admit that no estab¬
lished Church can claim quite the same liberty as one non-
established. But my point is that in the existing state of
the law there is no security that either the one or the other
will really be allowed this liberty when it comes to the
pinch.
So long as this doctrine or anything like it be dominant, it
would probably be an evil rather than a benefit if the Church
of England were to become, what it now is not, a corporation
recognised as such by the law.^
Mere disestablishment would not of itself ensure liberty. For
this reason I do not wish to discuss the question of disestab¬
lishment. At bottom it is irrelevant to the issue. The real
problem is the relation of smaller communities to that
"communitas communitatum" we call the State, and whether they
have an existence of their own or are the mere creatures of
the sovereign. It might indeed be true as a matter of fact
that disestablishment is the necessary condition in this
country of the recognition in the Church of those principles
I am trying to set down. But if so, it is mere fact; for in
the case of the Established Kirk of Scotland this recognition
exists to a large extent, while in certain other dases where a
Church is not established it is still without real freedom.3
Figgis was not only an Anglican cleric fighting for the rec¬
ognition of the rights of the church. Beyond that, he was a political
thinker who, on grounds which he thought equally worthy of acceptance
by Christian or by non-Christian standards, was making a plea for the
recognition of the rights of the church as one among the group-person¬
alities in any given state, the personality each of which must be
recognized if any sane view of politics is to be entertained.^ In the
1. Ibid., pp. 37-39.
2. Ibid., p. 6$.
3. Ibid., p. 8.
i|. "Starting from a deep conviction of the spiritual independence
of the Church, Dr. Figgis proceeds to a general doctrine of the 'inher-
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introduction to Churches in the Modem State, he writes:
The main purpose of the lectures will have been accomplished if
I can have persuaded the reader to see that the problem is one
which is concerned not with ecclesiastical pretensions so much
as with the nature of human life in society.
Since, as a fact, religious bodies are only one class of a
number of other societies, all laying claim to this inherent
life, it is clear that the question concerns not merely ec¬
clesiastical privilege, but the whole complex structure of
civil society and the nature of political union. It cannot
be too often repeated, that the primary question at issue is
no narrow quibble of a few bigoted clergy and ecclesiastically-
minded laymen, but has to do with the quality of all persons
other than natural persons in the nation. Are corporate
societies to be conceived as real personalities or as fic¬
titious ones, i. e., is their union to be throughout of such
a nature that it has a life greater than the mere sum of the
individuals composing the bodyj that it is not merely a
matter of contract) that in action it has the marks of mind
and will which we attribute to personality) that this corpor¬
ate life and personality grows up naturally and inevitably out
of any union of men for permanent ends, and is not withheld
or granted at the pleasure of the State?2
...in fighting their own battles religious bodies are fighting
the battle of a healthy national life and alone providing the
framework under which the perennial social instincts of men
can develop, and instead of a scientific monstrosity (that of
the omnipotent State facing an equally unreal aggregate of un¬
related individuals) we may look for a land covered with every
kind of social life, functioning not only in matters religious,
intellectual, artistic, but also in the most necessary form of
industrial and manufacturing and even agricultural activity,
and each receiving its due place as a living member of the body
politic, recognised as a real self-developing unity. It is be¬
cause the ground on which we stand is nothing marrow or mean,
but is the only security for true social liberty, and is emi¬
nently congruous with English life, that I am persuaded, that
however long or bitter is the conflict, victory in the long
run is certain.3
ent, self-developing life' of all societies." Barker, introduction
to Gierke, o£. ext., p. lxxxii.
1. Figgis, Churches ih the Modern State, p. ix.
2. Ibid., pp. I4.O-I4I.
3. Ibid., p. £l.
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Figgis was one, if not chief, among those High Churchmen
who p.r essed the theory of Gierke into a defense of the independence
of ecclesiastical societies. The above quotes, however, give con¬
siderable cogency to the assertion that he was pleading the recogni¬
tion of the rights of groups on a broader basis than that of his
High Churchmanship. His interest in Child Socialism, a completely non-
church-related ramification of Gierke's thought, is further evidence
of his concern with the recognition of group personality as a political
thinker, a social theorist, and not simply as a member of one group
within the Church of England. A further case in point is the fact
that Gierke's thought and its relevance ibr English s ocial life was in¬
troduced to Figgis through Maitland, a man who "distrusted all re¬
ligious organizations."^ Speaking of the political writings of Gierke,
Figgis writes:
The value of all these books is the greater for our purpose
that they are in no sense ecclesiastical in tone and that the
English introduction (referring to Maitland's introduction to
his translation of a portion of Gierke's Das Deutsche Genossen-
schaftsrecht) was the work of one who described himself as a
"dissenter from all Churches."2
Figgis also strives to make it clear that wherein he is mak¬
ing his plea for right political thinking as a churchman, it is not
as one identified with the High Church Party or even as a member of
the Church of England. In the Preface to Churches in the Modern State,
he makes this comment in explanation of the book's title:
1. Ibid., p. 26h. (Appendix II)
2. Ibid., p. $6.
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The word "Churches" in the title page is used without any-
theological prejudices to denote religious bodies of any-
particular kind.l
Although the church was seen by Figgis to be fighting a
common cause with all groups within the state which insist on the
recognition of their own personality and the rights which stem from
that personality, yet the church does have, even as she did have
historically, an especially important role to play in winning the day
for freedom. A recurrent emphasis in From Gerson to Grotius was that:
Political liberty, as a fact in the modern world, is the
result of the struggle of religious organisms to live
Religious forces, and religious forces alone, have had suf¬
ficient influence to ensure practical realisation for poli¬
tical ideas.2
Throughout the struggle of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, it was the right of their own church to exist
as a trainer of character which drove Jesuits, Hugenots,
Puritans, and Dutchmen to become often in spite of themselves
the promoters of libertyj and found perhaps its corapletest
expression in the 1Volteface" of the Anglican clergy which
alone made possible the revolution of 1688. For all these
men character was bound up with religious systemj many of
them did not greatly care for and some of them definitely
disapproved of religious and political liberty. But they
were one and all driven to fight for the existence of that
society, whatever it was, which wis for them the true home of
the spirit, and which could alone direct it to the highest
ends. This they did in spite of all theories of the risks
of rebellion, or the evils of anarchy, and sometimes in as¬
tonishing contradiction to the principles which in other
spheres they maintained. It is perhaps true to say, not that
civil liberty is the child of religious liberty, but that lib¬
erty, whether civil or religious, was the work often reluc¬
tantly, sometimes unconsciously, undertaken by communities of
men who had an end higher than political, who refused to sub¬
mit religion to politic arguments, who fought for ends never
1. Ibid., p. viii.
2. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. 5«
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entirely utilitarian."'"
Figgis saw that utilitarian arguments for liberty as such are
not powerful to serve the cause of freedom. Utilitarianism lends it¬
self more readily to an apology for tyranny than for freedom on the
ground that suffering under the worst of tyrants may be preferable
to that produced by insurrection. The most potent argument for free¬
dom is:
the (insistence on the) right of human nature to reach the
noblest.^
In insisting that they be allowed to continue to provide the atmosphere
which to their minds was best suited to develop the highest character,
churches were the most potent force in obtaining toleration and free¬
dom not only for themselves but ibr all.
Figgis challenges the churches in one sense to be in the
twentieth century what they had been in the seventeenth, the soldiers
in the front ranks of freedom's battleline, fighting for their right
to exist as a church. In so doing they are fighting for the rights of
all groups to exist on their own merits and are, at the same time, con¬
tending for individual liberty which is historically, according to
Figgis's thesis, a by-product of corporate freedom. But even though
the church can contribute most to freedom by being the church in the
truest sense, yet Figgis would urge upon all churchmen, as he urged
upon the clergy of Gloucester when delivering Churches in the Modem
1. Ibid., p. 108.
2. Ibid., p. 107.
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State in lecture form, a keener awareness of the political aspect
of their position and of the common cause they have vrxth all who
would establish a healthy society.
One of the controversial outgrowths of Figgis's insistence on the
right of the church to live its own life without the state's infring¬
ing upon its personality is his like assertion that the church has no
right to dictate to the state.
Insisting that neither the individual Christian nor the
church as a corporate body has the right to impose Christian morality
upon those who owe no allegiance to Christ or His Church, Figgis as¬
serts that the impact of the church upon the community must be through
the leavening influence of churchmen who take their Christianity and
its ethic seriously.
What I am anxious to emphasize is that, primarily, the business
of Christians is with the moral standard of their own society
and with themselves as its members. The raising of that
will gradually bring about the elevation of the great mass
of those who do not belong to it. So long as Churchmen do
not see, except in a few matters, such as Sunday observance
and sexual morality, any real reason why they should have any
higher standard than the world at large, so long is the
Christian Church failing in its mission. ... We want an e-
normously heightened public opinionwithin the Church, and then
it is bound to affect the world at large.^
Addressing the congregation of All Saints' Church, Margaret
Street, London, in £>10, Figgis sounded the challenge to the individual
Christian as "separated unto the Gospel," as a member of the church
which is meant to be "an holy nation, a peculiar people," and also as
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, pp. 129-130.
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identified with the church of the upper middle class;
...we need even more closely to ask ourselves personally the
question? What do I mean when I speak of myself as "separated
unto the Gospel"? Am I, indeed, being crucified with Christ?
What difference does it make to me that I am a member of this
wonderful company, the general assembly and Church of the
firstborn? Do I get and do I spend my income differently from
ray neighbour over the way, who calls himself an agnostic or
something else? I think some of the talk about social reform
has done harm. It is directing many people's minds to the
gigantic evils of Western civilisation, evils so gigantic that
but few see any way to cure them, and those few must wait years
before anything can be done, while their minds are diverted
from the more practical question of what they are doing with
their own opportunities. How are their dependents treated?
What are their relations to servants? How many of your servants
are allowed to break down by overwork and want of proper rest?1
H. M. Helton, who speaks of an indebtedness to Gierke, Maitland, and
Figgis, makes a comment Figgis would have recognized as expressing his
own mind:
It is well recognized that at the time of Constantine the
"world" got into the church and has never since been out of
it. If the world is indifferent to the church it is because
the church is so little different from the world; and the first
step to attaining an effective influence over the world is
through dissociation from the assumptions and habits which pre¬
vail in the world.^
Figgis's strong conviction about the church's "hands off" pol¬
icy towards the state comes home with particular force when one Beads of
his assertion that the church should not presume so much as to instruct
the state on legislation relating to marriage and divorce.
\y~t_ y\ce.*t~h it /vevAec"/£■( it fa-A-t - -- .
...any change in the law of the land(toward increasing the
facilities for divorce) shall leave entirely unchanged the
1. Figgis, Religion and English Society, (London, Longmans, Green
and Co., 1911), p. ij.67
2. H. Maurice Helton, Religion and the State, (London, John Heri¬
tage, 1937), p. ll|8.
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freedom of the Church to insist on the observance of the
Christian law of marriage by all her communicating members,
and to exclude all who do not. But as Churchmen we are not
bound to go further.1
All that Figgis will allow the Christian to ask of the state
is legislation which is generally acceptable apart from a plea in the
name of the Christian faith:
I am not saying that every individual among us might not vote
or write against such proposals; he may object to them as a
change, or because they have this laxity in America, or for
its effect on the children, or because it is only aiad of a few
of the rich, or because indissoluble marriage is affirmed by the
law of nature, and so forth. But he ought not to be asked to
oppose them on grounds of loyalty to the Church;2
Favourable as most of Figgis's readers were to the general
thesis of his work, many were critical of his development of his thesis
to the point where the concurrence of the positivist or some equally
non-Christian school is required before a Christian may take a stand on
a moral issue regarding state action. In a letter to the Church Times,
a rather representative voice is given to that criticism:
..we may remark that Dr. Figgis here seems to forget what he has
elsewhere emphasized—that the common ground to agnostics
and Christians is rapidly suffering erosion under the waves of
recent ethical criticism of Christianity, and that it is there¬
fore very hazardous to rely on it as a foundation for any com¬
mon moral action. And too, such action would be extremely
limited in scope, for these conditions would apparently not
allow a Christian (according to Dr. Figgis) to resist a move¬
ment such as "reform" of the divorce law, of which the real
object is sexual promiscuity.
The notion that Christians in their capacity of citizens can be
content with advocating a sort of "reduced" Christian morality
is in fact exactly parallel to the old and exploded idea that
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, p. 121.
2. Ibid., pp. 12U-1257
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there are such things as natural religion and undemonination-
alasm onto which revelaed religion and definite church teaching
can respectively be clapped as superstructures. Dr. Figgis
would, I imagine, repudiate these ideas... let he is ap¬
parently prepared to accept the analogous and highly unsatis¬
factory distinction between Natural Ethics and Christian
Ethics, and to allow that the Christian may - nay, must - act
in politics only according to the former.
There is a fundamental difference between Figgis's thought
regarding the relation of church aid state, church and community, and
the thought of a number of men in Great Britain who, in recent years,
have given significant attention to this problem as accentuated by the
grim realities in the world and within national communities during the
years including and surrounding World War II which compel thinking
churchmen to examine wherein the church has failed that these things
should have come to pass, to rethink the church's position with regard
to the community in general and the state in particular. Such men as
T. S. Eliot, John Baillie, and Alec Vidler are all of a mind that the
church and her members have a definite Christian obligation to God for
the community and that to keep the faith and to preserve the Christian
community, however loosely the term has to be defined if it is to des¬
cribe the modern English state, a Christian claim must be made upon that
community.
It must therefore be said, in season and out of season, that a
Church to be worthy of the name, however small a minority it
may be in any given society, is charged with the responsibility
of bearing testimony to God's sovereignty and God's will before
kings and rulers and the whole people. It must declare man's
civic duties as well as his ecclesiastidal duties. It must
teach the Law of Gbd, as well as preach the Gospel of God. It
1. J. G. Walker, Church Times, "Dr. Figgis and Christian Morality,"
(letter which appeared in the Correspondence Section) pp. 36-37.
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must denounce injustice and sin wherever they are to be found,
and call upon all men to repent and return unto the Lord their
God by obeying His law in their common life.-'-
There is a general agreement among these writings, according
to Mr. Eliot's expression, that "Christianity is communal before being
p
individual." Dr. Baillie developes this theme in the context of the
doctrine of baptism:
The insight enshrined in this doctrine and practice is that
the most likely way to bring men to an individual decision for
Christ is to nurture them within a Christian community. This
community is in the first place the family, and hence the con¬
troversy has always revolved round the baptism of infants bom
to Christian parents. But it is necessary that something of
the same principle should be extended also to those larger
social units in which, as the child grows to adolescence and
manhood, he finds himself increasingly involved; and this is
all the more necessary in a day like our own, when the family
unfortunately counts for so much less in adolescent life than
it used to do.
Justj therefore, as it is wrong to think meanly of the Chris¬
tianity of children before they reach the age of personal de¬
cision and are confirmed in the faith, so I believe it wrong to
hold as of no account the Christianity which prevades the life
of a community before it is confirmed in the personal decision
of every individual citizen.3
Interesting expression is given to Mr. Eliot's insistence on
Christianity's responsibility for the community as his thesis comes face
to face with the problem of the non-Christian statesman:
What the rulers believed, would be less important than the
beliefs to which they would be obliged to conform. And a
skeptical or indifferent statesman, working xri_thin a Christian
frame, might be more effective than a devout Christian states¬
man obliged to conform to a secular frame. For he would be re-
1. Vidler, o£. cit., p. 133.
2. T. S. Elxot,""TKe Idea of Christian Society, (London, Faber and
Faber Limited, 1939), p. 59.
3. John Baillie, What is Christian Civilization?, (New York,
Charles Scribner's Sons, 19UFT, p. 35.
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quired to design his policy for the government of a Christian
society.
Poihting up the whole contrast between the three who have been singled
out and Figgis is a statement by Figgis wherein he is seen to retire be¬
fore that same figure, referred to by Eliot, of the non-Christian states¬
man. Rather than to entertain the hope or even postulate the ideal of
a community in which the community's temper, constantly nourished by a
community-minded church, would compel a certain conformity to a Christian
standard, he writes:
One of theunder-secretaries of His Majesty's Government is a
person who varies his defence of Liberalism with public and
repeated denials of the historic fact of our Lord's existence;
and when he has spoken of Him, does so in terms of which the
following is a specimen: "Some cf the sayings attributed to
Jesus have a relatively high moral value." Such a man has every
right to his place in the modern State; but what guidance can
the law of the Christian Church be as to what ahall be the
wisest law to make in a society of which such people are the
rulers? What may be the wisest rule for a nation so hetero-
geneously composed we cannot from the Christian standpoint
The fundamental difference between the approach of Figgis and
those like him and that of Eliot, Baillie, Vidler, and those sharing
their thoughts is explained in part by the fact that Figgis assumed from
his observations that the church had returned to a minority position of
the kind it had not known since the early church, and that the twentieth
century civilization which surrounds the church is no more Christian than
was the pre-Constantine Roman State.
1. Eliot, op. ext., p. 28.
2. Figgis,"Churches in the Modern State, p.122.
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Figgis was a student of his age in many aspects of its ex¬
pression, and the more he saw, the more he was confirmed in his rather
pessimistic estimate of the century in which he was living. The inroads
of secularism, the treating of people as means to an end rather than
ends in themselves, the ridiculing of holiness even as an ideal, the
dropping off in church attendance, the largely anti-Christian, even on
the ethical side, atmosphere in literature and art, novels and dramas,
newspapers and reviews, the loss of adhesion to the ancient faith among
the intellectuals (including the universities), as well as among the
general public, in their cumulative effect brought him to this conclu¬
sion:
...it is truer to say that Christianity runs counter to our
civilisation than that it fulfils its.
C- F. 5
Figgis quotes $ Mr.^ Masterraan and is in complete agreement with him:
"It is the passing of a whole civilisation away from the faith _
in which it was founded and out of which it has been fashioned. "
Again in Figgis's words:
I should say there are no longer grounds for believing that the
Western World is Christian now in a sense in which it was not
in the period immediately preceding the peace of the Church
under Constantine the Great.3
1. J. N. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads (New York, Long¬
mans, Green and Co., 1913), pp. 23-2317
2. Ibid., (quoting Condition of Sngland,) p. 33-
3. Ibid., pp. 29-30. Figgis is to be identified in large part with
the group which Dr. Baillie describes as "....those within Anglicanism,
Catholic, and High Church in temper and tracing their descent from one
strain of the Oxford Movement, who urge the Church to a much franker
recognition of its minority position from an increasingly pagan or merely
secularist world." Baillie, o£. ext., p. 32.
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The other view which, though not minimizing the powerful in¬
fluence of non-Christian forces, suggests that the pre-Constantine stage
has not yet been reached is expressed by Mr. Eliot:
...a society has not ceased to be Christian until it has be¬
come positively something else. It is my contention that we
have to-day a culture which is mainly negative, but which, so
far as it is positive, is still Christian. I do not think
that it can remain negative, because a negative culture has
ceased to be efficient in a world where economic as well as
spiritual forces are proving the efficiency of cultures which,
even when pagan, are positive; and I believe that the choice
before us is between the formation of a new Christian culture,
and the acceptance of a pagan one. Both involve radical
changes; but I believe that the majority of us, if we could
be faced immediately with all the changes which will only be
accomplished in several generations, would prefer Christianity.
Figgis would argue his estimate of the twentieth century on the ground
that "positive paganisms" are sufficiently influential in defy the
description of the present age as a negative culture.
It is unlikely that Figgis's approach to the problem of the
relation between church and the community would have been appreciably
different even if he had been less pessimistic in his estimate of his
age. Figgis's basic political principles, as the study of his later
political-historical works has indicated, were by definition opposed to
the Church-State as representing the form of the "single society" which
had historically given rise to so many injustices either to the State or
the Church, depending on which held the balance of power.
Any attempt to impose the opposite (Church-State doctrine) doc¬
trine seems to me partly to be a survival from the regime of the
seventeenth century, and from the theocratic ideals which Puri¬
tans and Carolines alike inherited from the Middle Ages; and
1. Eliot, 0£. cit., p. 12.
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partly due to the definite effort to establish an all-embrac¬
ing humanitarian Church-State,which would ultimately mean the
destruction of all freedom in religious bodies. For the uni¬
tary doctrine of the State leads only, in\ery rare instances,
to the establishment of the claims of the Church (which from
this standpoint are always illegitimate), and then they only
take the form of supremacy. In nine cases out of ten it means
the secularising of the Church, and the dominance of Erastian-
"1 'ism.-1-
Every attempt to raise the code of the nation to that of the
Church leads, if unsuccessful, to an attempt to lower the code
of the Church to that of the world, because it proceeds from a
notion that at bottom the two are identical. Thus if the lax
party gets the upper hand it will compel the Church to conform
to its standards, an attempt which is being made on all hands
just now. The two socieites are distinct—distinct in origin,
in aim, and (if you have toleration) in personnel. The smaller
is never likely, as things are, to control the larger. If she
attempt to do so she will be beaten, and in the process be
like to lose her own freedom. The Puritans attempted to raise
the nation to their own notions of a high morality. The con¬
sequence was seen after the Restoration. It is the essence of
the Church to be different from the world, and her mission to
proclaim that difference. Whenever men try to sanctify the
world by raising it to the level of the Church, they commonly
succeed only in lowering the life of the Church to accommodate
it to the practice of the world. The two centuries which began
with Pope Boniface VIII ended with Alexander VI.2
Figgis, as has been observed, makes much of the "two society"
developments in political thinking whereby both church and state came to
be recognized as units enjoying their particular prerogatives, each hav¬
ing an identity of its own which guards against loss of identity through
the illegimate encroachments of the other. One would expect that Figgis
would proceed to apply to the full his principle of the real personality
of groups to both parties suggested by the term, "two society." The fact
is, however, that while insisting on the real personality of the church
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, pp. 130-131.
2. Ibid., pp. 133-13H7
(11h)
which the state has no power to grant but only to recognize, there is
no parallel development of the real personality of the state. He pro¬
ceeds from his deep conviction of the real personality of the church
to the real personality of the vast number of interrelated societies
which go to make up the social structure, all the while avoiding any
discussion of or concession to the real personality of the state.
There seems to be a reluctance to recognize such a possibility similar
to the reluctance of seventeenth century Jesuits to concede that the
state, as well as the church, is a "perfect society.""*"
Vidler writes:
Figgis wis concerned to establish the group personality of
societies in the State over against'the omnicompetent State",
and not the personality of the State itself. He maintained
that the true idea of the State is that of a "comraunitas com-
munitatum," but his own emphasis was on the "communitatum"
rather than on the "communitas."
That Figgis's emphasis was on the "communitatum" rather than on the
"communitas" is borne out by his own words:
As a matter of fact, in England at least, it is these smaller
associations which have always counted for most in the life of
the individual. His school, or college, his parish or county,
his union or regiment, his wife or family is the most vitally
formative part in the life of most menj and in so far as Eng¬
land has anything worthy in civic life to show to the world,
it is the spectacle of individuals bred up or living within
these small associations which mould the life of men more in¬
timately than does the great collectivity we call the State.^
The extent to which Figgis considered groups within the state
Cf« C-erson to Grotius, p. 160.
2. Vidler, o£. cit., p. 5?, footnote 3-
3. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, pp. U8-li9.
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to be a more basic reality than the state itself is vividly conveyed by
his attitude toward the education controversy.
Throughout the education controversy much has been heard against
the iniquity of privately managed schools receiving public money,
at least in the form of rates (for the income-tax is not concerned
with conscience). Now surely (except in the case of the one-man
manager) this is a total misconception. As opposed to State
management, perhaps the word private may be admitted, but when it
implies, as it ought, purely individual management, a false view
is suggested. These social bodies other than the State are not
only not private, but in their working they are more akin to the
State than they are to the individual. ... The popular use of
the word "Public School" to denote a school under collective man¬
agement is a far more reasonable sued realistic habit, though I
suppose that it is not technically justified. 1
Rather than look upon the state as one great personality among,
if not superior to, other group personalities, Figgis speaks of it as
something of an impersonal referee among the vast number of group per¬
sons making up the community.
What do we find as a fact (as actual features of civil society)?
Not, surely, a sand-heap of individuals, all equal and undif¬
ferentiated, unrelated except fo the State, but an ascending
hierarchy of groups, family, school, town, county, union,
Church, etc., etc. All these groups (or many of them) live with
a real life; they act towards one another with a unity of will
and mind as though they were single personsj they all need to be
allowed resasonable freedom, but must be restrained from acts of
injustice towards one another or the individual; ... Between
all these groups there will be relations, and not merely between
the individuals composing them. To prevent injustice between
them and to secure their rights, a strong power above them is
needed. It is largely to regulate such groups and to ensure
that they do not outstep the bounds of justice that the coercive
force of the State exists.2
1. Ibid., pp.68-70.
2. Ibid., pp. 87-90. The extent to which Figgis emphasizes the nec¬
essity of state regulation and police action exonerates Figgis's thesis
of the accusation that it leans in the direction of syndicalism, a ten¬
dency which Barker recognizes in the English development of Gierke's
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By confining the state to a regulative function in the sphere
of external action as he does, by refusing to consider the state as a
person in the same sense in which other groups are, Figgis points up,
by way of omission, the fact
that a nation's life is larger than what is comprised in its
organised activities as a state.
Figgis would agree in large part with a distinction tetween society and
the state made by Barker:
A Society is a community of human beings who seek to fulfil
the general purposes of human life in all its aspects. A
State is an association of the same beings, in legal form,
for the specific purpose of regulating human life, in the
sphere of external action, by rules designed to secure the
minimum of friction between its members and the maximum of
their development.
It may well be questioned whether or not Figgis's failure to
doctrine: "...Gierke's doctrine—at any rate in our own country, and
since Maitland first gave it vogue in 1902 has been drawn into that way.
Me must not be pragmatical, nor judge the truth of a doctrine by the uses
to which it is subsequently put. But at any rate we may examine the com¬
pany which it keeps, and if we are already inclined to question its truth
on fundamental and essential grounds, we may perhaps find that the re¬
sults of such examination serve to corroborate our doubts." Barker, op.
cit., p. Ixxxi.
On cne occasion a French Syndalicist, having read Churches in the
Modern State, came to visit Figgis at Mirfield. Beyond the fact that he
was a complete atheist, he, in lecturing at the college, gave such a
bloody picture of social reform that Figgis was thrown in a rather un¬
happy light at the college.
Coker concludes somewhat critically of the Pluralists' (of which
Figgis was one) deprecation of the monists' facing up to the fact of
state sovereignty. "The significant fact appears to be that, however
much we exalt individual or group freedom, we are faced at present with
the prospect of a more varied and centralized political control, and that
the net result of our practical efforts at devolution will rot soon diminish
greatly the scope or importance of state authority." Francis W. Coker, Re
cent Political Thought, (New York, D. Jfc>pleton-Century Company, (193i|))jP.Tl?.
~
lT Vidler, 0£. cit., p. 62.
2. Barker, on. cit., lxx.
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recognize the personality of the state was a convenient omission and
one only questionably permissible even according to his own precepts.
Even when the state is functioning in its regulatoiy capacity, it has
the marks of a self-developing personality as much as, if not more than,
the multitude of other group personalities in the community. Even a
policeman is a moral person. But if there is no logical justification
of his neglecting the state as a group-person, perhaps the omission can
be explained, if not justified, on the consideration that "...if a boat
is on the point of capsizing, it can only be trimmed by leaning far
over to the other side." Figgis felt that political thought and ac¬
tion both historically and, what was more to the point, in modern
times, was enslaved to a doctrine representing the state as a super¬
man, ruling individuals who are below men. In "leaning far over to the
other side," he stressed almost exclusively the personality of the
smaller groups within which individual personality comes to maturity.
By not having any developed theory of the personality of the
state, Figgis was not forced to confront the fact that a church could
not be true to its mission to the world of persons, including group
persons, if she did not at least strive to induce those persons to be¬
come Christians. "Personality and religion," as Forsyth observed, "are
inseparable.For the church to abandon the state to its own religious
devices would be something less than Christian.
Figgis does not face up to the inseparability of personality and
1. Forsyth, o£. cit., p. 191.
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religion (except, of course, in the church) even when dealing with those
groups for the recognition of whose personality he so vigorously contends .
Figgis was so insistent that the Christian does not have any right to
make decisions on a Christian basis when identified with a predominantly
non-Christian, heterogenous group, that it xaay be surmised with consider¬
able certainty that he would not have gone along with Relton (indebted
as Relton was to Figgis's thought),"'" who claims in essence that all
forms of group life are legitimate areas of Christian expression.
Group-consciousness based on race, nationality, family, class,
area of government, political party, and so on, is not, by
Christians, to be ignored, abjured, and repudiated out of hand;
any of these groupings may be hindrances to faith and the fel¬
lowship of the faithful, occasions of dragging down to the level
of the world; so that what is here meant by giving precedence to
a fellowship based on religion is that the claims of these forms
of group consciousness should be scrutinized in the light of
devotion to Christ himself.
In speaking about any proposal for a complete separation of
the church and state (he recognizes each as a group personality), P. T.
Forsyth shows from his standpoint how detrimental it is to personality
to demand a different level of conduct according to the allegiance one
has in mind at the moment.
The people of this country at least are little likely to accept
the absolute secularization of the State; which would be an ad¬
mission that civilization, or society, cannot become Christian
but can only have a Christian society, in the shape of a Church,
beside it or within it. But we cannot so divide either a soul,
or a people. The polar unity that connects both refuses to be
cleft with a gulf across which nothing travels, or to suffer
a paralysis which makes the right hand careless of what is done
1. Infra., p. 1X4-- lar.
2. Relton, o£. ext., pp. l!f7-ll4-8.
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by the left."*"
Figgis's constant reiteration that whatever influence the
church is to have on civilization must be through the medium of the in¬
dividual Christian acting as an individual seems to be at loggerheads
with another of his often-repeated contentions that individual persons
cannot exist apart from society and can fulfill their destiny only in
society. The former thesis appears to permit the individual as a mem¬
ber of society to fulfill all but his Christian destiny as a member of
society.
Barker is quite explicit in his assertion that Figgis's de¬
velopment of Gierke's theme, which he looked upon as leaning in the di-
2
rection of syndalicism, is alien to the logic of Gierke's general
theory. According to Barker, the logic of his theory tends more towards
the creation of a Leviathan.
The theory of the real personality of groups may not only
trend towards syndicalism. It may also keep other company;
and it may trend towards that very doctrine of the absolute
State from which it is supposed to be our rescue. We can only
make the theory a defence and buttress against the State if
we suppose that it does not apply to the State, and if we say
that there is no real person standing behind the State, as
there is behind other groups.3
The thing which Barker fails to consider is the possibility in our time
of a church which, even as historically, has a sense of divine mission,
a supernaturally imposed resolve to stay alive, a church which would re¬
sist in the name of the Christ, whose body the dhurch is and in whom her
1. Peter T. Forsyth, Theology in Church and State, (London, Hodder
and Stoughton, 1915), p. 122.
2. Supra., p. 115.
3. Baker, o£. cit., p. lxxxiv.
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personality consists, any effort of the Leviathan to rid the state of
this most significant of all group persons.
...he leaves out of account the belief that the church as a
group-person and the greatest of group-persons stands over
against the State to check its monistic pretensions.
But this reply to Barker's accusation based on the unique per¬
sonality of the church is not here presented as though to suggest that
Figgis would have made such a rebuttal. He does not plead for the rec¬
ognition of the group-personality.of the church as distinct from that
enjoyed by the vast number of other groups which constitute the community.
Writing in Theology of Church and State, which was published only a year
after Churches in the Modern State, Forsyth, though not denying the per¬
sonality of group-persons other than the church, the state, and the
family, suggested against the background of his great conviction as to
the uniqueness of the church's personality, that only by pleading its
uniqueness could the church obtain the desired recognition of its per¬
sonality and the attending right to interpret its own articles and to
alter them without any consent other than its own.
There are two suggestions. The first is that every group,
commercial, cultured, or other, that has shown itself by a
long and effective history to possess a common life indepen¬
dent of the coming and going of individuals should rank as a
corporate personality, with innate revisory rights. But this
is hardly practical politics. The State would never consent
to relinquish its control over the national universities for
instance. And it has not yet done with the City Guilds. So
that the other course awaits us—of recognising in the Church
(through its indwelling Lord) a life quite unique, a collec¬
tive personality more distinctive and divine than that of any
other society (even the State itself), and a sanctity of in-
1. Vidler, o£. cit., p. 72, footnote 1.
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born right more immune than theirs from, the law's control, as
owing nothing to the law's creation. Such a solution would be
practical to the situation. And it would have the greater ad¬
vantage of being a religious solution to a difficulty religious
in its nature.1
It is impossible that the Church, the one society in the world
which has an absolutely universal power and destiny, should be
treated by the State like a gas company, and that as a Church
it should for the State simply not exist.
Of the two suggestions considered by Forsyth, Figgis choses to follow
the first. Figgis offers a Christian solution to the problem of the re¬
lation of church and community when challenging those who identify them¬
selves with the Holy Catholic Church; he offers a solution counhed in
political terminology when addressing the larger community or when
recommending to the church an approach that might be acceptable to both
Christian and non-Christian. He was concerned not with the most that
the church could claim but with the "least that it can claim without
committing corporate suicide."
Some, perhaps, will doubtless criticise what is here said,
especially in the third lecture, and will complain that it
is unduly conciliatory to the State. I cannot help that.
That the Church might under certain conditions claim a great
deal more may be true. But with so much frank denial of her
right to claim anything at all, it seems to me at this junc¬
ture far more profitable io discuss what she must claim so
long as she is a Church, than what she might claim if her
right to an inherent life were once universally admitted by
statesmen and lawyers.3
However much it may be agreed that Figgis was far too concilia¬
tory and that he indeed could have claimed much more in the name of the
1. Forsyth, op. cit., pp. 17U—17^-
2. Ibid., p.~2I4JL3..
3. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, p. Ij..
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church, yet his whole position is geared to confront certain stark
realities, which even advocates of the joining in holy matrimony^
of church and state recognize as very real obstacles to this match-
making. The would-be groom (the state) finds it impossible to settle
on any one bride (considering the religious heterogenity of the modern
community).*^ If he were to settle according to his liking, his choice
would offend the sensibilities of all the other hopefuls whom he had
no desire to offend. If he were to settle on one that would, in a
sense, be agreeable and representative of all, she would be of such
weak character that the contemplated life together would be both bor¬
ing and unproductive. The embracing of a watered-down religiosity, a
vague undenominationalism,^ would be of no use to the church nor the
state.
The danger, and one which Figgis does not appear to recognize
as a necessary fact, is that the bride (the church), despairing of the
1. Vide, Forsyth, o£. cit., pp. 2i|l-2lj.2.
2. "Since the object of the church is the redemption of the world,
it must at any moment consider the world as it is." Figgis, Our Place in
Christendom, (London, Longmans and Green, 1916), p. 120. (Lectures de¬
livered at St. Martin's in the Fields, Autumn 1915; subsequently pub¬
lished in book form to which Figgis contributed Chapter 1+, "Councils and
Unity," and Chapter 6, "National Churches.")
3. "In seeking to realize a Christian theory (sc. of the relations
of Church and State) we have to face the fact that there is to-day no
united church, and that in society the Christian faith is not, as in the
mediaeval world, in possession, nor yet, as in the early Church, a new
challenge." Vidler, ojo. cit., p. 98, quoting C.O.P.E.C. Commission Re¬
port on Politics and Citizenship.
"If my outline of Christian society has commanded the ascent of the
reader, he will agree that such a society can only be realised when the
great majority of the sheep belong to one fold." Eliot, 0£. cit., p. U6.
i;. "By undenominationalism we mean the attempt to preserve Chris¬
tianity in abstraction from a substantial church." Vidler, o£. cit., p. 131.
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day when the state will finally make up its mind and ask the question,
will go into seclusion and strive to make the best of her spinsterhood,
will leave the state to his bachelor fate (the church would thus resign
itself by its lack of relation to the state, to the category of a sect).
Figgis's treatment of the problem of church and state, church
and community, had a very real influence on the approach of many English
churchmen to the problem during the years following his delivery of
Churches in the Modern State in lecture form in 1911, and its appearance
in book form in 19lii.
The comments of Bishop Gore, the founder cf the Community of the
Resurrection, in testifying before the Archbishops' Committee ai Church
and State, 1916, are a fine index of the extent of the impact macfe by
Figgis:
The present writer believes, with the author of Churches in the
Modern State, that it's a matter of greatest importance that the
modern legal and general theory of state unity and authority de¬
rived from Roman times should be so fundamentally remodeled as
to recognise fully and frankly, not only with regard to the Es¬
tablished Church but with regard to all other churches and cor¬
porate bodies, that the great unity of the State and its aithor-
ity can include and recognize a great variety of relatively free
corporations, exercising in their own spheres authority over
their members, while they yield all of the recognition to the
State which composes and, in its own general sphere, rules
them all.l
Other testimonies in the same report, though not mentioning Figgis's
name, bear witness directly or indirectly to his particular emphasis.
It would be mistaken to regard the Middle Ages as a continual
fight between spiritual aid temporal. These are rather two as-
1. Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Church and State, 1916,
pp. 2k7-2W.
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pects of one united community.--
There can be no question that the solution of the difficulties
that we have described must be found by securing to the Church
liberty to perform the functions which it alone is confident to
undertake, and transferring to it work which the Parliament can
no longer adequately perform. This is just not merely as a
practical way out of the difficulty but also by tie fundamental
conception of the church as a self-governing society, ready,
and able to cooperate with the civil power but maintaining its
independent existence, ana rejecting the notion that it is in
any sense a mere organ of the state.
Giving evidence of Figgis's continuing influence, Barker said
before the Archbishops' Commission on the Relations Between Church and
State, 1935:
Speaking in terms of my own subject, as a teacher of Political
Science, I could say that I have noticed in the last thirty
years (particularly under the influence of Dr. Figgis) a vogue
of certain theories of Gierke (or rather Maitland in his intro¬
duction to his translation of a chapter of Gierke), and a con¬
sequent disposition to advocate what are called the "inherent
rights" of the real "group-person," whether civil or ecclesiastic.^
Among the people whose writings contain an acknowledgment of
debt to Dr. Figgis and give strong evidence of his influence, let three
of them be singled out: H. M. Relton, H. J. Laski, and P. T. Forsyth.
Relton, the most rocent of the £e«r to express his indebted¬
ness writes:
In particular I would express my indebtedness to F. W. Mait¬
land' s translation of Otto Gierke's work, and the writings
of the late Dr. Figgis.^-
Later on in the same work, after quoting from a portion of Churches in
1. Ibid., p. 15.
2. Ibid., p. 31.
3. Report of Archbishops' Commission, 1935* pp. 68-69.
h, Relton, 0£. cit., p. 11.
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the Modern State, which contains a summary statement of Figgis's main
position, he writes tliooe'uordc j
These words were penned in 1911, and all that has happened
at home and abroad since is surely an illuminating comment
upon them and a striking tribute to their prophetic note.^
illthough H. J. Laski has since moved away from the doctrine of
the personality of the group, in 19tif he wrote::
How much it (his book, Problem of Sovereignty) owes to Mait-
land and Saleilles and Dr. I'iggis, 1 dare not estimate.3
Lawyers, for the most part, have tended to believe that the
status of a person is something it is in the power of the
State alone to confer, and in this view Austin, doubtless,
would h ave most fully concurred. But surely it is abundantly
clear that the personality of associations is primary, that
it springs from the fact of their existence, and is not con¬
ceded to them by the State.)*
P. T. Forsyth in Theology in Church and State, as has been
seen, moves considerably beyond the claims made by Figgis, both for the
church and the state,^ but he too acknowledges a very real indebtedness
to him:
Some years ago I came across Maitland's edition of Gierke's
Political Theories of the Middle Age, to find that here was
a point of view so new and thorough as to suggest a reconstruc¬
tion of many aspects of our usual attitude on Church questions,
as well as on the certain others. Then, in 1913, I read Dr.
1. Some of the words to which Helton was referring: "...More and
more it is clear that the mere individual's freedom against an omnipotent
State may be no better than slaveryj more and more is it evident that the
real question of freedom in our day is ihe freedom of smaller unions to
live within the whole." Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, p. 52.
2. Relton, on. cit., p. 28.
3. Harold J. Laski, Studies in the Problem of Sovereignty, (New
Haven, Yale University Press, 191ilT7 Preface.
k. Ibid., p. 272.
5. Supra., pp. 13.0-HI.
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Figgis' book, so largely based on Gierke, Ghurches in the Modern
State, This work of a historian highly erudite and spiritual
acted so strongly on me that, falling on the soil prepared by
Gierke, it sprang up in the second portion of this book. The
principles there treated are of the first value for a theory
of the Church which is to be just both to its distinctive life
and dogma, its long history, and its relation to the society
round it.
If there is a sense in which Relton and Forsyth (especially
Forsyth), in elaborating on Figgis's theme arrive at a more acceptable
interpretation of the church and state, church aid community problem, it
is no discredit to the master that he was excelled by his students.
Earlier in this chapter considerable attention was given to
Figgis's general enthusiasm for the political principles enshrined in
the Conciliar Movement, the movement which he recognized ss the culmina¬
tion of medieval constitutionalism.
The preceding pages have shown the principles of Constance and
Basel to be an important part of the working basis of Figgis's suggestion
as to how the state aught to conduct itself. Now, in the original con¬
text of the Councils' preoccupation with matters pertaining to the prob¬
lem of authority within the church, Figgis is seen to single out the prin¬
ciple's enshrined in the'Movement as the safeguard against the all-devouring
autocracy cf Rome, as the preservative against mere individualism and
the disorganized anarchy of Christendom divided into warring sects, and
as the example of, if not the authentication of, the English Church.
One of the most important claims made by the fathers of Constance
and the other councils was that "the church is nothing less than the whole
1. Forsyth, o£. cit., pp. vii-viii.
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of it."
With an iteration almost wearisome the Coneiliar party assert
that the commission to St. Peter was a commission to the whole
Churchj that the Papal power is only representative; that he is
not "domimis" but minister; that he may be restrained, and even
deposed, as he was. I think some went so far as to say that the
Papacy might be abolished, if the Church saw fit, for "orbis
major urbe." None of the Conciliar writers could dispute that
the actual administrative power rested in the Pope, although
many wished to curtail it and to devise a definite system of
constitutional government. Still, the Pope's authority is
merely that of the mouthpiece; the real authority is that
which exists diffusively in the whole "communitas fidelium."I
Drawing the lesson from this Conciliar emphasis that real authority
"exists diffusively in the whole 'communitas fidelium'," Figgis con¬
cludes :
What we need most is to realise that authority in the Church of
God is the expression of the life of the whole Christian com¬
munity, and no single member but bears his part.2
The truth...sees the spirit of Christ, the authority, in the
Christian body as a whole, and does not concentrate it in a
centre, not even in a general council.3
These truths are presented by Figgis as opposed to the political prin¬
ciples enshrined in ultramontanisrrA which, he insists, are inextricably
bound up with the false theory of the omnipotent sovereign. Ultra-
montanism represents the development within the church of a theory analo¬
gous to that which Figgis tirelessly combated as it evidenced itself in
the State.
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, pp. 157.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, p. 193.
3. Ibid.,'p. 202.
It. Figgis enjoyed the optimism of "...attributing to the ultra¬
montane Papacy the character of a transient historical phenomenon."
Churches in the Modern State, p. 155.
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...the development of the Corpus Juris Canonici, with the
principles that underlie it, has merely meant the taking
over from the Corpus Juris Civilis of the conception of the
sovereign power of the Smperior, and its transference to the
Pope. The doctrine of the "plenitudo potestatis," of which
we hear in all their writing, is purely the Roman theory of
sovereignty vested in the Pope. The differences are all in
favour of the Papal autocracy. ... The Church is thus con¬
ceived merely as a State on the antique model, with all
power centred in the Pope or derived from him, and no juris¬
diction nor any rights existing except expressly or tacitly
by his delegation.1
Figgis then proceeds to inform his readers wherein the practice of single
sovereign, unitary political principles in the church is even more seri¬
ous than their practice in the state.
...all this is only what we have been already discussing.
What is worth adding is this. A doctrine which denies
reality and all-self-developing life to the parts of the
body politic is in religion yet more disastrous than in
civil society, because in the long run it must destroy the
springs of spiritual life in the individual conscience.2
Furthermore:
The apotheosis of the Pope has destroyed Episcopacy as a seri¬
ous force in ultramontane theory the Pope is omnipresent
and every bishop, every priest even, is only the Pope's dele¬
gate, jrst as every police-court magistrate represents "His Majesty
the King, his crown and dignity." From the ultramontane stand¬
point, to suggest that a parish or province or even a national
Church could exist as such apart from the fountain of all its
life, would be like saying that you would have a legal juris¬
diction in any royal country apart from the king of it.3
But not only does Figgis champion the Conciliar movement as
representing a saner view of church polity than that of ultramontanism.
The Conciliar emphasis on authority as existing diffusely in the whole
1. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, pp. 135-136.
2. Ibid., pp. 153-1557
3. Ibid., pp. Ik9, 151.
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"communitas fidelium" also argues against the kind of individualism
entertained by some Christians which rebels against any suggestion
that the church has any authority over them and which considers
church membership to be not of the essence of the Christian life.
Elaborating on such thinking, Figgis writes:
No individual need join because he isa Christian; while
he remains he must, it is true, obey its rules, but he
can leave it whenever he likes, on any pretext, without im¬
pairing his Christianity, just as/ man can leave a club with¬
out affecting his claim to be an Englishman.
In contrast to such individualism, individualism of ihe kind that Figgis
saw to be the root of so much error alike in politics and religion, he
writes:
The Catholic notion of authority asserts that the Christian
becomes such cnly by membership of the Christian society, of
which the seal is baptism; just as an Englishman is an Eng¬
lishman because he is a member of the English nation and a
subject of King George. Moreover, it goes on to assert that
he cannot, if he would, repudiate its claims upon him. True,
he is free to leave it, and no one can compel him to remain;
but if he does leave it, he does so at the peril of his
Christianity, for schism is a sin. This is the conception which
is largely denied today, for it involves the detested notion
of authority as inherent in the life of the Christian. Many
men, deeply devoted to our Lord, regard all such claims as an
infringement of natural liberty, the invention of aspiring
priests; others, glorying in the name of Churchmen, would yet
repudiate with scorn all attempt at discipline.
In keeping with Figgis's not uncommon practice of turning to man's
general social experience for excellent examples of the principles
which have meaning for church polity as well as state government, Figgis
focuses the reader's attention on school life as illustrating both the
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, pp. 182-183.
2. Ibid., p. 183-181;.'
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necessity of authority in group life and also of the individual's contri¬
bution to that authority to which he also submits himself:
let us take an instance from a society we have all been through—
school life. What is the nature of authority in the form of
communal existence which we enjoy in a highly organised school,
concerned with the whole life, not the mere instruction, of its
members? Does it consist in the commands of the head-master?
I trow not. Is it in his power, even including that of all his
delegates—under-masters and prefects—to issue commands?
Hardly. Something it is, deeper and more subtle than any powers
of command. Surely the authority of a school, while it includes
all the elements I mentioned above, is rather to be found in the
altogetherness of the social life of its members, including those
gone from it. The total pressure of this or any new boy would
come to him as its authority. Some of this (avery little) is
written in rules; more of it is crystallised into public opin¬
ion. More still is indefinable—ageneral spirit, what one calls
"tone," constantly changing yet always continuous, All
alike share it (this authority); all in some way submit to it;
and all contribute to it. Not the newest or the least effec¬
tive member but makes some difference, either by his character
or by the lack of it; nor, on the other hand, can bhe strongest
or most influential person ever act alone.
Addressing himself to the problem in the England of his day of men who
claimed membership if not places <£ authority in the church while at the
same time refusing to submit themselves to the authority of the church
even in the most fundamental matters of faith and morals, Figgis writes:
In England, too, the fact of establishment lends colour to the
claim that every Englishman has a right to use all the offices
of the Church, without fulfilling any moral cr spiritual obliga¬
tions whatever. Even more ludicrous is that form of this dis¬
like to definition which is shown in the claim that an official
of the Church should be allowed entire freedom of criticism,
while still continuing to exercise his office. It
should be no less clear that if criticism of any society,
whether political or religious, carries any member of it to
the point at which he repudiates its foundations, his only course
is to leave it. Yet entire freedom for any and every kind of
1. Ibid., pp. 188-189.
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historical criticism is now claimed for a priest, not merely
as a man, but as a priest continuing to exercise his ministry.
If this claim were admitted, a priest would be right in cele¬
brating the Eucharist even after he had become convinced, with
Professor Drews or Mr. ¥. B. Smith, that our Lord never existed
at all.1
Figgis further singles out the Conciliar movement for its use
the legal principle "Quod omnes tangit, ab omnibus approbetur" not only
as sanctioning church councils but also as a ground for giving the
laity a>voice in the councils, especially in matters of faith which
concern them. This is in contrast to the ultramontanisra against which
the Conciliar movement was fighting,which allows to the laity no more
than a passive role in the life of the church. "The mass of the people
have nothing to do with the law except to obey it." Figgis singles out
Dietrich of Niem as one who realized in special measure how the author¬
ity of the church resides in the whole church with each individual hav¬
ing a share in that authority.
It was the cry of Dietrich of Niem that if neither the Pope nor
the cardinals could call a council, recourse must be had first
to the local hierarchy, but ultimately to the citizens them¬
selves, and even the poorest old woman.2
Figgis felt very strongly about the place of the laity ±1 the church.
In regard, moreover, to the Church, we cannot often enough re¬
peat that the Church of the future must be a laymen's Church,
(although it still must have its priesthood), that is, the
great democracy of God's servants and Christ's brethren, and no
exclusive or illimitable power into which they may not look.3
As has been seen,^ Figgis's initial concern was with the Con-
1. Ibid., pp. 178-179.
2. Figgis, Our Place in Christendom, p. 9•
3. Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, pp. l51j.-l55.
ii. Supra., p. <oX.
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ciliar movement as it insisted that authority rests in the entire com¬
munity, not just in its titular head. His later concern was with the
federalistic aspect of the movement wherein the rights of groups within
the larger group are recognized and protected. Attention is now turned
to his preoccupation with this later aspect of the movement.
In the first chapter which Figgis contributed to Our Place in
Christendom, he refers to those Conciliar writers who emphasized the
federalistic side of the movement:
...in some writers there is the sense also that every individual
community, every diocese, shares in this (the sense of communal
authority;, to some degree, and more especially the nations.^
As Figgis speaks in behalf of the authenticity of the Catholicity of the
English Qhurch, his appeal is "more especially to the nations" as having
very real authority within the whole, and very considerable right of self-
determination.
In order to justify the English Church now and since the Reforma¬
tion, you have to establish two things: (l) that the parts,
in this case a nation, or if you will the two provinces, have
such inherent powers of life and self-development, that the
breach with the Papacy did not affect them vitally; (2) that
what they did or suffered was not of such a nature as to cut
these parts off from that stream of universal communal life we
call the Catholic Church. For that purpose it is needful to
reassert the principles set out in the fifteenth century at
Constance and at Basel.
Particular churches, as Laud said, must have real inherent
powers—i.e., that relatively compact group of the Catholic
body we call a national churph must have within it a life not
merely derived from the center; and it must be capable, if nec¬
essary, of acting on its own. 3
1. Figgis, Our Place in Christendom, p. 87.
2. Figgis, Churches in the modern State, p. l£6.
3. Figgis, Our Race in Christendom, p. 131.
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Speaking in behalf of the wisdom of considering the Catholic
Church in terms of its national units, Figgis writes:
The question is whether, so long as nations exist, that sense
of communal authority on the one hand, and cn the other of in¬
herent life in the parts not merely derived power from the
centre, is not best expressed and most effectively preserved
by an organization of the church with natural units like those of
England, Russia, Greece, etc. Nor can I see any ground to
doubt that God may have a word for a nation not as mere indi¬
vidual units but as gathered into a religious society
Some people seem to think that it is un-Christian to talk of
national churches, because a nation is a national unit. If
that is so, the arrangement of many a diocese, 1he seat of the
bishbp, the patriarchate, the providence, must be equally un-
Christian. They all followed civil lines. Any unified group
of men that is real may be the centre of a church. .... This
truth is not altered by the fact that many members of the na¬
tion feel no such allegiance. With religious liberty that is
inevitable, for many will not be Christians or even theists
at all. Nor must we forget that all the baptised are members
of God's church, and that the members of those unauthorized
guilds we call the sects are not outside the church altogether,
except on a theory which not even the Romans accept. Further,
such a national group within the vast church universal will be
expected to make its own contribution, and must enjoy a rela¬
tive independence. / The real question is whether such a national
jy group has any true unit y-/-and what is the true nature of religious
authority. On neither the Papal nor the Protestant doctrine can
this organisation be accepted.
'^ The contribution of nationality to tie church is a real one; that
.contribution of liberty with order which is the distinct quality
of the English,.looks like anarchy to the autocrat, and like
tyranny to the anarchist.
"What is interesting as one reads the above is that in considering the
1. Figgis, Our Place in Christendom, pp. I38-II4.O. A reviewer of
Our Place in Christendom wrote, "Two lectures are also contributed by
Dr. Figgis, and while that on 'Council and Unity' is important, we re¬
gard this contribution on 'National Churches' in some respects the most
useful chapter in the book. It is a bold, and we think convincing,
justification of National churches, and will help many Anglicans who
find the arguments of the 17th century divines in defence of the 'Ec-
cleaia Anglicana' unsatisfying. "Times Literary Supplement," May 15,
1916, p. 30.
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National Church, Figg-s is not thinking only- of the Church of England
as such but of the English nation on its religious side, engulfing the
non-religious and including, apparently, members of other churches
within that large natural community. This is especially interesting
in that it seems to contradict a reluctance previously observed-^- to
think of the nation as, in any sense* a positive religious grouping.
This may be explained on the basis that he changed his mind between
1911 when Churches in the Modern State was written and 1915 when he
delivered his paper, "National Churches," which appeared under that
heading as a chapter in Our Place in Christendom. The more likely
explanation may be found in a word of caution which Figgis sounds
to the student of St. Augustine, and to which the student of Figgis
should attend:
One constant temptation besets the historian of thought in
every sphere. He is apt to suppose that his subjects are
more consistent than they are; toraake logical wholes of
scattered and often contradictory hints; and sometimes even
to rule out, as unauthentic, writings which have no other
evidence against them than that of being hard to reconcile
with others of the same author. In no case could this be
a worse error than in that of S. Augustine.^
In Our Place in Christendom, Figgis points up yet another im¬
portant aspect of the Conciliar Movement:
Above all, perhaps, for the influence of the universities was
paramount, it stands for the recognition of sound learning in
the councils of the church-that principle which Creighton used^
to say was the distinctive quality of the English communion.3
1. Supra., pp.IIO-HI.
2. Figgis, The Political Aspects of Saint Augustine1s'City of God'
pp. 7-8.
3. Figgis, Our Place in Christendom, p. 9k-
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The works of John Neville Figgis, a one-time pupil at Cambridge of the
man who singled out this "distinctive quality of the English commun¬
ion," represent much of the sound learning to which the councils of his
church referred for guidance in sound political thinking. All did not
agree with "Figgis as a Political Thinker," but they all were ax-rare of
him, all had to contend with him, and many then, and not a few now,
found much that recommended itself as the basis of sound political-
historical judgment, sound decisions in church and state, church and
community relations, and in sound thinking about the nature of author¬
ity within the church itself.
(136)
CHAPTER IV
FIGGIS AS A THEOLOGIAN
"A Plea For Otherworldliness"
L. S. Thornton relates that just previous to the First World
War William 'Temple said that a warwas an economic impossibility. Figgis,
Thornton observed, saw differently. Figgis saw "death in the pot of
modern civilization," and war came as no surprise to him. In 19133
Figgis wrote:
The forces of civilisation are imposing; but apart from Christ
they are visibly dissolving. Its tall towers are shaking, and
the splendid spires of the edifice of the western world are
crumbling. Catastrophe is threatening. We can almost hear the
thunders of the avalanche of war—war an a scale unknown.
Hardly does the world even look stable any longer. It is not
like the forties of Victorian complacency, but looks all
tottering—tottering.1
Figgis' sense of a world headed towards destruction obviously was not
born of the final months of Germany's preparation for the war that was
to terrorize the world for the next four years. Keble Talbot, a fellow
member of the Community of the Resurrection and an intimate friend of
Neville Figgis, writes that Figgis's estimate of civilization's tragic
trend had not a little to do with the rector from Marnhull becoming the
monk from Mirfield in 1907.
...and what powerfully contributed to the direction his life
took and to his embrace of the vocation to which in the last
1. J. N. Figgis, Antichrist and Other Sermons, (London, Longmans,
Green and Co., 1913)> PP« 30-31.
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thirteen years of his life he devoted himself was his haunting
sense of a world rushing on catastrophe. ... It was evident
to him that civilization had come to the crossroads. Its in¬
tellectual and moral chaos, its loss of inner faith, even of
faith itself, its casual creeds, its increasing ruthlessness
and radical injustice, its ugliness and banality, its fevered
acquisitiveness—upon all this he embodied judgment and dis¬
aster.1
Talbot continues by citing that incident in Figgis's life which raised
the disharmony of modern standards with anything that even resembled a
Christian standard to such an unbearable clamour in his own mind that
he felt compelled to show his revulsion by withdrawing himself the more
from the civilization whose Christian supports had been removed and to
identify himself the more completely with the Christian faith, the only
force that had the power, as he envisioned the plight of modern civili¬
zation, to redeem the world.
It was as he sat in the stalls watching one of Mr. Bernard
Shaw's plays that he made up his mind to seek entry into a
Religious Community. Either something like the ideas of that
drastic critic of society were true, and there was no hopej
or else the Christian Gospel of a supernatural Revelation and
Redemption, the faith of the Saints of all the ages wa3 the
truth, and in that case he must stake all that he was and had
upon it.2
His somewhat drastic step into the "religious life" was accompanied then
and in the years that followed with equally drastic words:
The state of our cities, the lives of the vast masses are a dis-
1. Talbot, Keble, The Quarterly Chronicle of the Community of the
Resurrection, (Christmas, 19U0), 18. Figgis is sometimes said to have been
very like Chesterton and that, for more reasons than a shared obesity. K.
Talbot draws this comparison in conversation, pointing up Figgis1 sense of
the tragedy cf the times, "In their different idioms, Figgis struck the same
note as Chesterton. let Figgis shouts one note with a particular resonance:
his declaring the end of an age."
2. Ibid.
(138)
grace to any civilisation, and insofar as that civilisation calls
itself Christian, it is a lie.-*-
...there are no longer grounds for believing that the Western
world is Christian now in a sense in which it was not in the
period immediately preceding the peace of the Church under Con¬
stantine the Great.2
Figgis had a tragic sense of the times in which he lived when
most people were still enjoying the overflow into the twentieth century
of the optimism of the Victorian era; furthermore, the century to which
Figgis addressed himself, after completing two wars and entering into an
era of the third, continues in need of the kind of scrutiny that he was
able to give it. These things being true, one is drawn to this man,who
was as unique and striking in thought and expression as he was ungainly
in appearance. His preoccupation with an estimate of his time makes a
fitting introduction to any consideration of "Figgis as a Theologian."
Anarchy best describes the twentieth century, according to
Figgis's estimate of it: an anarchy intellectual, religious, and moral.
We live in a time of unparalleled intellectual anarchy when
'every man does that which is right in his own eyes' and no
generally accepted canons can be admitted.3
Speaking of the intellectual anarchy against the background of his having
taken note of the disappearance in his time of the previous century's gen¬
eral acceptance of some form of German idealism among students of philos¬
ophy and having noted by way of example the writings of such men as
1. Figgis, Antichrist, p. 191.
2. J. N. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, (New York, Longmans,
Green and Co., 1913)* PP« 29-30.
For more about Figgis's estimate of twentieth century civilization as
non-Christian, supra., ill,
3. Figgis, Religion and English Society, p. k3'
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William James, ji. Bergson, BertrajsdRussell, and G. E. M0ore, he writes:
I note all these movements not in order to discuss them, but
rather to point out that there is no such thing as philosophic
authority at present, nor any likelihood of our reaching it;
Speaking of the religious anarchy, Figgis writes:
And not only is the Church no longer the religion of civilisa¬
tion, but she is met by many competing systems, and that even
on her own hypothesis that mankind needs redemption. That is
the point. There are so many.2
So strange is the welter of creeds and sects, of religions and
irreligions, moralists and immoralists, mystics, rationalists,
and realists, and even Christians, that it is hard to guess
what nostrum may be dominant with your next-door neighbour.3
Figgis gives the background for this religious anarchy by explaining that:
...the problem is not whether or no we shall have a spirit of
faith, but of what kind it shall be. For the seventies and
eighties the question was, Can we save religion? It might be
legitimate to assume that if this were answered in the affirma¬
tive the battle was won, and a ground secured in some way for
Christianity, even though it should be necessary to clip its
wings.
Now, however, we have begun to realise that we are living in a
new age, and that it will be an age of religion, or at least of
religions. Men may oppose the Christian faith for many reasons:
but less and less will they condemn her simply and solely
on the ground that she is a religion. It is religion they are
crying for, struggling for, determined in some way or other to
get; although I grant that they do not for the most part expect
to find what they are seeking in the Christian Church.k
...at this moment the question most of us have to decide is not
whether or no religion is proper to human life, but what kind of
religion it is to®.5
1. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, p. 1+1.
2. Ibid., p. 3U.
3. Figgis, The Will to Freedom, p. 1.
li. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, pp. 12-13.
5. Ibid., p. l£.
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Concoinmitant with Figgis's envisioning his as an "age of religion" was
his view of it as an age of sharp struggle and strongly conflicting loyal¬
ties. Suggestive of the high feelings involved in the shift of the age
from "one religion if any" to "which religion of many," he deals with the
subject in lecture form under the heading of "Armageddon" and in sermon
form under the heading of "Antichrist." In Antichrist he writes:
The world at large does not love Christ and it is at last able
to say so. .... It is to betray the grossest ignorance of the
world in which we live to talk of our present controversies as
though they were all being conducted in a rectory garden, with
every one friendly and the most unbelieving ready, and indeed
anxious, to walk across the garden to the evening service if you
could only make the path a little clearer. It is not a garden,
it is a gulf which divides these people from the Church
Do not let us deceive ourselves. This assault which is now be¬
ing delivered from all sides is no child's game. It is not the
melancholy unfaith of those who lament that they can but honour
where we adore. It is not the languid refusal of some dilettante
agnostic too much bored to decide. It is the passionate and de¬
liberate hatred of all that we hold dear, by the fanatics of an
alien faith—the faith that this world is all, that the Christian
Church is a thing loathsome and contemptiblej and also the belief
that she is a decaying force, and the desire to be the poxtfer tri¬
umphant upon her ruins.
In brief:
In the last generation men were unable to take "Jesus as Lord,"
and they were sad. Now they are choosing other masters, and
are glad. There is a xrorld of difference.^
But if the anarchy among belligerent systems competing for men's allegiances
was rampant, even more severe was the anarchy that ruled in the moral realm.
Apart from the Christian hope, we are in a state of chaos, only
the more appalling that it seems to be hardly realised. The chaos
1. Figgis, Antichrist, pp. 12-13.
2. Figgis, The Cospel and Human Needs, p. 8.
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is all the greater that it applies not only to fundamental doc¬
trines, but to practical ideals. For the anarchy of speculative
thought is almost a harmony compared with the chaos of the moral
ideals. ...
Here and there you find a belated Positivist or an austere agnos¬
tic holding to an ideal indistinguishable from the Christian, but
for the most part the non-Christian no longer even affects to take
Jesus as Piaster, but opposes, with more or less of contempt for
the founder, the whole system of Christian morals.■*-
Figgis singles out a number of raen in the literary and educational, fields,
such as Lowes Dickinson, H. G. Wells, Henry Sturt, and George Bernard
Shaw, who evidenced the logical moral bankruptcy (although to them it was
an ideal) of their frank disavowal of any Christian sympathies. Typical
as such men were of the sharp divergence from Christian norms, and that
without apology, none was quite so powerful a factor in the "transvalua-
tion of all values" as the man with whom this principle is especially
associated, i. e., Frederich Nietzsche.
The irruption of Nietzsche, that strange comet in the serene
heaven of philosophy, has meant a revolution. The newethics
discards the notion of love, ridicules sacrifice and pity, and
pours a virulence of scornful hatred upon Christ Himself.
Christian purity, Christian sympathy and humility, Christian
gentleness and even courtesy are set at naught by the new
apostles of the will to power, and a saturnalia of selfish
pride is set up as our ideal..
And not only did Nietzsche minister to the moral chaos; he also contrib¬
uted significantly to the religious chaos by ridiculing the ideals of
Christian character.
So long as men go on admiring Jesus and making Him their ideal,
no good will come from disproving the Gospel history. Somehow
1. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, pp. 52-53.
2. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. 11.
(1U2)
or other men will hold to a system fundamentally Christian and
will adopt practically, if not theoretically, an attitude of wor¬
ship. They will act in a way which logically implies the system
which in theory they have rejected. If they are finally to be
cut loose from the Christian Church, they must be taught in
trample on the Christian ideal. And so Nietzsche set himself to
develop the taunt of the rejecting Jews at Our Lord, "He hath a
devil.
The figure of Nietzsche, who epitomized for Figgis the religious
and moral chaos of the age, held a strange fascination for him, so much so
that Nietzsche was the subject of his Boss Lectures delivered in 1915 at
Lake Forest College, Illinois, under the heading of The Will to Freedom
or The Gospel of Nietzsche and The Gospel of Christ, ' Disavowing that
his interest in Nietzsche was stimulated only by the war with Germany,
Figgis writes:
It is nearly twenty years (which would date his Interest back to
1895) since his (Nietzschefe)danger and his charm became clear to
me. 3
Not a little of Nietzsche's charm for Figgis lay in the fact that
Nietzsche derided many of the same idols of his time, the idols of senti-
mentalism, determinism, unwarranted optimism, rationalism, and the glori-
1. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, p. 59-
2. This book was widely read and reviewed and well received without ex¬
ception. "It is the outcome of a long companionship, it is appreciative,
critical, affectionate, severe; and it is solid as well as brilliant." Jour¬
nal of Geological Studies, XIX, (July, 1918), 377.
"He (Figgis) has produced the best exposition and criticism of the
philosophy of the "Will to Power" with which we are acquainted The
truth is that Dr. Figgis is peculiarly fitted by temperament, as well as learn¬
ing, to deal sympathetically with his subject. He shares Nietzsche's hostil¬
ity to compromise and half views ana can understand the essentially religious
nature of the author he is criticising. ... We have found nothing to criticise
but much to admire in Dr. Figgis' statement of Nietzsche's views." The Church
Quarterly Review, LXXXV, (October 1917-January 1918), 363.
3. Elggis, The Will to Freedom, p. 5-
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fication of comfort, riches, and immediate satisfaction, which idols were
also the objects of Figgis's vituperation. Nietzsche also championed much
in his own system which Figgis saw to be germane to "unmuffled," "distinc¬
tive" Christianity, the very elements which the modern advocates of a
certain "reduced Christianity" were inclined to leave out in deference to
the claims of the modern mind as enslaved to a mechanistic and outdated
science operating out of bonds.
Nietzsche knew the tragedy of things. He never thought that evil
was only an appearance, nor was suffering to him merely the creases
in the eternal smile of the Absolute. No facile optimism, whether
of Hegel or of Rousseau, no blind JkLth in the idol of automatic
progress, no romantic idealisation of nineteenth-century enlighten¬
ment narred the clearness of his vision. He knew that life is tragic,
and that man needs redemption. He knew, too, that the cost of any
redemption that is worth having must be terrific. The price for
the world's ransom must be paid in blood. The world would not be
worth redeeming could it be paid in any lower coinage. In this
sense Nietzsche is at one with all that is best in Christianity
although he was opposed to much that masqueraded under that august
title. Modern civilisation is the apotheosis of vulgarity—or
was. In its gaudy and clamorous prosperity, with every shop-
window shouting, men have mistaken all their values and mixed the
colours of the world. In religion an idol has been made of easy
amiability, and for the enthralling spectacle of God as Father
men have substituted a pretty picture of the eternal grandmother.
The "splendour of God" had become a tawdry oleograph, and a milk-
and-water sentimentalism had usurped the once austere name of
Christian piety. The leaction against Puritanism had led to a
religion of weak good nature and the refusal of all austerity.
It was against this that Nietzsche tilted when he attacked Strauss
and denounced the shallowness of free-thinking optimists.^
It is also true that Nietzsche's ideas have very much more affin¬
ity with the truly Christian conception of life than had the moral
ideas of Strauss or of any other of the Pantheistic philosophers
whom he superseded. It is true, also, that his attitude to life is
at bottom mystical. He sees that man as he is is not a beautiful
sight. He sees the wickedness of pessimism. Pessimism, the nay-
1. Figgis, Ibid., pp. 312-3liu
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saying to life, is ten thousand times more wicked than all the
variegated blasphemies of Nietzsche. Man can be saved only by
becoming changed in his nature. That is the Christian doctrine
of grace. Nietzsche is nearer to this than are those who preach
a -dogma of inevitable progress or those who deny sin. ... Also,
when Nietzsche talks of the rarity of the higher man, he is more
like Christianity than those who teach the contrary. Christians
are, and are likely to be, a minority. .... It is a will con¬
secrated to God that marks the Christian, not emotion or knowl¬
edge. In his insistence on the will and its training Nietzsche
is in harmony with Christianity and with the characteristic
■English conception of education. Even the ideal of the superman
enshrines the truth that individuality or group distinction has
its own quality, and that man is of worth, through something in¬
herent and inalienable in himself. All forms of Christianity
admit this, except the heresies which are toppling iito Pantheism.
Nietzsche's hatred of equality in the sense in which he gives it is
not belied by Christian sentiment. His idealisation of heroism—
his use of suffering, the religion of valour—is only the ancient
doctrine of the Cross taught by Jesus Christ, palpitating in St.
Paul and the whole New Testament, ^en what he says of the bar¬
baric virtues, his new commandment, "Be hard," might perhaps be
interpreted as little more than a warning against that pity whiclr
is born of cowardice, or that sympathy which is a form of luxury.
Sick of the stuffy atmosphere of academic lecture-halls, Nietzsche
cries for the free and open air. Wearied with domestic virtues
and morality in petto, he hails barbaric grandeur. From the mean
streets of modern civilisation he calls men to Alpine heights <f
danger and triumph, despising above all things utilitarian democ¬
racy and theqptimismof inevitable progress, with its gospel of
the sofa-millennium.
It is as the tight-rope dancer living dangerously on a line strung
between precipices amid eternal snows that Nietzsche is so much of
a "wonder, a beauty, and a terror." In a new age, very childlike,
he calls to all with the spirit of youth, to try all experiments,
to shrink back neither for fear nor for love, neither for God nor
for man, neither for good nor for evil. This call, together with
1. Ibid., pp. lii-3—ILU6. Figgis repeated his lectures on The Will to
Freedom to an English audience at All Saints, Margaret Street, Condon, in
the spring of 1916. The sister of King George V attended one of the lec¬
tures, following which she was heard to comment, "It seems to me that Father
Figgis makes Nietzsche out to be quite a Christian."
2. Ibid., pp. 91-92.
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his strange, mystical sense of the eternal in the transient and,
therefore, the value of the moment; this paradox of the ungodly
who yet worships, of the immoralist who preaches self-control, of
the Antichrist who could mount the Gross, the iconoclastuho could
yet set up a religion, this it is which gives to Friedrich Nietzsche
a charm that will outlast all the febrile puerilities of his at¬
tack on Christianity and all the superficial snobbery of his con¬
tempt for the common man.
So much for Nietzsche's charm; what of Nietzsche's danger?
Figgis suffered no delusions regarding the antagonism towards Christianity
of the man who looked upon Jesus as a decadent, a madman, and who wrote:
One does well to put on gloves when reading the New Testament.
The proximity of so much uncleanliness almost compels one to
do so.^
The Christian Church is to me the greatest of all imaginable
corruptions; it has had the will to the ultimate corruption
that is possible. 'The Christian Church has left nothing un¬
touched with its depravity, it has made a worthlessness out cf
every value, a lie out of every truth, a baseness of soul out
of every straightforwardness.3
One of the chief dangers of Nietzsche was seen by Figgis to be the applica¬
tion of his unbridled individualism, egoism, and racism to the realm of
politics.
Is it not, then, obvious what is likely to happen if any state
or nation adopts his views? It can assert that the State is
Power, nothing else but Power. It ban believe with Nietzsche
that power is the one end of life. It may go on to proclaim it¬
self free from all restraints in dealing with enemies and from
every kind of limitation in dealing with its subjects or with
religious and economic groups.d
Nothing can relieve Nietzsche from the stain of having stimulated
the tendencies, already sufficiently strong, towards that essen-
1. Ibid., pp. 263-26U.
2. Ibid., p. 1£6, quoting Antichrist (Nietzsche), pp. 31k»
3. Ibid., p. 6, quoting Antichrist, 5 62.
li. Ibid., pp. 283-281;.
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tial evil of Paganism which we see at its worst in Nero and
at its best in Diocletian. The Italian tyrants of the Renaissance,
refined and cruel, are the true comment on this doctrine.
No small part of Figgis' sense of "a world heading towards destruction"
and the imminence of war was due to his long acquaintance with, fascina¬
tion for, and fear of Nietzsche.
War, also, it has been thought, would be shown to be a chimera,
because it is so expensive. A rationalist world would settle
down to eternal mutton-chops. Nietzsche saw through this fal¬
sity. So far from all grounds of quarrel coming to an end with
the growth of great aggregations, they have increased. Now there
has dawned upon men's minds the prospect of world-dorainion. Here
Nietzsche was prophet.2
"The time for petty politics is pastj the next century will bring
the struggle for the dominion of the world—the compulsion to
great politics."^
It is due in part to Figgis's estimate of Nietzsche as a prophet that Figgis,
himself, deserves a similar ascription.
Thus Figgis presented Nietzsche as the chief example of the re¬
ligious and moral anarchy of the age, not to mention its intellectual an¬
archy as well. In the latter regard, Figgis recognized Nietzsche, along
with Bergson and others, as playing an important part in the revolt against
the general acceptance of nineteenth century idealism and the maxim of
Hegel that the hidden secret of the universe must be penetrable to thought.
"A Plea for Otherworldliness" was the title of a sermon which
Figgis delivered before the University of Cambridge, November 10, 1907. In
it he said:
1. Ibid., p. 289-
2. Ibid., p. 292.
3. Ibid., pp. 292-293, quoting Beyond Good and Fvil, p. 11*6.
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I desire to-day to examine the charge often brought against
the Church of being other-worldly. That charge is true. But
it is our glory, not our shame. There is a sense, of course, in
which the Church ought to be this-worldly. This sense, however,
is so obvious, and is emphasised so much just now, that it is
perhaps more profitable^to dwell for a little upon the other
aspect of tie truth.....
"A Plea for Otherworldliness" is more than a sermon title; it is the key
to Neville Figgis's entire theological emphasis. In the pages that fol-
low--be the subject that of Figgis's estimate of the task of the theologian,
his criticism of the idols of the modern mind, his emphasis on Christian
experience, his insistence on the importance of the miraculous, his pre¬
sentation of the Person of Christ, his discussion of the need for social
reform, his critique of culture, or his love for the church and her sac¬
raments—explicit and implicit through it all is the "plea for other-
worldliness."
The very last thing that will attract is a Christianity with
the supernatural left out Christianity which is what Mr.
Wells called "muffled" will have no appeal.2
That faith of the Cross it is that alone can satisfy, and it
is, while akin to the other faiths, more unlike them than like,
and while in moral exhortation not unlike the nobler philosophies,
at bottom something different from any, something more splendid,
more difficult, more unfathomable, because its essence and its
ground are other-worldly, its God One who is also man, and its
supreme act the execution of a criminal.3
Figgis is an interesting exception, although not the only exception, to
a statement made by John Baillie in And The Life Everlasting:
There can be little doubt that, if we have regard to the leaders
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, "A Plea for Other-worldliness,"
p. 120.
2. Figgis, The Will to Freedom, pp. 306-307.
3. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, p. 120.
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of thought both within and without the churches, it is not in
the years since the Great War, but rather in the years immedi¬
ately preceding it, that the receding tide of Christian other-
worldliness reached its lowest ebb.
Figgis, himself, did not presume to be the on^rreligious thinker who saw
the importance of emphasizing the supernatural.
Professor Denny, Professor Burkitt, Dr. Forsyth, Dr. Garvie,
Dr. Orr, Dr. Seeberg, Dr. Knowling, Mr. Wilfrid Ward, Mr.
Gilbert Chesterton, the Bishops of Birmingham and Durham,
Evangelical Dissenters and Ultramontanes may seem a rather
heterogeneous company. Doubtless many of them would condemn
as woefully inadequate the theology that contents the other,
let all have this in common. They have crossed the Rubicon.
All are on the other side of the line which divides the natural
from the supernatural theory of the origin of Christianity.2
To Figgis's mind, the task of the theologian was the presenta¬
tion of a unique, supernatural Christianity. In one of his many published
sermons, he says:
Every age has its own task. Part of that task is always to
correct the exaggerations of its immediate predecessor.3
Figgis saw the task of the modern theologian, working against the background
of the previous age's overemphasis on Christianity's similarity to other
modes of thought and belief, to consist in asserting the uniqueness of the
Christian faith. He insisted that what he called the "Alexandrian Age" of
asserting the assimilations between Christianity and other systems, such
as the vogue <f the^study of cnmpnrrvtiage religion^ was past. This approach
was allowable in an age when it was a battle between materialism and other
1. Baillie, John, And The Life Everlasting, (London, Oxford University
Press, (1934)), p. 15.
2. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, pp. 192, 193.
3. Figgis, Antichrist, pp. 162, I63.
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thought contending for the importance of the things of the spirit, but an
approach which loses its appeal in an age of competing religions.
The accent ought to be not on the likeness, but on the differ¬
ence of Christianity from its rivals, whether philosophic or
ethical or religious. After all, we are Christians not because
our faith resembles that of other men, but because it does not.
We shall but confuse our minds if we harp on the superficial
resemblances, real though they may be. If the differences were
not important it were wiser to combine with the great mass of the
religious-minded, and sink or minimise all the strangeness, the
unique charm of the Gospel, the things that are at once its appeal
and its shame.
We have passed through an age best termed Alexandrian, when men
have been concerned to shew the assimilations between Christian
and other systems and have almost forgotten the difference in the
process. So much alive have they been to the human environment
that they have neglected to emphasize the divine origin of the
Gospel. Now, it seems, we need rather a Tertullianist or Augustinian
presentment of the faith insisting more on its difference from,
than its approximation to, other systernsj on the vital change it
brought, rather than on the connection, however undoubted, with the
oldj on the gift of a new life, that makes it what it is. Both
sides are truej what might be roughly called the Greek, or the
Johannine view of things, and the Latin or the Paulinej at this
moment it is the latter that we need to bring into relief.
As doggedly as Figgis insisted that the task of the theologian in
his own day was to assert the uniqueness of the orthodox faith, which is
given "symbolic" expression in the ancient creeds, still he acknowledged
and affirmed the importance of attempting to relate the faith of the Church
to the results of modern discovery.
While holding fast to the "Sternal Gospel," there is before us
in this age the task, not yet accomplished, of adjusting to a
theology framed in another intellectual climate, a new view of
the Bible, enlarged conceptions of history, and deeper knowl¬
edge of the natural world and of the mind of man. "Mediating
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, Preface p. viii.
2. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, pp. 169-170.
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liberalism" is perhaps the best term in which to describe the at¬
titude of wisdom; for that implies a real reverence for the heri¬
tage that is ours, together with an alert openness to what is new.
Do not, however, let us suppose there is no problem, or deny
changes whichare real.1
The fact that Figgis was an exponent of a "Mediating liberalism"
which would relate the faith received to new discoveries wherein they had
a legitimate claim to attention is not to be mistaken for a sanctioning
of the.movement in Roman Catholicism which was known as Modernism and
which, in Protestant circles, came under the heading of the "New Theology."
Important, if not chief among the spokesmen for Modernism in
England was George Tyrell, who looked upon Christ's ascension, His descent
into hell, His coming to judge the quick and the dead, and other equally
important assertions as "non-essential accidents." For him the New Testa¬
ment account of Christ was largely poetic rather than scientific. The
modern task of theology, as he envisioned it, was to distinguish the sci¬
entific from the poetic and the essential from the non-essential. Tyrell's
Christianity at the Cross Roads gave expression to such views and received
much attention; and although Figgis, in his preface to his book, Civilisa¬
tion at the Cross Roads, the series of four lectures delivered before
2
Harvard University in 1911 on the William Noble Foundation, denies that
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, pp. 96-97.
Figgis looked upon that rebuttal of liberal views written by Ronald
Knox and appearing under the title, Some Loose Stones, as a "brilliant but
unsatisfactory work," because it assumed the attitude of denying the prob¬
lems that modern thought raised for orthodoxy.
2. In a letter dated April 1;, 19h9, Norman B. Nash, Bishop of the
Diocese of Boston, wrote regarding Figgis's deliveiy of the Noble Foundation
Lectures: "I went to the first lecture, in which Leopold King of the Bel¬
gians T*as brilliantly depicted as the typical modern man, to the mirth and
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his desire is to "controvert the main thesis of the late Father Tyrrell's
famous work," no small portion of the lectures controverts Figgis's denial.
He begins his first lecture:
Not long since a writer, who seemed to wield flame rather than
words, directed all our thoughts to the topic of Christianity at
The Cross Hoads. And indeed the tragedy of Tyrrell's own life
(Tyrrell became almost a complete sceptic before his death) sym¬
bolised that crisis in thought of which the book was the expres¬
sion. More than any of his works was his life an illustration of
the momentous problems urgent at this moment on all reflecting men.
How far can the new wine of modern knowledge and changed ways of
thought be poured into the old bottles of traditional religion?
And in the third lecture he writes:
The assumption at the basis of George Tyrrell's Christianity at
the Cross Roads seems to be that wherever Christianity conflicts
with our modern mental scheme, it must be trimmed to make the two
square. This view seems to be quite without ground. Neither facts
nor theory justify our holding the dogma of the infallibility of
the modern Western mind. Its most acute representatives do not
claim this infallibility, and the intellectual anarchy of our day
reveals its inadequacy.^
In a final blast against the Modernist spirit in general and as epitomized
by Tyrrell in particular, Figgis says in the second and last appendix to
The Fellowship of the Mystery, entitled "Modernism versus Modernity":
Modernism, if we are to use the word to denote this complex of
movements, is regarded with unfavourable eyes on these grounds:
that it is not modern in spirit, but depends largely on a view
of things that is obsoletej that it is in fact Victorian; that
it is not liberal, but involves notions inimical to spiritual
astonishment of a very small audience, including as I recall President
Lowell. To my recollection the group was in considerable proportion com¬
posed of faculty members and graduate students, with a very few undergradu¬
ates. Being personally fascinated by Father Figgis' verbal brilliance and
by his viewpoint, then quite novel to me, I went to all the lectures."
1. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, p. 3.
2. Ibid., p, 171.
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freedomj that it is not popular, but aristocratic in its religious
sympathies; not national, but academic; and that its whole mental
outlook, so far from being broad, is restricted;—while to the
most potent voices of the religious spirit it is deaf, and to the
visions of Eternal wonder it is blind.
If the modernists should succeed for a couple of generations in
establishing the claim of men like Tyrrell, and in preserving all
the old values while broadening the basis, such success would not
prove that they were right; but it would win them sympathy. So
far, they have failed to do this; and that failure has much to
teach us! ^
The fact that Figgis was a competent historian helped him to be
suspicious of ascribing an absolute value to the intellectual predilections
of any one age. In his lecture, "The Value of the Study of History,"
which he delivered in 1895> and the full implications of which he came to
appreciate only after the century had turned, he said:
It (the study of history) transports him (the historical student)
into times alien in spirit from his own, and causes him to breathe
the varying intellectual atmosphere of other ages. Introduced thus
to other points of view than those now current, and compelled to
look at widely different modes of thought and action from those im¬
mediately around him, he cannot fail to observe that the most ac¬
cepted modern principles, the alphabet of our political and social
education, were unknown or scornfully rejected among peoples not
uncivilised. He sees that right reason has meant different things
at different times, and that a man might be highly developed, and
have all his energies generously employed, without his being a
worshipper of our idols of the market-place. 'This, indeed, is no
proof that current maxims are untrue, still less that they are un¬
desirable guides under our peculiar conditions. But the student
of history .ill scarcely look upon them in the same light as do
those, who have imbibed their principles with their mother's milk,
and would as soon think of doubting them as of denying that the sun
shone in heaven.
Part of the challenge of Modernism and part of the responsibility
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, "Modernism Versus Modernity,"
(Appendix B), pp. 298-299.
2. J. N. Figgis, "The Value of Historical Study"—a Lecture—Delivered
before the Kettering Branch of the National Union of Teachers, (January 31>
1895).
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of the "Mediating liberalism," which he championed, Figgis saw to be the
restatement and translation of Christian dogma for twentieth century man
without, at the same time, surrendering that which is divine in it.
Let us take away from our mode of presentment all that makes it
harder than need be for the men of our day to discern the truth
that the answer to all their restless longings is in one place
only, Jesus Christ, and Him crucified.
In one regard it seems folly to set forth our faith afresh, if we
hold to historic creeds and believe ourselves the guardians of a
"faith once delivered." let such effort is not to be avoided,
unless at the cost of the entire deadness of what to us is ihe
most living of all things. Were it not possible to bring faith
into relation to the world, as it lives now within us, it must
sink (on its intellectual side) into the utterance of empty formu¬
lae, which once were flames <f the spirit and have since become
dried into words, and—with such conditions—would ere long be no
more than sounds.2
What we do well to remember—I speak as a Churchman to Churchmen—
is this: we cannot ourselves escape the need of restatement, and
we are always making it, whether consciously or not. To doubt of
this is to doubt the presence of the Holy Spirit in the Church.
While we must hold that Cod has given to every age of the Christ¬
ian Church all things needful to its salvation, it is not faith,
but the denial of faith, to suppose that all was fixed finally and
for ever by the close of the fourth General Council or by the sixth
century, <r by the thirteenth, or by the sixteenth, or by any other.
If we can commit blasphemy against the Holy Ghost, surely we shall
be doing something very like it if we deny that He is speaking through
God's Church in the twentieth century. Only lat us bear in mind
also that He spoke in the first, and will speak in the twenty-first.
Heirs of all the ages, let us be slaves of none—not even our own.3
In the above words, the reader detects something more than a sense of respon¬
sibility to recouch the creeds of the Councils of the early church in modern
language. Here may be found a deep attachment for Newman's Doctrine of De¬
velopment every bit as real as his deep affection for the man as a person
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, p. 8.
2. Ibid., p.' 5-
3. Ibid., p. 6-7.
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and a writer. Figgis writes of the leader of the Tractarian Movement who
turned to Rome:
Further, he saw "that in order to justify the developed scheme of
Catholic theology, something more than logical argument is needed.
This he found in the fact of life. His development of doctrine is
an essay in creative evolution, It seeks to show that, since life
is ceaseless movement and energy, we must apply dynamics rather
than statics to our criticism of the Church. All that the inquirer
needs is to satisfy himself that the Church, as she now appears, is
the actual development of the Christian society of early days; that
it is but the oak of which the meeting in the upper room was the
acorn. I think that it is not alx-rays clear whether Newman intended
by his development a truly "creative evolution," or merely the ex¬
plication necessary to the original idea. Tyrrell charged against
him the narrower view. But although, writing when he did, he may
well have confused the two, his whole temper made in favour of
that view of the life of the Church as essentially creative, with
which M. Bergson has made us all familiar in regard to the universe
as a whole. In spite of its defects and the looseness of the tests
he applies, Newman's Development of the Christian Doctrine, together
with Mohler's Symbolik, remains a most valuable asset of Catholic
apologetic.l
It is not unfair to Figgis to say that he had considerable sym¬
pathy with the bias in Newman's "Essay on Development" in the direction of
justifying the general development of the Roman position. Figgis's main
bone of contention with Rome was its doctrine of authority, which, in the
realm of church government, is enshrined in ultramontanism and, in the
realm of conscience, in infallibalism. He asserted that Newman did not
share the idea of authority which is inherent in the Papal Curia. Having
cleared Newman of any such sympathy and having given in evidence Newman's
essay on "Consulting the Laity," Figgis writes enthusiastically of those
elements in the Roman church which were equally attractive to him as to
Newman.
1. Ibid., pp. 256-257.
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Nor was it that (the Ultramontane ) element that really attracted
him (Newman). It was the Catholic religion, the great human-divine
thing, the collective conscience of humanity, the central fact in
spiritual experience, with its majesty of immemorial tradition and
the pathos of a million tears, the great community of the saints,
and the martyrs, and the mystics, and the sinners,with its roots
in the past and its strong social bonds: that was the really com¬
pelling charm to a man of Newman's temperament. Little wonder that,
things being as they were, he could find this only in the Roman
obediencej1
Just how much sympathy Figgis had with the Roman communion may be seen from
his comment in a series of sermons an "Our Catholic Inheritance."
Whether any other matters, (other than ultramontanism or infalli-
l balism) such as the doctrine of the Eucharist or the Immaculate
Conception, or various extravagances in popular devotion or
practical abuses, would be sufficient, apart from his, to justify
our separation, I do not know. Perhaps they would not.^
Just how far, in spite of all his sympathies with Rome and in
spite of his discontent with much of the Anglican church, the claim to an
absolute monarchy within the church upon earth kept him from entering the
Roman fold may be seen in a further quotation from his article on Newman:
...how strangely they deceive themselves who think that, exchanging
"the Anglican paddock" for the Roman campagna, they exchange slavery
for freedom. Whatever may be the defects and difficulties of our
English Church, "its freezing coldness" in parts, its smug official¬
ism, the complacent atmosphere redolent of the cathedral precincts
and the clergyman's wife:—all of these things, which stank in
Newman's nostrils, may still, in some sense, be with us. We roay
still have much to learn from Rome in regard to the place of the
poor in the Christian Church, and the recovery of many things which
have nearly vanished under the arid tyranny of the "Aufklarung." For
all that,/the actual working of the Vatican machinery is controlled
by a narrow and jealous camarilla, as incapable of generosity as it
is ignorant of true religion. Unworthy to black the boots of a man
like Newman, they did their best to shut his mouth. I'he tragedy of
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, "John Henry Newman," (Appen¬
dix A.), p.p. 2kQ-2k9-
2. J. N. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, (London, Longmans, Green
and Co., 1919), p. 72.
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Newman's life—and it was a tragedy—is the tragedy of the saint
and the genius, thwarted by the spirit of worldly officialism
and unsympathetic autocracy.
So strong was Figgis's feeling against the Roman church regarding this
whole matter of authority that he thought the young ordinand who was as¬
sisting him at Marnhull and who left him to enter the Roman priesthood
had lost his mind. As strong as his sympathies were for the worship of
the Roman church, he confessed to one of his associates that rather than
become a Roman catholic he would join the smallest sect in Christendom.
And although Figgis did not approve of the kind of Liberalism and Modern-
0
ism which directly evoked the Papal Denunciation by Pious X in 1907, he
looked upon such methods as typical of Roman autocracy and as a threat to
all significant theological thought and discussion.
Returning, however, to the general discussions of Figgis's esti¬
mate of Modernism, both as to the service it could perform and the abuses
to be avoided, Figgis saw in Newman's kind of Modernism that to which he
would affix his stamp of approval, the stamp of a true Mediating liberalism.
He (Newman) is rightly regarded as the source of Modernish, in the
sense that he discarded the scholastic method of proof, and as the
originator of a doctrine of development without which it is not
really possible to justify the Church. What he actually did was
to bring religion under the category of life, instead of treating
it as an aggregate of propositions to which assent is demanded on
grounds intellectually coercive. But Newman was in no sense a
Modernist, if by that be meant one who is content with only the
present value of a system and confuses its truth with its worth,
or one who treats as of slight importance the historical character
of the New Testament narratives.2
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, "John Henry Newman," pp. 238-239.
2. Ibid., p7"2W.
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Because he was alert to the constructive elements in the
Modernist movement, because he had the power to be objective about the
kind of thinking which had either jeopardized or ministered to the health
of his own sensitive religious spirit, and because he was a competent
historian, Figgis saw that the experience of the Christian faith is what
gives credence to it rather than any intellectual act and that our experi¬
ence of it determines our attitude toward the whole body of faith. 'The
chief credential of Christianity is the experience of it, an experience
which by its veiy nature is supernatural.
There is nothing proved, no principle even probable, which
stands in the way of Christian faith. There is no "a priori"
obstacle to the faith, provided that it seem on other grounds to
be reasonable. Such grounds are to be found in the New Testa¬
ment experience as solid with the life of the Church and the in¬
ward witness of the believer.
The problem, then, is one as to the transcendental or the normal
character of this experience or group of experiences; the central
facts as recorded in the New Testament, the impression made by
them at the time, and the continuance of that impression in the
Church and its individual members.^
A statement made by Frank Weston about the ancient creeds would have met
with Figgis's approval.
1. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, p. 63.
2. Ibid., p. 198.
It is obvious from what is here said that in his stress upon the
importance of religious experience, Figgis is not an apologist for the kind
of mysticism which neglects the experience of faith enshrined in the long
history of the church or which makes little of historical revelation. It
was this kind of mysticism in the writings of Evelyn Underhill and also of
Dean Inge, whom Figgis disliked anyway, that Figgis spoke out against. He
felt that mysticism of this type represented movements begun as hobbies by
people of a particular type, that they were therefore exclusive and un¬
democratic in nature, representing a certain coterie of interest.
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The witness of the Apostolic writers and the great Christian
teachers is to the Christologian a testimony based not merely up¬
on reason,but also upon experience. The definitions of the
Councils are the official summary of the private personal ex¬
periences of multitudes of faithful souls during a period of some
four hundred years, an experience that the Christian body of every
age has ratified and confirmed.1
Part and parcel of this emphasis on experience is the assertion
that men do not arrive at conclusions about the supernatural character of
Christianity from the consideration of certain creeds or isolated super¬
natural events. Faith is the experience which carries its own proof with
it, an experience which once attained, men argue from rather than towards.
It is right to put the question in this broad manner, as one which
is concerned with our view of the nature of the experience as a
whole. We are putting the cart before the horse, when we argue,
as though the question were first and foremost concerned with dogma.
Dogma only brings out the implications of the supernatural view,
and it cannot be arrived at independently or argued about as con¬
sisting of so many isolated propositions. The Creeds a® the in¬
tellectual expressions of this faith, developed in the life of
the Church, and they guard its essential nature, which is to be
supernatural. It is this supernatural character which is its
"differentia." On this we have to make up our mind before, not
after, we consider the Creeds. The enquirer must decide whether
or no these supernatural claims irere made, and then whether he
can accept them.
As a fact, we are dealing not with a number of isolated events
apparently marvelous, each to be discussed "in vacuo," but with
a great experience of human life extending from the converted
sinner of today right back to "that strange man upon the Cross"
and all that He Implies. The question is, What does that experi¬
ence mean? Even in regard to the New Testament it is a mistake
to adopt this purely analytic method. It is not the Virgin Birth,
or the Empty Tomb, or the Transfiguration, or the feeding of the
five thousand, or the walking on the water, or the tremendous
claims of Christ, or the stories of the Apostles, or the experience
of St'. Paul, or the theory of St. John; it is all these things to-
1. Wilfred L. Knox and Alec R. Vidler, The Development of Modern Catholi¬
cism, (Milwaukee, Morehouse Publishing Co., (1933))> quoting The One "Christ,
p. 20lw
2. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, pp. 193-191;.
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gether. Or, to be accurate,it is the atmosphere, the mental ..
world, in which all these things take place, that is in question.
Ihe man who, as a historian, insisted that no category of life could be
truly measured apart from an appreciation of surrounding categories, no
person or event understood except in context, no period understood apart
from an investigation of the years which preceded and followed was not
likely to recommend the treatment of creed or event of religious signifi¬
cance in isolation. For him the only category which could give such
things meaning, relevance, and the stamp of truth was the context of
religious experience, both personal and as embodied in the continuing
life of the Christian church.
Figgis was keenly aware, in keeping with his emphasis on the
deductive rather than the inductive method in matters of faith, that argu¬
ments in behalf of the historicity of certain significant events in the
New Testament are not adequate in themselves to give rise to the convic¬
tion in men's minds that these things actually took place.
All belief in alleged historical facts depends partly on the
actual evidence, partly on a presupposition that the facts
are not in themselves and under certain conditions improbable—
i.e. on a faith in a certain order of things, with which such
facts are congruous.
But in the case of miraculous or very abnormal occurrences the
consensus "a priori" as to what is likely does not exist and
never will exist, so far as I can seej and hence the evidence
alone is not and never can be sufficient to convince every one
that such events have occurred, and we do wrong in expecting a
degree of certainty which, from the nature of the case.is un¬
attainable. The more abnormal or unique any event is the larger
1. Ibid., p. 199.
2. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Meeds, p. 62.
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part must be played in the belief by our sense of its being
likely; and the greater divergences of opinion must therefore
exist as to the value or origin of the evidence. I think, there¬
fore, that they greatly err who hope to found the Christian re¬
ligion on a certain basis by pure historical inquiry.1
I have heard that an eminent historian considers that our Lord's
resurrection is a feet of history as certain as the death of Julius
Caesar. With all respect I submit that this view is untenable and
is disproved by the very large number of instructed persons xvho
disbelieve in the one, while of fee other there is practically no
doubt whatever. Belief in the resurrection of Christ cannot be
possible, apart from certain presuppositions as to what the world
means or may mean, which enable a man to view the evidence sym¬
pathetically. ... On the other hand, to a Christian believer
who has both examined and approved the evidence and has appro¬
priated to himself the presence of the living Christ in the
Church of the Bueharist, the resurrection may seem a fact infin¬
itely more certain than an event like the death of Julius Caesar,
which strikes him as merely external fact.
Although Figgis did ridicule the notion that one could be con¬
vinced of the historicity of certain momentous events surrounding the Per¬
son and life of Christ on the basis of historical evidence apart from cer¬
tain presuppositions that would indicate that they were highly probable,
still he did not make little of historical criticism nor of the achieve-
3
ments in that realm of such men as Westcott and Hort.
1. Ibid., p. 62.
2. Ibid., p. 63.
On one occasion at a meeting of clergy, Figgis, in referring to a
recent book, The Resurrection, the Most Certain Fact in History, went on to
say, "The man who can write a book with a title like that doesn't know what
he is talking about." Unfortunately, the author was in the frontrow.
3. It is interesting to see Figgis in The Church Quarterly Review for
October 1903-January 190U, page 101, Volume LVII, in the article entitled,
"A Puritan Utopia," exercising himself in the discipline of historical
criticism pertaining neither to the Bible nor to politics. In stating
his own reasons for believing that The Ideal City of Jerusalem Regained
was written by John Milton in this article reviewing '//alter Begley's trans¬
lation of the work with a similar assumption, Figgis shows himself to be
a keen student of history even beyond the sphere of his main interests.
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There is no fact related of Christ, which does not require to
be examined, and our knowledge of Him rests on certain docu¬
mentary evidence and traditions, which must be interrogated
like all other historical testimony.
We cannot, however tempted,separate a rational belief in Chris¬
tianity from the careful investigation of its early records.
The century now past has been greatly busied in this matter, and
I need not here do more than refer to the work of the scholars
who made Cambridge famous in European learning, From the
crucible of severe investigation to which the New Testament has
been subjected two facts appear to issue with some certainty.
Nothing in this investigation has resulted which hinders the sound
scholar from Nicene Christianity apart from other hostile presup¬
positions. ^
But then he reasserts:
On the other hand, it is abundantly clear from the mere observa¬
tion of facts that historical criticism of itself and alone is
not sufficient to induce certainty in the minds of those who, on
other grounds, assume the impossibility of the miraculous.3
For some years the writer lived, however humbly, in the academic
world. That experience made two things apparent: (a) the im¬
portance of the contribution of criticism; (b) the fact that it
is no more than a contribution, one factor among many others, all
of which must be taken into account.**
In a footnote Figgis quotes Westcott himself in support.
"Miracles and prophecies considered separately and in detail are
not the proper proof of Christianity, but as parts of this whole
testimony of experience they have an effective power. Historical
testimony originates and commends a religion but it does not es¬
tablish it. "3
Just as Figgis was aware that something like certainty about the
supernatural beginnings of Christianity could not be enjoyed apart from
1. Figgis, Christianity and History, p. 1+7.
2. Figgis, The Gospeland Human Needs, p. 60.
3. ibid., p7~5iT
1+. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, "Modernism Versus Modernity
(Appendix B), p. 290.
5. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, "Notes to the Hulsean Lectures
(Appendix), p. 186, quoting Gospel of Life, p. 30l|.
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favourable presuppositions, he was also persistent in pointing out that
conclusions against their probable historicity also arise out of certain
presuppositions, certain skeptical presuppositions of the kind employed by
the liberal German school of historical critics. Warning against a hyper¬
critical approach to history, Figgis writes:
The sober historian must always beware of the desire to transmute
his material, and remember that the hypercritical attitude of mind
must inevitably lead not merely to the denial of religious stories
but of all history.
For the very reason that Figgis was a deductive rather than an
inductive thinker, because he approached from an experience of the whole
rather than from acquaintance with detail, he was really out of line with
the Cambridge mentality in general and its theological mentality in par¬
ticular, and that, in spite of the fact that Cambridge was his educational
home and that he too had taken the mathematical tripos in 1888. The con¬
flict becomes obvious in light of the following interesting observation
appearing in The Church Quarterly Review:
Hard indeed is it to exaggerate the unconscious way in which the
Cambridge mind is influenced by the now almost remote past when
the sole avenue to academic distinction was "the Tripos," as the
mathematical examination was always styled.
Classical studies themselves were until recently moulded by mathe¬
matical ideals. The knowledge of the historian and the thoughtful-
ness of the philosopher were held in slight estimation compared to
the rigid accuracy of the "pure classic." The fame of the classical
tripos rested on the impossibility of mere ingenuity, originality,
or brilliancy blinding the eyes of the examiners to the fact that
the candidate was a slovenly or inaccurate scholar. Its most fin¬
ished product was a mathematician who had devoted his attention to
the ancient languages. And now, though "the Tripos" has fallen from
its high estate, though far more men read for natural science
1. Figgis, Christianity and Histoiy, pp. Ul-U5.
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than mathematical honours, though new triposes are constantly-
springing up, the old spirit is still alive and active. Thus
it comes to pass that modern theology is still at Cambridge
under the spell of the old mathematical tripos. Naturally it
looks to facts rather than fancies, and many Cambridge men have
a strong disposition to consider textual criticism as the most
important branch of divinity.1
From what has been said, it is obvious that Figgis was critical rather
than in favour of such an emphasis. An added indication of Figgis's atti¬
tude toward the Cambridge overemphasis on the side of historical criticism
may be seen in his comment in the"London Times"on the controversy over
whether or not men with no particular Christian sympathies should be
awarded the Cambridge D. D. degree for their research in the field of
Biblical history and linguistics.
Should agnostics be permitted to take the D. in D.? That, as the
master of St. Catherine's truly said, is the plain issue. Unlike
him I am ready to say yes. In the present condition of opinion
in the university and the highly technical nature of the exercises
often accepted as these.s in theology, no good purpose is served
by confining the degree to clergymen or even to Christians
if the change be made (giving the degree to non-believers) the
doctorate will be without any presuppositions at all and a recog¬
nition for learning on the topic of religion considered as a hu¬
man phenomenon. This being so, there can be no ground for con¬
fining it to Christianity, and the degree ought to be equally
obtainable for an exercise in Confueius or Buddah, without any
reference ± all to the Christian church. Once this change is
accepted, we shall cease to be in a false position in the matter,
and I am willing to accept its obvious correlaries. Possibly,
though not probably, it may have some slight effect in inducing
the leaders of the theological school to devote more detention to
the fundamental problems of belief instead of their existing
immertion in critical and linguistic studies which are only by
courtesy to be called theology.^
1. "Religion in Cambridge," The Church Quarterly Re¬
view, CIX, (October 1902).
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Sir Spens wrote in his Belief and Practice:
What then are the data for those who appeal to religious ex¬
perience? In the first place a very general experience of
certain needs and capacities, and the possibility of their
satisfaction.1
This statement serves to describe a large part of Figgis's apologetic.
The Gospel and Human Needs, the name given by Figgis to the Hulsean
Lectures delivered by him before the University of Cambridge in 1908,
to a large and attentive audience, provides a suitable caption for a
large part of Figgis's whole emphasis. The most significant thing for
the Christian faith is that it satisfies more adequately than any other
allegiance man's basic needs and longings.
Mr. Bernard Shaw, in one of the most impressive of his many help¬
ful and impressive utterances, made Undershaft declare that we
have had enough of shams, and must at last demand a religion that
fits the facts, I agree. It is because Christianity fits the
facts, and helps us to live as real beings in a real world, and
not as the puppets of fate or even as the dreamers of an earthly
Paradise, that it will outlast all the systems of criticism,
philosophy, or morals, which arise one after another, plausible
and dazzling in one decade, and disappear in the next, futile as
the "snows of yesteryear."2
For this gift taken in its fulness—eternal life in Christ Jesus
our Lord—ministers to three permanent, irreducible needs of the
soul; the need for intimacy between man's spirit and the eternal,
which is met by the life in Christ; the need for a voice from the
world beyond, assuring him of a life beyond life, and the conser¬
vation of value; and the need for deliverance, for some hope of
redemption of a world which cries loudly for salvation and can be
satisfied with nothing less than a Redeemer.3
The claim of the Gospel is not so much to solve problems as to
come near to human lives. It is to man, as he lives and works,
1. Knox and Vidler, 0£. cit., p. 231, quoting Belief and Practice.
2. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. x.
3. Figgis, The Fellowship of the hystery, p. 22.
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as he fights and sins, as he loves and hopes, as he feels the
need of outside support to sustain him in his weakness, of Love
from Beyond to console him in his gloom, of social institutions
and environments to prevent his spirit being crushed by the world
or throttled by comfort, that the Christ appeals, To everyday
men and women, with the pettiness and stains of sordid vulgar life,
but also with the tenderness and heroism never far from any lover,
never unknown to parent or child, to these it is that the Christian
Church makes its appeal, resting on definite facts iasuing in
clear statements, and ministering gifts real but supernatural.
In the very helpful book, The Development of Modern Catholicism,
these words appear:
On the other hand Modernism had grasped a point of vital impor¬
tance in -.realizing that Christianity must be defended as a whole
system, expressing the complete religious experience of man, not
as a series of isolated dogmas depending on immediate divine reve¬
lation, or deductions following from revelation with conclusive
certainty. It is only in virtue of our acceptance of Christianity
as a whole that we can see either the reasonableness of particular
doctrinal statements, or the value of the historical element in
Christianity. The fact is obscured to those who have grown up in
a Christian atmosphere, where the truth of Christianity and the
value of religious practice is assumed so unquestioningly that
we are not conscious that the assumption has ever been made. We
mistake the rationalization of the Christian experience in the
form of theology for the reasons which lead us to believe. It
is noticeable that in Lux Kundi the argument from experience is
occasionally used to reinforce other arguments, but in general
it is supposed that the facts of history or the dogmatic system
of Christianity are the grounds from which belief follows, rather
than the attempt to explicate a religious experience which is al¬
ready accepted or at least desired. Here the contribution of
Modernism to the understanding of the psychology of Christian be¬
lief and the function of theology in regard to it has been of
lasting importance.
Because he sympathized -with the Modernist point of view to the extent that
he aaw the importance of approaching and defending the Christian faith as a
1. Ibid., p. 7b'
For an elaboration from Figgis's own experience of "the partial,
relatively superficial character of intellectual processes...at the crises
of life" — supra, p. 12.
2. Knox and Vidler, o£. cit., pp. 181-182.
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whole system, because he, like the Modernist, fully appreciated the im¬
portance of the argument from experience, good cause is given to those
who seek to discover Figgis's place in the theological movements of his
time to recognize him as one of the second generation Anglo-Catholics,
like T. A. Lacey, G. C. Rawlinson, and Will Spens, who, while receiving
much of their stimulus and inspiration from the "Lux Mundi" group, were
yet distinct from it in these and other significant ways.
Figgis concluded his last lecture on The Gospel and Human Needs
with:
"Credo quia impossibile. "^*
He felt compelled to speak boldly, convinced as he was that he was living
in a time which was witnessing a recrudescence of the sentimental ration¬
alism of the eighteenth century.
It is a similar phenomenon we witness to-day. All around us we
see new theologies, up-to-date catechisms, common-sense religions,
re-births, restatements, some profound, some a little crude, all
rather depressing. From London and New York and Birmingham, not
to speak of the Continent, books pour from the press which are
all directed by the same bias.
We are to learn the permanent value of Christian faith by stripping
it of every wonder and every mystery. We are to reject the strange
birth as materialistic, the physical resurrection as unscientific,
sacramental grace as magical—above all, the deity of our Lord dis¬
appears in a cloud of phrases? and all the Churches are invited to
join in a "caput mortuum" of pious sentiment and pantheistic emotion.
In brief, we are to capitulate to the enemy on every controverted
point except the general need of religion and prayer, and then to
trust to the God of philosophy to come doxm "from the machine" and
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. 119.
Keble Talbot of the Community of the Resurrection recalls that
Figgis walked with him for an hour one afternoon, trying to decide whether
or not to end his lectures intiis fashion.
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save from the wrecks of ecclesiasticism just enough to suit men of
parts and of polish, while throwing to the wolves the poor man's
God, who wrought wonders and rose from the tomb. I
You cannot search for religion merely from the side of intellectual
inquiry and arrive at a Christian result. It is impossible, for
the intellect demands necessity, and freedom is the postulate of
the Gospel.2
You cannot serve God and Mammon with the mind any more than with
the heart. Somewhere there comes the choice between worshipping
God and idolising your own mind.3
Figgis felt a great attraction to Bergson, whom he recognized as a
"supremely acute observer of this life" and whom he admired for his in¬
sight into the fact that "the intellect is by its nature incapable of
comprehending life.Figgis held no brief for the traditional arguments
in support of belief in God. To attempt to use them in modern apologetics
he considered akin to entering upon modern warfare with bows and arrows.
We cannot, indeed, too deeply take to heart the lesson impressed
from without by Kant and even Herbert Spencer, and from within by
Pascal and Newman—that we cannot find God merely by the under¬
standing, that there is no coercive proof of His being, and that
all our terms to express Him are but symbols and figures. No
longer do men attach absolute value to what are merely inadequate
formulae, or waste energy over rational proofs. These things are
1. Ibid., pp. 29-30.
2. Ibid., p. 33.
3. Ibid., p. 1*2.
1;. A reviewer of Figgis's The Fellowship of the Mystery draws an in¬
teresting and not inaccurate parallel between Figgis and Bergson: "It may,
in fact, be said that the philosophy of Bergson and the theology of Br.
Figgis are two important symptoms of the forces which lie beneath the sur¬
face of these days. Both start from the conception of life; and, as Berg¬
son explains the whole forces of the world in terms of life, so does Dr.
Figgis apply the same conception to the doctrines and institutions of the
Church. All the dogmas of Catholicism claim to be expressions of a living
experience, and hence, without being final, they are valid and necessary.
Rev. C. E. Rolt, "Father Figgis ai The Fellowship of the mystery',' English
Church Review, VI, (April 19l£), pp. 15>9-l60.
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regulative, the best possible; they do but suggest, they cannot
comprehend, that awful splendour of holiness which is far beyond
word and thought,and like all personal differences can only be
bridged by love and faithful souls.
We cannot demonstrate these matters any more than you can demon¬
strate to the solipsist the fact that there is a world beyond
himself.
Nor did Figgis care any more for Roman Catholic Scholasticism than he did
for its ultramontanism; and that on the ground of its excess intellectual-
ism.
I think we can find in this temper part at least iof the hostility
to scholasticism and certain other aspects of Roman belief. We
resent its hard outlines, its clear distinctions, its arrogance
of certitudej while its attempt to secure an intellectually coer¬
cive proof of God's being strikes us as both ineffectual and un¬
attractive. It is not valid; and if it were valid, it would
destroy the very belief it proves, and it would make God inferior
to our intelligence.3
The reader is not surprised to come upon the following round condemnation
of idealism.
Idealism in various forms displays the inadequacy of mere ration¬
alism, and develops what its adherents regard as unanswerable ar¬
guments for the spiritual nature of reality. A firm basis in re¬
flection is thus believed to exist for theistic belief, and it is
anticipated that these benefits will soon be universal when philo¬
sophic training is extended to all. This is a great act of faith,
for neither the past nor the present position of philosophic con¬
troversies observed as facts afford much ground for any hope of
general agreement. 'This temper often brings with it a refusal to
consider as vital any belief not :in this way acceptable to the
philosopher, and develops the tendency to transmute religion into
philosophy. It is often hostile or apathetic to all the historical
elements in Christianity, and though quite compatible with orthodox
belief, tends to treat religion mainly as a system of ideas, a lux¬
ury for the study rather than the lord of life and death. All these
1. Figgis, 'Ihe Gospel and Human Needs, p. 51.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the mystery, p. 2u.
3. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. I4.9.
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methods spring from the same error—the desire to do away with the
element of risk in faith, and a dislike of what is unfathomable to
the intelligence. To all the forms of the new theology there is one
common assumption—a "naif" faith in the intellect of man.
This faith is not only improbable but is contradicted daily by the
facts of life. If we were able by thinking to plumb the secrets
of things, it is dear that no revelation is needed, nor could there
be any place in religion for mystery, which in its very notion is
something unfathomable. On this view it would be true, as Browning
said in irony, that there is now a higher tribunal than God, the
educated man, and the Christian religion must be made subject en¬
tirely to our intelligence, and shorn of all elements which tran¬
scend it.T
Wherein an element of idealism figured in the thinking of the Oxford men
of the "Lux Mundi" movement, Figgis was distinct from and critical of them.
So it was that he. lauded Dr. Bussdl's Bampton Lectures, Christian Theology
and Social Progress.
Dr. Bussell sought in fact to disengage the Christian system
from its lamentable confusion with tie lamentable form of the
philosophic idealism at Oxford, which leads in so many cases
to a repudiation of all the most distinctive ngtes of the
Gospel and the obscuring of the beauty of God.
To the defenders of the faith, Figgis sounds a precaution ad a
challenge:
The truth is that apologists are constantly tempted to concede
the claims of their adversaries by arguing upon their assumptions,
and these assumptions are inherently opposed to the Christian
faith, as revealed and supernatural. If that faith be what it
claims, its defenders have only one course open to them. They
must help man's eyes to see the King in His beauty; must set
forth the grace of Christian truth as the veritable splendour of
1. Ibid., pp. 36-37.
2. J. N. Figgis, "A Review of The Church and the World, being the
Bampton Lectures for 1908 and 1909 By the Rev. Walter Hobhouse," The
English Church Review, I, (September 1910), I4.OO-I4.05. (The article refers
to other Bampton Lectures, including Dr. Bussell's).
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God; arid show that it is more congruous with life, as it is lived,
than is any proffered substitute. I think that since the time of ^
Descartes, the process I am condemning has been specially dominant.
At the heart of all objective and subjective reality, there is
mystery; there is that which reason cannot invade and does not comprehend.
Mystery seems to be part and parcel of the plain man's experience of life,
and to this man (and it is always to this man that Figgis turns in his
thinking), nothing is real, least of all religion, but shares this mystery.
To remove the mysterious from religion would be to withdraw that which
constitutes a large part of its appeal.
All nature may be movement, but does any one really understand
motion or change? We are told that science has not yet explained
one single fact, and in the simplest things in outward life we
find a mystery unfathomable But even though these were not
the case, and the outerworld were quite within our intelligence,
it is the inward life that is the real, aad that is always a mystery,
and speaks of something beyond.
Mystery is, in fact, no less needful than miracle in our world of
thought to-day. The one saves us from a world of cast iron; the
other from that profounder slavery of the mind to its own crea¬
tions, from that superstition of the logical process, which is
willing in its blindness to treat the real life of struggle and
hope and joy as mere illusion, if only at the cost it may pre¬
serve its self-consistency. This is to make an idol out of an
instrument. The perfection of theoretic harmony is dearly
bought if life be tie price we are to pay for it.
Mystery, which it is sought to eliminate from the creed, is of its
very essence; for the dreed is a "symbol" in its old name, the ex¬
pression partial and inadequate of something greater—life. Man's
sense of the greatness of things, of the profound wonder in his
daily life, is too deep to be eradicated by any dialectic clever¬
ness, and is proof against all the ridicule of philosophers.2
It all comes to this. The plain man's readiness to accept the mys¬
teries of God's grace rests at once on his ignorance and his knowl-
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. 35.
2. Ibid., pp. 38-I4O.
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edge. He feels that in all things there is mystery, and that
what is the constant factor of his inner being is somehow part
of the stuff of the universe. He places no reliance at all upon
the optimistic faith of men who, like Du Bois Beymond, look for¬
ward to the day when the world can be reduced to a mathematical
formula; or in the more common assertion that the whole of being
is penetrable to thought; for even the delight in a poem or a piece
of music can prove the contrary. He knows that, though you may ex¬
plain the world, he remains inexplicable to himself. On the other
hand, he feels that there must be reality in that love and joy and
willing resolve which are the deepest and most real things in his
life. The Christian faith asserts this truth at once of the mystery
of things, of the eternity of love, of the infinite worth of choice,
as does no other creed. And this is its warrant.
To such an one belief in God is not dependent upon formal proof;
like his own existence, it is a postulate, not a conclusion. In¬
deed, if God be, as we say, a loving Father, it is clear that our
knowledge of Him cannot rest on a basis of reasoning; or it would
be unlike our perception of any other personal relation.
It is to be added that Figgis's sense of the irrational, the mys¬
terious at the core of all reality, as in the case of other aspects of his
thinking which have been worth of special note, is partly indebted to his
experience as a historian. In the heart of his lecture on "The Value of
Historical Study," he says:
Philosophers in all ages have set themselves the task of reducing
God's universe to system, and if they have succeeded in satisfy¬
ing themselves, to the mind of the observer they have established
nothing save that life is toA large to be comprehended by a formula
and that to form a theory of thinking that shall be catholic is
possible only on the condition of its being nugatory. The logician
may banish contradiction from his own views,but it remains inherent
in the nature of things,and the last word of thought is surely this—
that truth does not admit to expression except in paradoxes.^
Integral to an appreciation of Neville Figgis's contribution to
religious thought under the general heading of "A Plea for Otherworldliness"
o/
1. Ibid., pp. 50-51.
2. Figgis,"The Value of Historical Study," p. 11.
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is an understanding of the importance he places upon miracles. In the
preface to The Gospel and Human Needs, he writes:
Not long since a friend said to me that miracles which had once
been a support to faith were now a stumbling-block. I made the
reply that that stage was at an end, and that once more they were
becoming a help, were indeed of the essence of revelation. The
following lectures are an attempt to explicate that dictum.1
Expanding his claim that miracles are a help rather than an impediment to
faith and that they belong to the essence of revelation (or in Westcott's
words, "Miracles are more probably the circumstances than the proof of
revelation"), Figgis hinged the very possibility of the existence of an¬
other world on the certainty that miracles happen.
...the question of miracles is really the question of the existence
of a transcendent world. Does there exist behind the veil a Being
or beings of spiritual nature with knowledge and powers more than
human and able to influence our life in the world of sense? To
deny this existence is to surrender the last vestige of the Chris¬
tian doctrine of the other world. Yet if such beings have any re¬
lation at all with this life they must somehow or other cause that
to happen which otherwise would not; and vice versa. When such
events are normal in character we call them special providences.
When they are not we call them miracles.2
Figgis does not approah the miraculous in Christianity from the
standpoint of individual miracles. He does not suggest that isolated mira¬
cles are their own authentication nor that individual miracles bear the bur¬
den of the proof of Christianity as a supernatural religion; by the same
token, neither will he permit the ridiculing of the miraculous element in
the Christian tradition on the basis of a negative estimate of individual
unnatural occurrences. One sees Figgis's previously considered deductive
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. vii.
2. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads. MKing Richard the Third
and the Reverend James Thompson," (Appendix), p. 25U.
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rather than inductive approach in matters of faith as in matters of history,
his insistence on an approach from the whole, pressed into service in his
defense of the miraculous element in Christianity.
Here it is the total fact that has the character of miracle. It
is there that we obtain that irresistible impression of witnessing
an invasion of this world by powers from that beyond—a view which
is only inadmissible provided the world as we see it be self-ex¬
planatory and complete. If this be not so, we cannot rule out be¬
forehand the supernatural character of the Christian fact, and it
is as parts of this alleged supernatural fact that the miracles
are to be considered. They are not single and unrelated marvels,
and yet that is the way in which criticism of this sort habitually
treats them.l
...a right judgment of the New Testament experience depends on our
view of it as a whole. Is there not ground for believing that here
we are in the presence of a mighty inrush from the power behind the
phenomenal world, producing a coruscation of wonders? The more I
read the New Testament, the more certain I am that this is the true
interpretation of what the early Christians thought they were ex¬
periencing; and, unless some other considerations inhibit me, I
should suppose that what they thought was justified in fact
I feel justified in holding that the experience is of that order
best described as supernatural. If this be so, it is under the be¬
lief that the whole is a strange and miraculous occurence that we
analyse the particular items, and not vice versa.2
In keeping with his equating the Christian revelation with the
miraculous, Figgis insisted that to concede the miraculous in Christianity
is equivalent to conceding the Nicene doctrine. What makes this assertion
the more interesting is his authentication of it on the basis of his own
personal experience.
The Dean of Christ Church has recently shown how deeply the idea of
the miraculous is involved in the Christian conception of Cod, and
how, if we give up the one, we cannot hope for long to retain the
other.
1. Ibid., p. 2^6.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, "Modernism Versus Modernity,"
(Appendix B), p. 287.
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Here, moreover, some can appeal to their own experience. We,
who are unwilling to bow the knee to the new Baal, are not ig¬
norant of his attractionsj and some of us have passed through
the fire.
From a personal knowledge one is able to state what has been the
consequence of making these concessions, apparently so trifling.
Speaking for the one person whose experience is certain to him,
the writer can say this. For some time he gave up his belief in
the Virgin Birth, or, to be accurate, he treated it as irrelevantj
but he did not find it so. Slowly almost everything crumbled.
Faith in the sacramental presence was not so much denied as prac¬
tically forgotten. Harder and harder of credit became the great
Christian doctrines—a dominant intellectualism seemed to cut
away everything, not by argument, but by detaching faith from all
living interest.^
Every system of thought must take something on faith, must begin
with some irreducible factor or reality which is not subject to being dis-
proven,according to the system's proponent, something within which or out
from which the rest of the system grows and upon which it depends. For
Figgis, the central fact of experience is freedom. Freedom to him is that
irreducible reality in life which is the stumbling block of systems whitoh
make little of it and the authenticity of those which take it sufficiently
o
into account.
1. Ibid., pp. 293-29k-
2. The large part which freedom plays in Figgis's religious experience
and expression is doubtless related to the emphasis placed on freedom by his
three most influential instructors in political thought: Creighton (who was
also a strong religious influence), Maitland, and Acton. In the introduc¬
tion which Figgis and Lawrence wrote to their compilation of Acton's cor¬
respondence, they said in reference to the centrality of the category of
freedom in Acton's thinking: "What is certain is the unity of the main
thoughts which governed Acton. That thought is the idea of freedom as an
absolute end for all men. Freedom is not to Aston one among many human con¬
ditions to be balarced with others by the politician. Rather it is ihe govern¬
ing principle of time statesmanship, the determining element in political
thought, the criterion of all constitutions. The sense that freedom is a
spiritual principle made for Acton a religion of politics." (Acton, Selec-
(175)
Freedom must be accepted as a given fact, mysterious like the
primary facts of life.
Freedom is to me an immediate doctrine of consciousness,
a primary fact, the most real thing in life. So much is it a
part of my life that to deny this fact reduces it to ruins.2
Freedom, the noblest motive in human life, the highest aim of
all true politics, the one foundation of moral development, the
one source of all values and of every spiritual meaning—this
is the Aladdin's Palace of everyraan's desire to which Christ and
Christ alone can give the open Sesame.3
Asserting it to be self-evident that man as a free agent by
his actions can cause things to happen which otherwise would not have oc¬
curred, Figgis suggests the analogy that God, once conceived of as a free
being, must also exercise a like power, miracles being but his free ac¬
tions, the free actions of a personality whose mind and power are greater
than the mind and power of man.
The real question between Christianity and its adversaries is
concerned not with the miracles of Jesus, but with the possibil¬
ity of human freedom. The antecedent difficulty which keeps men
from Christian Faith is commonly understood to be this problem
of the miraculous. This is time, but it is true only because
miracles are a part of the larger issue between freedom and nec¬
essity. All along the line there is one and only one fundamental
difficulty, that created by "scientific fatalism." It is clear
that without some doctrine of human freedom the Christian scheme
and the whole theory of sin and redemption is nonsense. What is
less obvious is that once it be established that the acts of men
are not all of them determined, the "a priori" argument against
miracles is gone. Supposing our wills be free, we are spirits
who choose and, acting frequently upon the material of nature,
alter and interfere with its arrangements We make that happen
which apart from our free act would not happen. A miracle only
tions From the Correspondence of Lord Action, p. xi. Speaking of the one
great concern that these three men shared, Figgis said: "It is this faith
in freedom which is in different forms the characteristic of them all "
Figgis, Churches in the Modern State, "Three Cambridge Historians: Creighton,
Maitland, and Acton" (Appendix II), p. 230.
1. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, p. 176.
2. Ibid., p. 175.
3. 37X Figgis, "The Gospel of Freedom," The Guardian, (December 20,
1912), p. 1686.
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asserts the same about a being or beings also free and with wider
knowledge than ours. When God employs the forces of nature without
any apparent interference, we call His act a special providence;
when He brings forces into play which we cannot manipulate, -we call
the act a miracle. Both are equally involved in the conception of
God's freedom, that is His personality.^
....The whole problem turns on the reality of freedom, for that in¬
volves even in ourselves powers which may well be called supernatural.
It is of course conceivable that there are w higher beings in the
universe than we are. If that were so, of course miracles in the
ordinary sense could not happen. But once grant that God is to be
thought of as the free Being who created and controlled the world,
then it is really less difficult to credit His action than our own;
for we know very well that our life is dependent. Once grant, how¬
ever, that our acts are free, or some of them, and the whole edi¬
fice of a system of rigid mechanism falls to the ground; and we
must, at least, allow the possibility of such irruptions from the
world beyond sight as are best called miraculous.2
If we have once surmounted the cardinal crux of human freedom,
there is no real ground for boggling over miracles.3
Figgis placed so much emphasis on freedom and on the miraculous
because he felt that the time and stream of popular thought in which he
found himself demanded of the defender of revealed religion an emphasis
on personal forces in the world and the universe which would counteract
the tendency to confine faith and life within the prison house of mechan¬
istic, deterministic thinking.
The contention of the Christian is that in the last resort all
the order of things is personal. Moreover, since on this view
God has created a number of free beings with a relative independ¬
ence, there is always uncertainty in the universe. The opposite
view is that, so far from this being the case, one might (theo¬
retically) and may by-and-bye practically be able to predict the
whole future of the universe both in gross and detail, because
everything in it is mutually determined. At bottom this view de¬
nies the reality of change and freedom and treats the world as
1. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, pp. 172-173.
2. Ibid., p. 17U.
3. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. 21
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dead, i.e., given once for all, and working out a formula like a
calculating machine.
Miracles were easy of credit in days when personal agency was de¬
tected throughout nature, and the physical world was not conceived
as an orderly whole. Belief was easy then, but it was also super¬
fluous; for the miracle was simply a fact, like any other fact of
daily life, and conveyed none but a particular lesson. Nowadays
the belief is not easy, but it is essential; unless we are to be
deprived of all faith in our own spiritual being, and driven to
view the world as a vast system, which may perhaps be a living
whole, but without any place for personalities, and with our own
loves and fears, our sin or sanctity mere illusions, a sort of
phosphorescent by-product of the outer world, The iron law of
physical sequences is always with us; the pressure of the world,
environment, heredity, is patent and appalling; what is a mere
theory to the student is the most constant and oppressive of facts
to the plain man. It is just this very thing he wants to escape
from. It is only miracle, revelation, that can assure him that
behind all this network of material forces there is a living will;
while God manifest in Christ displays that will as Love. That is
all he wants. That gives him a refuge, a home for the soul, whose
deepest emotion and noblest desires may now be satisfied. Just as
a man of business or toil needs a home with sill its pieties, if his
higher nature is not to be starved, so man "who goeth forth to his
work and to his labour until the evening" and is ever confronted by
natural law, demands the assurance of spiritual freedom, of the liv¬
ing reality of Love and Peace.
In an age like this, when the scientific knowledge of the natural
world and our power to use it have increased so marvellously, we
need some bulwark to guard us against being lost in the sea of
naturalism: the danger is great lest we take the part for a whole,
lest we extend into a general theory of things conceptions useful,
as a partial description of the outward phenomena, conceived in ab¬
straction, but not an account of life or ourselves. Such a bul¬
wark is afforded by the idea of the miraculous and its content in
the revelation of Jesus Christ, '■'•'his alone can save us from con¬
fusing God with the creation which is His will, ^his alone can point
to a way of escape,to a sure refuge from the iron chain of cause and
effect. For this alone assures us that we are not items in a series,
cogs in a great machine; but free spirits living in society, the
children of one like unto us, in so far that we may love Him and
speak to Him; and caring so much that God Himself died to save us.
God revealed in Christ is the one truth, which gives to tired men
1. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, "King Richard fche Third
and the Reverend James Thompson," pp. 257-258.
2. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, pp. 22-23.
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and women the right—the right to be a little children, with the
child's freshness of delight and trust. "That is all we know on
earth, and all we need to know. "3-
Figgis again and again takes to task those who look upon miracles
as "contra naturam."
To assume that any alleged event is "contra naturam" is to assume
that we know all about Nature and that we can treat it as a closed _
system. The whole contention of Theism rests on the denial of this.
Nature is often used, as by Huxley and St. Augustine, in the sense
of all that happens. Here, again, miracles, if they take place, are
naturalj no thing "contra naturam" is even conceivable. It is in the
literal—not the journalistic—sense unthinkable. Sometimes, again,
Nature is used to mean the whole phenomenal world. This also would
include miracles, if there be such; for "ex hypothesi" miracles are
occurrences in the visible universe. Changes, however catastrophic
in the inward life, need not, except in figure, be termed miraculous.3
To those who thus spoke of miracles as contrary to the order of the universe
he insisted that order is a spiritual quality and that miracles are the most
excellent expression of a spiritually ordered universe, a universe not gov¬
erned by immutable physical laws but by the spirit of a loving God.
The order of the universe as a whole is the only real order, the
mechanical order, except on a materialistic theory, is but a formu¬
la for a part of it. Miracles reveal the personal, as distinct
from the mechanical, nature of the universal order.4
So far from miracles being contrary to order, they are in the high¬
est sense expressive of orderj for they are admittedly irreconcil¬
able with a mechanical conception of the universe. Ultimately a
mechanical universe would not be an orderly one; for order is a
spiritual quality.5
As part of his effort to substitute a creative evolution whose
1. Ibid., pp. 25-26.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, "Modernism versus Modernity,
272.
3. Ibid., p. 273.
I;. Ibid., p. 278.
5. Ibid., p. 279.
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impetus is God's love for a mechanical evolution of which blind fate is
the moving force, Figgis went to some length to refute J. M. Thompson,
whose objections to a traditional view of miracles are contained in his
Miracles in the New Testament, Thompson's thought, as far as Figgis was
concerned, epitomized the reign of non-personal, mechanistic, deterministic
ideas borrowed from the realm of natural science, dictating the limits
within which man and God must operate and ruling the miraculous out of
court. Figgis pressed home the point that the true scientists of the
early twentieth century had begun to recognize that psychical influences
do interfere with the course of physical nature and that therefore it can¬
not be assumed, arguing on the basis of immutable natural laws, that mir¬
acles never happen. Figgis reveled in saying tiat Thompson's attack on the
miraculous was based on allegiance in theological matters to an out-of-
date science. Referring to McDougall's book, Body and Mind, he says:
This book deserves to be widely known. It shews what are the liv¬
ing tendencies among students of natural science. At least some
of the acutest minds are seen to be moving away (at this very
moment, when Mr. Thompson develops an attack based on the notions
of the last generation) from that monism, whether materialist or
spiritualist, to which all events are mere changes in the one
Being and miracles or new happenings and freedom or the existence
of individuals are equally out of court.^
In his emphasis on freedom as the mark of the personality of both
God and man, Figgis, although according to his own particular lights, was
in the same strong tradition of the main core of "Lux Mundi" thought which
"saved Anglo-Catholic theology from the Modernists' premature abandonment
of the 'personal' conception of God, as revealed in Christ, in favor of a
1. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, "King Richard the 'Third and
the Reverend James Thompson," p. 259.
(180)
theology of divine Immanence which could be accused by its opponents with¬
out entire injustice of being mere pantheism.
Figgis's main effort to refute Thompson was entitled, as already
indicated in the footnotes, "King Richard the Third and the Reverend James
Thompson." The article's initial blast at Thompson's minimizing the
miraculous in the New Testament shows Figgis the historian enjoying himself
as he brings his wealth of historical background and know-how to bear yet
again in the defense of the supernatural, in his "Plea for Otherworldliness."
Taking Sir Clements Markham's noble effort to whitewash the blemishes tra¬
ditionally associated with the dharacter of Richard the Third, Figgis enum¬
erates a number of the arguments used by Markham to accomplish his end, in¬
cluding the assertion that the writers who recorded Richard's exploits were
subservient to Henry VII, who stood to gain by doing injury to the reputa¬
tion of his predecessor, the labouring of the inadequacy of the evidence
for the bulk of the crimes credited to Richard, the plea that Richard was
no usurper but true heir to the Crown, and the insistence that Richard did
not so much as make away with his nephews but that he left them alive and
that they were murdered by Heniy VII, or at least at his orders.
So far from being an educated Renaissance villain, Richard is
shewn as a rather nice man, capable like others of crimes, but
averse from them.
Not minimizing the ingenuity of much of the case in Richard's favour, Figgis
points out that Richard's new face was never accepted as representing the
character of the man who lived and proceeds to explain:
1. Knox and Vidler, o£. cit., p. 170.
2. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, "King Richard the Third
and the Reverend James Thompson, p. 236.
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Of course all this might be the fruit of Tudor cabmny; at least
the contrary must be proved. But to a mind not resolved "a
priori" to discard the common tradition such an explanation seems
too far fetched to be probable. Thus ifcccan be seen how, even in
a case like this, any sound historical judgment must take into ac¬
count not only the documents, but also the common tradition, while
it must treat not merely of the facts in isolation, but the total
picture, of which they are elements.*•
Thus pointing up the difficulty and the high probability of error involved
in challenging the traditional opinion regarding any historical figure or
event, Figgis brings this observation to bear on Thompson's book:
The age-long faith of Christendom goes for nothing. In his view
the consciousness of the Church creates not even a presumption
in favourcf any single interpretation—indeed the presumption is
rather the other way. Now it might not be accurate to say that,
critically speaking, the Church tradition affords more than a
presumption. But that it affords less is not so much a surrender
of any conception of Divine guidance in the religious society, but
it is false to the first principles of forming the most ordinary
historical judgments. ......tradition is rarely at fault in re¬
gard to the main lineaments of any character who held the stage,
and it ought always to be taken into account even by a writer
who desires to set up a different view. As a matter of fact the
vast development of historical investigation in the nineteenth
century has not greatly altered our judgments, though it has
deepened our knowledge and modified it in detail, in regard to
any of the great public men. Henry VIII, Queen Elizabeth, Charles I
and his sons, Marlborough, Joseph II, Richelieu, Frederic the
Great, Maria Teresa do not loom so very differently to us from
that they did to our grandfathers, however greatly we have deep¬
ened our acquaintance with the social and political conditions of
their life.
Figgis would have felt something very like pity for the King of
England if, upon crossing the border into Scotland and becoming a Pres¬
byterian, he would in that same moment find himself a necessary devotee of
the theology of John Calvin. Deriding Calvin was for Neville Figgis some-
1. Ibid., p. 239.
2. Ibid., p. 2I4.O—21+3.
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thing of a hobby, a hobby which occupied his sometimes scathing pen never
so fervently as when accusing the Reformer of denying man's freedom in the
name of defending God's freedom.
Calvin's system as developed in his Institutio Christianae Religionis
is a logical and compact doctrine, lucid, harmonious, and horrible.
It starts from one tenet, and from that argues deductively without
any qualification. That tenet is the sovereignty of God. The sys¬
tem is an intellectualist construction, entirely regardless of the
facts of life. Since God can only be conceived as sovereign, and
since no limits can be set to His omnipotence, for to do so is to
deny His freedom, there can be no place for any real choice on the
part of a created beingj and the place of man in the universe is
necessarily decided by divine decree. God's predestination is
something more than His foreknowledge, and no consideration is
given to the possibility of His limiting Himself hy the creation of
free beings. There never was nor will be any freedom save that of
God's eternal will. .... In Calvin's work the notion of God
as essentially Love simply does not occur.^
The notion of God as essentially Love reoccurs constantly in
Figgis's works. The Love of God is the title of a book of Figgis' sermons,
sermons preached at Christ's Church, Lancaster Gate; and Saint Mary's,
Graham Street. In this series he developes something like a complete
apologetic from the starting point of God as Love.
"God is Love" ought to be the starting point of all our thoughts
about God and the Faithj and they are so far its best apology
that no God who is not love can by us be accepted. The whole of
Calvin's system imposing though it be is vitiated at the outset
from the Christian standpoint because it rests all on the doc¬
trine of the sovereignty of God, who is treated as a human auto¬
crat j Calvin has no place, except incidentally, for God's love.
The presupposition of the Christian religion is quite other than
that of intellectualism. It starts from this notion, that love is
the real essence of things—the nature of reality—that at the
spiritual centre of the universe, as the ground and support of all
being, there is no philosophic absolute—but the flaming heart of
1. J. N. Figgis, Dictionary of English Church History, "Calvinism,"
(1912), (S. L. Ollard), pp. 80-81.
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quintessential Love."'"
Having said this, Figgis proceeds to show that if God is Love, He must be
a personal God, not the God of pantheism, who is indistinguishable from
His creation, but a distinct personality.
For love to reach its full realization, there must always be
two persons5 who preserve their individuality when most united.
Furthermore, a God of Love must be thought of as a creative God.
...the creation of a world of beings free to love, and there¬
fore to refuse to love, is seen to be involved in the very idea
of God as Love.3
Because God's revelation is born of love, it is further suggested that His
self-revelation must be doubtful, that is, not subject to coercive proof.
Love cannot rest in compelled affection, indeed there is no such
thing. Love's message may be refused. The response which is the
soul's answer to friendship must be free and thus it cannot be in¬
tellectually coercive. Our recognition of God is akin to our rec¬
ognition of earthly affection, and our knowledge of Him is like
that gained in friendship. Therefore no one must be surprised if
so far as proof goes, we can never get beyond presumption; the ut¬
most we can say to one who doubts is, "Here is a great experience,
try it."1*
Sin is defined as the refusal to respond to God's love, miracles as the
natural free expression of a loving, personal God bringing rule to bear on
a natural world from which He is distinct; ana God's sacrifice in the giv¬
ing of His Son and Christ's suffering on the Cross are explained on the
ground that:
Love not only gives, it must give at cost to itself—true love is
1. J. N. Figgis, The Love of God, (London, Francis Griffiths, 1916),
pp. 9-10.
2. Ibid., p. 12.
3. Ibid., p. 1U.
i+. Ibid., p. 25.
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always losing life to save it. Suffering willingly undergone
is a "conditio sine qua non" for the realization in life of Love,
by its very nature then one is involved in the other, and trans¬
muted into joy therein. .... I now say that God Himself could
only realize His nature of Love by an eternal sacrifice. He must
be giving or he would not be Love. The act in time is represented
by the death on the Gross. This is in truth the supreme instance
of giving "all for all," For the Eternal Son must needs
find Himself alone, reft of all sense, even of-the Father's
presence, or His Love could not have reached its full height. ...
we can reach full individuality only by Loneliness—and the Son
was forced to be left alone that his suffering, i.e., the real
work of Love, might be real. No sacrifice that does not reach
down to Loneliness of spirit is real.
Interesting, cogent, and imaginative as is Figgis's effort to
evolve all of Christianity's major tenents from an original conception of
God as Love, the reader cannot escape the impression that his frequent use
of "God must" reflects a certain forcing of all thought about God into one
category. Part of the explanation doubtless lies in the great care he took
to avoid describing God in terms of His sovereignty, a care based on his
often reiterated dislike of Calvin and the major theological emphases as¬
sociated with that name. Much of Figgis's dislike for Calvinism stems
from his hatred of sovereignty as a political doctrine, and his reluctance
to credit that sovereignty may mean much more when it is referred to in
relation to God's nature.
Not the least interesting of Figgis's developments of the basic
theme of God as Love is an attempt to explain the Trinity in terms of Eter¬
nal Love, requiring eternal objects on which to shower its love.
If the meaning of God's Being is this, that He is Eternal Love-
then we cannot conceive that love without an object—and this ob¬
ject must also be eternal the self-consciousness of God which
1. Ibid., ppT 29-30.
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is involved in his being Love could not be realized, could not
indeed be a fact, were He not able eternally to contemplate Him¬
self in another and eternally resting in that ineffable union, a
perfect friendship.....the notion of three Persons, the Eternal
Son and that Holy Spirit of Love which is the Union between them,
springs quite^naturally and inevitably from the root principle
that God is Love. If ;on the other hand you try to pic¬
ture yourself the pure autocrat of Deism, you are left with an
eternal loneliness which is not possible to reconcile with the
root idea of Love. In a word, if Love is to mean anything, the
unity of God must be differentiated and the differences must be of
His very essence; i. e., eternal. I do not say that this would
have become clear to men apart from the revelation of Jesus Christ,
but in that case neither would the notion of God as Love have be¬
come dominant.1
1. Ibid., pp. 17-19.
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CHAPTER V
FIGGIS AS A THEOLOGIAN
"A Plea For Otherworldliness"
(Continued)
The student of Figgis's religious thought comes to the place
where he must record something of the man's Christology, for the things
which Neville Figgis urged upon his readers and listeners regarding the
Person of Christ constitute the focus point of his whole "Plea for Other¬
worldliness ."
The main issues for theology at the turn of the twentieth cen¬
tury ultimately centered around the Person of Jesus and the question as
to whether or not He was what the Church had assumed and taught Him to
be for ages. Figgis, as may be discerned from what has already been said,
is uncompromising in his defense of the Founder of Christianity as the Son
of God Incarnate, of whom the Scriptures give a substantially accurate ac¬
count as to His person and work, and whose supernatural life continues in
the life of His church insofar as the church is true to Him. A large part
of Figgis's defense of Christ as not merely man but God has been implicit
and explicit in what has already been said about Figgis's defense of the
miraculous element in Christianity, his emphasis on the congruity of the
Gospel with human needs, his insistence on the importance of experience
and of reasoning from the whole of that experience in making any estimate
regarding the truth or falsehood of any one of its aspects, especially its
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historical aspect. What follows is by way of adding to and expanding what
has already been said.
There had been a strong tendency in the Oxford Movement, as ex¬
emplified in the writings of Liddon, to exaggerate the divinity of Christ
to an almost complete neglect of His real humanity. Christ1s humanity un¬
der the influence of this bias was understood to possess perfect knowl¬
edge of all reality, past, present and future. With the advance of science
and the important accomplishments in the field of the historical criticism
of the Old and New Testaments, it became patently clear that Christ, during
His earthly ministry, was limited to the knowledge of his contemporaries as
regards matters of historical and scientific fact. The very conservative
Anglo-Catholics were rigorously opposed to accepting these findings, es¬
pecially in that they had such ominous implications for the view of Christ's
Incarnation which they championed. In reaction against this kind of con¬
servatism, many religious thinkers, realizing that the defenders of religion
cannot close their eyes to scientific and historical discoveries, proceeded
to identify themselves with that Liberalism which rejected all ecclesiastical
dogma as a necessary preliminary to the return to the historical Jesus.
It was the writers of Lux Mundi, chief among them being Gore, who,
in coming to the fore with a Kenotic Christology (its leading exponent hav¬
ing been Bishop Martinson of Denmark), presented a view of Christ which was
essentially orthodox and loyal to the Person whose ministry is recorded in
the New Testament without being orthodox in the sense of holding to the
doctrinaire Lbcetism which typified so much of traditional Anglo-Catholicism.
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In so doing, they preserved a meaningful third alternative for those who
felt they had to chose between a staid orthodoxy and a devastating Liber¬
alism. John Neville Figgis was a young Anglo-Catholic who worked his way
back from a rather shallow Liberalism to find a theological home,in this
third alternative. Although there is not much reference in Figgis's works
to a Kenotic Christology as such, through and through there is that insis¬
tence on what constituted a major part of kenotic thinking—that Christ in
His Incarnation voluntarily laid aside the exercise of those attributes of
deity that would have hindered a real human experience.
...we need no Christ to assure of God's greatness That
God is little, that is the truth which Jesus taught man, and we
AVv"' ' find at once so tender and so perplexing. It is of the nature of
love to be infinitely minute, as well as soaring in its imagination,
and this nature is shown us by Christ. All His most appealing quali¬
ties reveal this aspectj the heart of Christendom has gone out to
the story of Bethlehem and the manger, of the shepherds, and the
wise man; to the blessing of the children, the words about the spar¬
rows and the lilies. This is what gives to Christian devotion its
distinctive, poignant note, so different in its simple gaiety from
the honour paid to the First Cause, or the Absolute, or the Neces¬
sary Being, the "Summum Bonum." The mother and the child, the
helpless sufferer on the cross, the "gentle Jesus" of the hymn—
these are images that come close to the toiling and wayworn, the
disinherited and the ineffectual; sometimes perhaps to the neglect
of austerer truths. It is not God in His power and majesty, the
pride of Deity, which was revealed in Jesus, but in deed and truth
God in His humiliation, scorned, spat upon, dying, that has been
the force which changed the world more than all the armies of all
the emperors.
...Like all the real things of life this truth is hard to fathom;
yet it is the case that the revelation of the manger and the Cross
has given to men that which elsewhere they seek in vain. It may be
easier for the Church to believe in God as the moral governor of
the universe, or the immanent Spirit, or the unchanging idea—but
to the despairing conscience, to the worldling satiate with pleasure
and seeking rest, al3 this is words and emptiness. But tell him of
the tender love which gave its only begotten Son, speak to him of
the child of Nazareth, and at once, if he can trust you, his heart
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leaps up The vision of God's greatness is ever with us to
appal and oppress, and we withdraw trembling from His glory. Show
us the vision of His littleness and weakness, love self-emptying
and suffering, and we can cry in the old hymn—"Jesu, Lover of my
soul, Let me to Thy bosom fly."
The supreme and most difficult act of Divine omnipotence is His-
Self-limitation; and it is conditioned only by humility in God,
which is the true expression of His nature as Love;2
In the context of his showing that sacrifice is a necessary expression of
love and that "God Himself could only realize His nature of Love by an
eternal sacrifice," it becomes even more clear that Figgis believed in a
Christ who "emptied Himself" of all those divine perrogatives that would
have made His life the exercise of power from beyond rather than an ex¬
ercise of sympathy from within the realm of difficult human experience.
Of Christ's words from the Cross, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken
me?" Figgis writes:
For the Eternal Son must needs find himself alone, reft of all
sense even of the Father's presence, or His love could not have
reached its full height We can reach full individuality
only by loneliness-and the Son was forced to be left alone that
His suffering, i.e., the real work of love, might be real. No
sacrifice that does not reach down to loneliness of spirit is real.3
The One Christ, written by Frank Weston and published in 1907, is
recognized as being in the main stream of the "Lux Mundi" tradition while
yet representing "an independent attempt to meet the difficulties of the
time."^ Much the same can be said of Figgis's, The Gospel and Human Needs,
delivered in 1908, and published in 1910. While in the "Lux Mundi" tradi-
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, pp. 86-88.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, p. 35.
3. Figgis, The Love of God, p. 30.
U. Knox and Vidler, op. cit., p. 203.
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tion, yet in light of Figgis's historical training and know-how, his
Evangelical background, the influence of Mandell Creighton, and the fact
of his own unusual personality as having passed through various stages of
religious and Christian experience, it too represents an independent ef¬
fort to develop the distinctive challenge offaith. The work may be said,
in some measure at least, to share the plaudits with Weston's book for
bringing to an end for serious Anglo-Catholic theology the old view of
Christ with its implications either of dual personality or Docetic human¬
ity.
Although Docetism was a problem, the greater issue sb the time
Figgis's voice was being heard centered around the "Jesus of History" and
the "Christ of Dogma " controversy and the assertion on the part of not a
few that the latter could be retained without retaining the former. Those
who accepted without question the radical criticism of the Mew Testament,
such as Modernists like Corrance and Loisy, believed that Christianity is
basically an adherence to certain general principles of conduct and a be¬
lief in a spiritual universe and that it is not necessary to make such be¬
lief contingent on the historicity of certain actual occurrences. It made
little difference to their thought whether the main events of Christ's life
were historically authentic or not. Men like Hegel and Rictschl had con¬
tributed significantly to this theological craze for disentangling the
kernel idea in Christianity from the external husk of historical facts and
institutions. Figgis was fully cognizant of this trend in religious thought
or lack of thought. He opens his chapter in The Gospel and Human Meeds on
"The Historic Christ" with these words:
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In a moment of irony Huxley once prophesied that a time would
come when apologists would be telling Christians to hold fast
to their faith, quite apart from the irrelevant question whether
or no there were any facts to confirm itI That prophecy has
come true.
In reply to and in contrast with the kind of thinking that dismissed the
stories of the birth and resurrection of Jesus as symbolic and which yet
claimed that in all its essentials Christianity kept its former identity,
Figgis writes:
Christian faith does not rest upon history by itself, for its
most compelling arguments are the lives of the saints and our
own experience. But it is so bound up with the events of at
least one period of actual history that if you destroy men's
belief in the substantial accuracy of the one, you will not
long retain even the name of the other.
Apart from the portrait of Jesus, it is idle to talk of the
Christian religion; and whatever details in that portrait may be
irrelevant, the main impression of a being at once natural and
supernatural, unique in his origin, in his action, and in his
rising from the tomb is inseparable from the portrait. And most
men are like children asking of a story-teller "Is it true?"
donvince them in regard to the story of Jesus that it is not true,
but only a symbol of the religious aspirations of ages, and men
will repudiate either in scorn or sorrow the claims of the Church
to be the home of the soul, and seek for themselves some other
refuge. The New Temple may be grander cr nearer, more beautiful
or uglier than the Christian Church, but it will not be the
Christian Church; it will be something else.
Christology was a popular subject in the early 1900's in Great
Britain. The "Jesus or Christ" controversy attests to the fact. A vol¬
ume by that name was published as a supplement to "The Hibbert Journal"
for 1909, the title coming from the lead article, "Jesus or Christ? A
Plea for Consistency," by Rev* R. Roberts. The remainder of the volume
consists of various replies to Roberts's insistence that it was incon-
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. 56.
2. Ibid., p. 59.
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ceivable that the Man from Mazareth could have been limited as He was,
Kenotic Christology notwithstanding, and still have been God.
Can we conceive of Jesus believing in and understanding the
Copernican system or following the reasonings of Newton? Is
it possible to think of Him following the dialectic of Aristotle
or entering into the enjoyment of the art of Pheidas? Political
science is a necessity of civilization, but what proof is there
in the evidence before us that Jesus had any conception of so¬
ciety as the product of human reasoning dealing with the facts
of associated experience? If Jesus was man only, these questions
are irrelevant. But if he was God, they raise, for me, an in¬
soluble difficulty.1
E.S.
For Figgis, as for^Talbot and Holland, the latter two having
written replies to Roberts in the "kenotic" tradition of the "Lux Mundi"
school, the issues raised presented no "insoluble difficulty," rather they
constituted the genius, or as Figgis loved to say, "the charm," of the
Christian faith and the Person of Jesus Christ.
The charm of Christianity lies in its excessive concretenessj
not merely is God seen embodied in man, but He comes to us, not
as one of the more abstract and speculative classes aloof from
the crowd, but Emmanuel, God with us. It is to the crib and the
baby that men look, to the boy in the temple, to the strange preacher
of goodness, the friend of Lazarus, to the sufferer of Gethsemane,
the confronter of Pilate and Herod, and, above all, to the "strange
Man on the Cross." This it is which pulls the heart out of human¬
ity, and gives to Jesus an undying attraction for men who sin and
women who suffer and boys and girls who love and quarrel. It is
vain to hurl against us the obvious fact, as though it were a new
discovery, that Jesus was not a philosopher or an author or an
art critic. Who ever said He was? The whole point of His life
lies in the fact that He was not.2
Figgis's Christology was concerned above all with that "strange
Man on the Cross," with Christ as Redeemer:
1. R. Roberts, "Jesus or Christ?" An Appeal for Consistency." The
Hibbert Journal, VII, (1908-1909), pg. 361.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, pp. 31-32.
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The gift of God is not merely in Jesus, as the brightness of His
Being, nor even in our communion with the Risen Life. It lies in
the gresb Act upon the Cross, where by His one sacrifice once of¬
fered He "made a full, perfect, and sufficient sacrifice, oblation,
and satisfaction for the sins of the whole world." Mankind, as a
whole needs not so much revelation as redemption. It is not a
theoretical, problem, but a practical trouble, that drives men to
Christ.!
He felt that nineteenth century English theology in general and the Trac-
tarian Movement in particular had stressed the doctrine of the Incarnation
to the neglect of the doctrine of the Atonement.
This, then, is the ground of hope for the Christian religionj
the world not only needs but feels the need of redemption; it
does not always use the word. But if we are to realise this
hope, we must fulfil certain conditions. -First of all, this re¬
demptive character of the Christian Faith must not be slurred
overj .... the theology of grace must be emphasised, the sense
that it is not of him that willeth, or him that runneth, but God
from Whom comes all help and power—the picture of the Gospel as
light to a world in darkness, or, more accurately, a spar to a
man drowning in a rough sea, and not merely the thought of religion
as the guarantee of man's own higher thought, or the sanction of
honourable living, or of social piety. It is that, but it is much
more than that. What the world needs is help; i£ feels that it can¬
not help itself alone, and if it can only believe it is ready to
recognise that power from beyond which shall tell us that "our
warfare is accomplished, our sin is pardoned."
People are afraid sometimes to talk about the forgiveness of sins,
but it is what we all want now. The Tractarian Movement went too
far in its reaction from the crude language and excited appeals
"to be saved" of the Evangelicals. In the last age the Atonement
was not denied; it was taken for granted. Conversion, definite
conversion, veiy often was denied. Men thought of the Incarna¬
tion as the central truth, and that if they concentrated upon that
all the rest would follow..
Unfortunately, what has followed this thrusting aside of the Atone¬
ment has been an increasing hesitation about the worship of Jesus
as Lord. Make people think of Jesus as Saviour, and they will soon
worship Him as Lord. Make Him only the Lord of all good life, and
1. Ibid., p. 37.
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they will begin to think of Him merely as the embodiment of the
moral idealj and gradually, almost without knowing it, to lose
sight of His transcendent nature. It is Jesus as our Saviour
'Who always wins men, and always will do, except the virtuous
few 1
Here the continuing impact of Figgis's Evangelical background, against
which he once revolted but which he came to cherish as sacred to his past
and relevant to much of his mature faith, can be seen coming to the fore.
Also one sees here the strong influence of Mandell Creighton:
The wisest Churchman of the last age, Mandell Creighton, was
aft to say that men had erred in giving this truth (the truth of
the Atonement) the second place and laying all the emphasis on
the Incarnation. Whether this tendency was wrong in its own d ay,
we need not askj probably it was needed. But its work is done.
What may be called the Alexandrine age of English theology has
passed or is passing. And now we need above all things to in¬
sist on "the Cruciality of the Cross." Christianity is a reli¬
gion of deliverance, of escape, or it is nothing}^
Figgis referred to P. T. Forsyth almost invariably when making
this emphasis on the Atonement and found himself in essential agreement
here as in many other matters with the brillaint Nonconformist theologian,
the value of whose works is being increasingly appreciated and who said:
"Redemption is the 'elan vital' of Christianity."
One of ;the reasons Figgis felt that "a stronger and more vital
hold on the Cross will be the note of effective religion in the age now
beginning" (written in 1910) was not only because he believed the Cross to
be at the heart of the Gospel for all time but also because he saw that in
his time men were finally awakening to a sense of their own and their world's
depravity, to the "awryness" of things, as Figgis put it so often. He rec-
1. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, pp. 21-23.
2. Figgis, Antichrist, p. 113.
(195)
ognized the First World War as bringing to a dramatic end for thinking
people all comfortable theories about the "best of all possible worlds,"
"inevitable progress," and the easy optimism about man's nature which
does not see the necessity cf looking upon man as essentially sinful, il¬
lusions which Figgis himself had long since abandoned.
This war has put an end to this optimism. (The shallow senti¬
ment of a good-natured universe which since the time of Leibnitz
has ruled a large amount of educated and benevolent opinion.)
Certain notions once popular have been destroyed by it. Ihe in¬
tellectual baggage for life's cabin passage, which a little while
ago did duty,has been torpedoed. First and foremost, men have
learned the reality of evil. Men used to say that evil was ig¬
norance, or that it was imperfection, or arrested development, or
the survival of animal instinct, or even that it was mere illusion,
the inevitable error of a limited and partial view, but that from
the point of view of God there was no such thing as evil. Now the
world has seen it in "all the naked horror of the truth." Evil is
the chosen idol of a will self-absorbed and worshipping its own
fancies. Other errors this age may make and will make. All kinds
of different schemes for salvation it may embrace. One thing it
will not do: it will not deny that salvation in some form is a
need of the world;^
Figgis took the proponents of the New Theology to task at every
point of his "Flea for Otherworldliness," nor did they escape his scorn for
failing to recognize and to speak to man's need for redemption.
Nearly all those who propound some one of the newer forms of
Christianity, in spite of all other divergences agree in this—
they belittle the Christian doctrine of sin.2
In this category Figgis singled out such writers as Algernon Sidney Crapsey,
Sir Oliver Lodge, R. J. Campbell, Lowes Dickinson, and Bishop Butler; and
of Tyrrell's Christianity at the Cross Roads, he said:
... in relegating to a subordinate place, the problem of sin and
1. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, pp. 16-17.
2. Figgis, The Gospel and Hunan Needs, p. 9^.
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redemption, it takes away from orthodoxy its main support. If
I were not a sinner, many other systems would suit me well enough;
there are attractions about pantheism; it is without certain dif¬
ficulties never quite surmountable in the historic faith, which
very well may lead to good and noble men refusing to walk therein,
and copying men like Marcus Aurelius, or teachers like Socrates.
It is for sinners that Christ made his awful sacrifice, and no
apologetic which omits conversion is likely even to get near the
fringe of the subject.1
To dramatize and document the inability of the thought of such men to speak to
man's greatest need, his need for redemption, Figgis speaks from the depth
of his own experience, his own sense of sin.
It is that very "worrying" about sin which I cannot escape that ob¬
structs all my desires to be up and doing and blights even my high¬
est and purest thoughts. Doubtless I might be happier, could I
feel myself a man of the new dogmatic, not "essentially a sinner"!
%t I cannot. I cannot help it; I have this burden, like Christian
in the story, and I cannot roll it off except at the foot of the
Cross. Miserable and well-nigh hopeless in face of the future, I
have to live. Taught by oft-recurring failures to distrust my best
resolves, and finding sincerest love and all the hardest sacrifices
vain, stained with the past, frightened in face of the tempter,
aware how easy it is to yield and what little rest he gives, tor¬
tured with lustful passions, a prey to pride and malice, contempt¬
ible even more than odious in my weakness, divided in my inmost be¬
ing, torn every hour between God and the devil, to whom shall I go?
What must I do to be saved? Alas! I know that I can do nothing.
I have no '*quid pro quo"to offer God, and cannot win my pardon by
any virtue or gift. I am naked, beaten, prostrate.
What is true of myself may probably be true of many others
To all so feeling, the facile optimism of the new theology is sheer
unreality. ....
Religion without deliverance, though it may appeal to a few favoured
and noble spirits, is no hope, no treasure to me.
Preach to the stricken sinner every truth of which we have hitherto
been speaking, and apart from redemption you will but deepen his
gloom. Tell him that God has revealed the other world as by a flash,
1. J. N. Figgis, "Christianity at the Cross Roads, A Review," The
Quarterly Chronicle of the Community oF the Resurrection, (Christmas 1909),
p. 11.
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that He is a Spirit, not tied down to the sensible universe, that
death does not close all. He will answer, "So much the worse for
me unless you can rid me of the barrier which divides me from God
and leaves me lonely.
An evolutionary philosophy, masquerading as a spiritual religion,
gives t'ome all they feel the need of, while on the intellectualist
assumptions the objections to the Christian faith must always ap¬
pear very nearly insuperable. At least they make it easier to
"interpret" than to accept the creeds. It is only the individual's
passionate insistence that he must be redeemed, that carries him
beyond the ordinary assumptions of idealism, to a belief in a per¬
sonal Saviour, in the Church, the Cross, and the Sacraments.2
For all of his stress on Christ's redemptive act, in no place does
Figgis define his or subscribe to any one theory of the Atonement.
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Meeds, pp. 102-105.
2. Ibid., pp. 162-163.
Deep as wjajs; Figgis's own sense of sin and as important as he saw
the Christian doctrine of sin to be to the whole Christian apologetic, yet
he did not subscribe to anything like a doctrine of total depravity. He
understood sin only as a disease of the will. "It is not human nature,
not classes of men, nor the fact of existence that is wrong, but the dis¬
ease of the will. Human nature is in itself of so high a worth that God
could take that nature upon Him, and bring about redemption through the
death on the Cross, and "give us life from His own risen life." Figgis,
Hopes for English religion, pp. lii-15. That he did not believe in total
depravity is abundantly evident through his numerous ^references in his
writings to his faith in the "anima naturaliter humana." "When we have
realised what I have been saying today, that the Christian ideal of cross-
bearing is at the bottom of all human life that is worthy, we shall be less
apt to be dismayed by the many violences that we see around us. For in the
long run the 'aniraa naturaliter humana' must assert itselfj and along with
the return of the human idealmil eventually come the conviction of many,
that the human points on to the Christian." Figgis, The Fellowship of the
Mystery, p. II4.6. This expression gives that much more authority to Kehle
Talbot's statement that Figgis had too much faith in instinct to permit any
close parallel to be drawn between him and Earth.
Furthermore, Figgis did not concern himself as to whether or not the
sinful tendency of man's will is due to Adam's fall. He would have gone
along with Gore's statement that "there must have been a moment when an in¬
nocent man sinned consciously, chosing evil when he had before him a clear
knowledge of what his choice involved."
Nor again are we....contending for any one theory of the Atonement,
but for the fact and reality of forgiveness.
The forms in which past ages have expressed their sense of the gift
are neither satisfactory nor authoritative. Yet even the most
grotesque testify to the extreme value of the truth such explana¬
tions were designed to guarantee, and to the real sense in which
forgiveness is so hard that it needs the miracle of a dying God to
accomplish. It were better to accept the crudest and most foren¬
sic doctrine of substitution rather than surrender the truth it is
intended to set forth.l
I am persuaded that we who are guardians of the gift are worse than
foolish if we preach the Christian faith mainly as the Incanation
or the Resurrection, and put into the second place the thought of
Jesus Christ and Him Crucified. The doctrine of the Atonement is
not fully clear to us; but is there any doctrine which is? Much
thinking needs to be done thereon, and perhaps this age may con¬
tribute something. But it is this fact of forgiveness which turns
the creed into the Gospel and converts the sinner.2
E. G. Selwyn, writing in Theology for January 1937, said:
...the main conclusions of the documentary analysis of the Scrip¬
tures has not been seriously altered since the nineteenth century
closed; and German theology has turned itself increasingly in our
generation to the study of the Gospel itself as the Word of God,
with its tidings of Redemption through the Cross of Christ. In
England, likewise, the note of pessimism and the need of Redemp¬
tion has increasingly led Christian thought to the Cross. The
events of the present century have seemed each year to drive the
message home.7 In the crucible of these events, there is being
formed a Liberal Catholicism which has the Cross of Christ at its
center.3
John Neville Figgis played no small part before his death in 1919 in bring¬
ing English thought back to the Cross and contributed significantly to the
formation of a Liberal Catholicism with the Cross of Christ at its center.
Figgis's "Plea for Otterworldliness" was never more emphatic
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, pp. 110-111.
2. Figgis, Ih e Fellowship of the mystery, pp. 39-liO.
3. E. G. Selwyn, "Christ in Nineteenth Century Thought," Theology,
(January 1937), pp. 18-19.
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than when asserting the absolute necessity of thinking in "otherworldly"
terms if anything like a Christian ethic is to be preserved. His rec¬
ognition of moral anarchy as -typifying the ethics of the early twentieth
Century has already been taken into account.^ There was no question in
Figgis's mind that the assumption common in the previous century that
the Christian ethic could be preserved although severed from its reliance
on Christian dogma had no basis in fact.
In truth, what has emerged more, than anything else in the con¬
troversies of the last fifteen years is the fact of the ethical
distinctness of Christianity. It was denied during what we may
call the Huxleian epoch. Any Christian who ventured to assert
that the ethics of Christians were dependent on their faith
and could not maintain themselves apart from it, was regarded
as narrow-minded.2
Much of our talk is futile, though the implied assumption that,
whatever the superstructure of dogmatic or ecclesiastical archi¬
tecture, the substructure of ethical ideals is always the same.
It is not. So far as international politics are concerned, this
fact has been known to students ever since Machiavelli told the
truth about Italy. So far as our personal life goes, even the
most optimistic should be persuaded by a glance through the
magazines, plays, and novels for any period of six months in the
last ten years.3
Just how intimately connected he believed an essentially orthodox belief
in the Person of Christ to be with the survival of an essentially Christian
ethic can be seen from these words:
This boneless Christ of the German liberals, this "transient,
embarrased phantom" living in vain and dying in disillusion,
is not only incapable of producing the mighty fact of the
Christian Church, or the mightier one of the converted soul,
but he cannot even maintain that lofty moral ideal which is by
1. Supra., p. lliO.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, p. 111.
3. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, p. 10U.
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some supposed to be the sole residuum of Christianity
Closely allied with Figgis's assertion that loyalty to dogma and
the ecclesiastical structure which embodies that dogma are absolutely es¬
sential to the preserving of high ethical ideals is the assertion that the
necessary social reforms require an "otherworldy" orientation and motiva¬
tion as well.
It is a change that is needed, a revolution of the spirit; and if
this once be realized, the strength of the claims of the Christian
Church is in a fair way to be felt. Of the social reformer we may
ask, "Where are you likely to get the driving force to bring about
those tremendous changes unless you have a religious faith, or
something very like it? Change the economic system of society
without somehow changing the passion and the pride of man and you
will but change the ways in which the strong will exploit the weak.
Without some change of heart, some fresh orientation of the spirit,
how are your great social changes to be effected or effectual?"2
The choice lies between schemes limited to this world, or schemes
which give redemption at the cost of personal existence, and the
Christian scheme, which "preaches peace to them that are off and
to them that are nigh," because it worships One who is not only the
Light, but is also the Life of men, and not only their Life, but
also their Saviour.3
The Christian, like the non-Christian philanthropist, is appalled
aththe vast spectacle of ugliness and tyranny which is the modern
notion of civilisation. But such changes he demands, he demands
because man is primarily an other-worldly being, and existing
arrangements tend to turn him from his true end,...h
The main thesis of this paper is that The Contribution of John
Neville Figgis (1866-1919) to the Religious Thought of His Period is his
"Plea for Otherworldliness," which is a way of saying that his chief
emphasis was eschatological in nature. His eschatological emphasis was
1. Figgis, Antichrist, p. 29.
2. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, pp. 117-118.
3. Ibid., p. 119-
k- Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. 127.
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never more strong than when proclaiming the inextricable relation of Chris¬
tian social ethics and Christianity's otherworldly quality.
...the whole meaning of the Christian religion is that it looks
beyond this life for its fruition, and that it does not believe
in any perfection this side the grave; thus it can never (while
remaining Christianity) realise a condition of equilibrium. All
the schemes for the amelioration of human life which are limited
to this world, must be theoretically capable of entire realisation,
and so far may be exhausted. There comes a time—in thought at
least—when the social reformer must sit down and weep with Alex¬
ander, for there are no new slums to conquer.1
In this regard there is seen the capital importance of keeping in
sight the otherworldly aim in Christian living. If for an hour we
allow ourselves to become immersed in any scheme of Christian
progress that is confined purely to this world, we shall find, not
merely that we have lost our true character and distinction, but
also that the spring and vitality of all our work is gone. Only as
we live within the circle of the Ascended Glory shall we be really
able for work here.2
... as always, it has been the mystic, the man with his eyes on the
other world, whose hands are most forward to do good in this.3
The authors of Lux Mundi were not only pioneers in theology, they
were also responsible in large degree for the introduction into the Catholic
movement of the social teachings of Westcott and Maurice. Webb said of them
and their immediate followers:
The lounger High Church School stands in the succession of the
Christian Socialists of Maurice and Kingsley and Westcott, as well
as that of the Tractarians.^
Figgis stood in the strong stream of this Younger High Church School emphasis
on social reform, but according to his own political and social insights
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, p. 92.
2. Ibid., pp. 93-9b'
3. Ibid., "John Henry Newman," p. 2£3.
h. C. C. J. Webb, A Century of Anglican Theology, (Oxford, Basil Black-
well, 1923), p. 19.
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as spelled out in Chapters II and III of this paper, insights which cul¬
minated in a strong preference for some form of Guild Socialism as offer¬
ing the best hope among many schemes for improving the lot of common man
as victimized by a mechanical, money-infatuated, impersonal, social and
economic system.^
It further documents what has already been said of Figgis' sense
ofa world headed towards destruction to read his estimate of the modern way
of life:
What is revolting is the conditions which take from a large mass
of men the means of a worthy personal life, which breed child-
criminals, pay women "the wages of prostitution," and even among
those better off produce an appalling insecurity. For thousands
of people live always on the edge of a precipice, and many more
are breaking down from the overstrain of an age which lives in a
fever. For is it not true that at present services are performed
by "private individuals under competitive conditions, struggling
for life and death on the inclined plane that leads to ruin,
fighting always for more, lest they should be obliged to take
less, too many of them everywhere competing for one job, and the
conditions of success not only or even mainly merit and capacity,
still less honesty and rectitude, which may be positive disquali¬
fications, but that peculiar and instrinsically contemptible art
we call tpush?,"2
It is not iron or engines, it is the unchecked operation of greed
that makes life so hideous; and until the soul of man is weary of
his millions, we need hardly look for much improvement.3
And although he did not believe it was the church's role to offer a scheme
of reforms, but rather to offer men a new soul, a new life, deliverance
1. Figgis was by the force of his own political philosophy opposed to
a centralized, socialistic welfare state. He was in favour of strong groups
within the state as the only effective means of securing good conditions on
a large scale. He interpreted the Trades Unionism Movement as a great spon¬
taneous effort to realize much of the ideal of Guild Socialism.
2. Figgis, Civilisation at the Gross floads, p. 87.
3. Ibid., p. 10i|.
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through faith, Figgis did believe strongly and proclaimed uncompromisingly
that the church shared the burden of guilt for the state in which society
found itself at the turn of the century. He found the church especially
guilty of taking the part of the rich and neglecting the poor.
Now what have we done, we good Christian people of England,
whether we are Anglican, Roman, or Nonconformist? Are we satis¬
fied? Can anybody be satisfied who looks about him, in view
of the appalling facts of child labour, prostitution, disease,
avoidable accident, ruined lives, which are the basis of all
the fortunes of the rich and the comfort of us all? Here and
there some one has raised a protest, only to be treated as a
crank. I do not mean that we are to have a political or eco¬
nomic programme because we are Christians. I only say, Why,
if we are going to make errors, should these errors always be
errors on the side of the rich, so that people think of the
Church as "the Conservative party at prayer?" If we must make
mistakes, let us do so on the side of the disinherited. Yet most
of us, even those who think of these things, hardly dare to lift
up our voices. Why? We do not want to lose support. Mr.
Bernard Shaw has said that all religious organizations are sold
to the rich. That may be unfair. Yet there is more grief in the
circles of the Church over one rich man that departeth than over
ninety and nine poor persons who never come near to be baptized.
True, we are not concerned with economic details. But we are
with the Gospel of fellowship. No wonder they think us insincere.
Here you are, they say, preaching that the Church is a society,
that we are members one of another, that there is neither Jew nor
Greek, but Christ is all and in all. Yet you lift no finger against
the evils which make fellowship impossible; you are mainly concerned
to denounce those who do lift their finger. "Dividends in danger"
is the one cry that unites people.^
Unless we can be the Church of the poor, we had far better cease to
be a Church at all. More and more does it appear that no
correctness of dogma, no beauty of Catholic ritual, no sentiment of
devotion, no piety esoteric and aloof can secure the Church from
collapse, unless she gain a "change of heart" in regard to the rela¬
tions of wealth and poverty. Not indeed that it is necessary, or
even desirable, that the Church as a Church should have a policy;
for in the modern State, which is nothing if not heterogeneous
1. Figgis, Some Defects in English Religion, pp. 36-37.
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in religion, no policy can be recommended merely on Christian
grounds; and the Church"quaE1 Church knows of no other. But the
Church as a corporate society ought to do the deepest penance
for her share in producing the existing relations between the
fortunate classes and the disinherited; and also for the wide¬
spread opinion, which must have some foundation, that she repre¬
sents the cause rather of the rich than of the poor.l
Figgis' sense of the social injustices of his time had not a
little to do, according to his own confession, with his decision to 3eave
his comfortable living at Marnhull for the poverty of monkdom in Mirfield..
Holding what was called a rich living (as things go), I resigned
it and joined a community of men living in voluntary poverty; not
the main, but one motive, was the feeling that at least one would
be no more exploiting other classes, and that one would be rid of
responsibility for an order, which such an act flouts. But I have
not found it so. Primarily I am not interested in these topics
and prefer to be free of them to think of other things. But the
very means of such simplified living as is provided by this regime,
and every piece of bread I eat and every train I travel by, and
to some extent the possibility of such an "order" at all, so far
as it depends on anything but alms, all issue out of the system
which is so repellent. The gains of the act are purely personal,
and one's relationto the economic system as a whole alters but
slightly, nor does the class-support grow less for such a surren¬
der, in many ways it grows greater, save that one is always a
recipient,;-no longer a donor. Certainly no man is justified in
thinking he is freed from all further responsibility and may dis¬
miss from his mind the economic muddle of the world. He cannot
be freed. So long as he lives, it is in him; and writhe as we
may, we must bear the Nessus-shirt of modern industrialism and
still feel that, as we have all our lives been sheltered through
the blood and tears of others and ridden on the crest of the wave,
so we do still; and ours will be the guilt if the chains of injus¬
tice are made heavier/
Sheer world-flight is not possible. The extremest ascetic—
S. Simon on his pillar—must be fed. 3
It can be seen, therefore, that Figgis' social conscience was the more
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, pp. 100-101.
2. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, pp. 8k-86.
3. Figgis, The Political Aspects of S. Augustine's 'City of God'
pp. 116-117/
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awakened by his entering the Community of the Resurrection. The result
was that he continued to exercise his mind and his pen in expressing his
concern that civilization was in need of redemption and his conviction
that an othervrorldy faith alone had the power to redeem.
It is not surprising that Figgis1 sensitivity to social prob¬
lems was increased after going to Mirfield, for many, although not all,
of the men in the Community shared the social passion of the Younger High
Church School. In his brief history of the Community of the Resurrection,
E. K. Talbot writes:
...the social ferment of the times challenged many in the Com¬
munity to a fresh apprehension of the faith in its bearings
upon the life of human society. Heads began to wag at teaching
which appeared to be dangerously revolutionary. Not without
qualms within the Community itself, liberty was allowed to in¬
dividuals to proclaim their social convictions, to appear on
Labour platforms, even to declare themselves Socialists at a
time when that title was one of approbarium in the minds of
many church people. The presence of Mr. Keir Hardie at confer¬
ences in the Quary between clergy and Labour leaders was greeted
as a portent of sinister import to some, to others of hope. It
was difficult for people to understand how a Community of Religi¬
ous could refuse to dragoon its members into uniformity or could
accord to them such liberty of utterances. Tension? Certainly:
but tension is the condition of any unity worth having.!
For all the time and energy Figgis gave to social problems,
there can be no question but that he considered efforts at social bet¬
terment of secondary importance. His ultimate allegiance was to that
otherworld which he insisted upon so often as the only abiding motive
for improving man's condition.
The duty, however arduous, of making earth a fairer place to dwell
1. Keble Talbot, "The Community 1892-19^2," The Quarterly Chronicle
of the Community of the Resurrection, (St. John the Baptist 19U2), p. 12.
••
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in, yields in stringency to that of helping men to see what is
harder still, that they have not long to dwell here, that how they
live is more important than what they live on.1
Figgis was very much interested in the seventeenth century
divine, Jacques Bossuet. He lectured on Bossuet at Oxford during the
Summer term of 1914. In the preface to the second edition of From Gerson
to Grotius, he speaks of "the work on Bossuet which I hope some day to
bring out."^ The fact is that Figgis did begin to write such a book,
some six chapters of which may be read in the copy made by C. S. Phillips
of the partial manuscript found among Figgis's papers following his
death.3
The first two chapters of this incomplete work on Bossuet are
dedicated to establishing Bossuet as an excellent diocesean in his rela¬
tion with the laity, the clergy, and the religious houses. The second
chapter deals at great length with the details of Bossuet's fight to bring
the Abbey at Jouarre into submission. The -viiole incident, Figgis reported,
"....shows Bossuet at his bestj inflexible in maintaining discipline but
carrying gentleness in method to the extreme.The third chapter pic-
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. 127.
2. Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius, p. vii.
3. The copy is in the library of the Community of the Resurrection.
There seems to be considerable mystery as to just how near Figgis ever came
to completing his work on Bossuet. It was generally accepted that a good
portion of the incomplete study went down with the "Andania." The question
is raised as to whether the papers Phillips worked on represent an effort
to rewrite what had been lost at sea or whether they in fact represent the
complete extent of Figgis's accomplishments in his stucfer of Louis XIV's
confessor. There are a number of good reasons, including the question of
Figgis's mental balance in his later years, for suggesting that the evi¬
dence is weighted on the side of the latter possibility. It is also known
that Figgis had hoped to go to France after World War I to further pursue
the Bossuet study.
4. J. N. Figgis, "Jacques Bossuet," handwritten transcript by C. S.
Phillips.
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tures Bossuet as an austere moralist, as something of a Puritan; the
fourth documents certain of Bossuet's ieanings towards Jansenism; and
the last deals with a phase of Bossuet's life least commendable in
Figgis's eyes, his use of his position to ruin the career of Richard
Simon, whom Figgis points out as the father of modem criticism.
Interesting as are the other chapters, the fifth chapter, the
one entitled, "Bossuet and the Jesuits—the Probablist Controversy," is
the most complete, the most worthy of notice, the only one ever pub¬
lished (in The Quarterly Chronicle of the Community of the Resurrection),
and the one most appropriately dealt with while considering Figgis's
general position on ethics. Figgis defines the issue:
The whole problem of Probablism is the problem of dealing with
those cases of conscience in which the dictates of the moral law
are doubtful. It has nothing to do with those in which they are
certain. In a case in which it is doubtful whether the moral law
forbids or allows a certain act, what is to be done? That is the
problem which Probablism seeks to answer.l
Having defined the issue, he proceeds to show "that Bossuet opposed proba-
bilism, that the Jesuits favoured it, and that he, Figgis, generally
shared the Jesuit position.
The casuists have an ill name: but they are trying to discuss
problems which are bound to arise in any society that is at all
complex: and Probabilists were laying down one portion of the
function. Protestants have never ceased to jibe at casuistry
and probabilism. But they have saved themselves all trouble by
abandoning the confessional.^





Law, again, cancb (no) more than give a rough formula for ordinary
cases. There must be difficult cases on the border-line. Hence
arose casuistry, the science of dealing with cases on the edge.
When it is difficult to know which class is right, casuistry is
necessary. It becomes dangerous only if you try to make a gen¬
eral rule out of exceptional cases. Without it you get an un¬
fair rigidity. Some defenders of tradition forget this. Love
to God and our neighbour are the two eternal principles of God's
law. All application of rules must be judged by them. You can
have no system of law which has not a loophole for dispensations.
This is known to the Romans, but it is not always realized among
ourselves. Some people are all for applying the whole canonical
system apart from those relaxations which alone rendered it tol¬
erable in practice. The best practical rule is to lean to the
lenient view when we are judging other people and to the severe
one when we are planning for ourselves.1
Figgis's own views come even more to the fore in the chapter on probabil-
ism as he define s the legitimacy of chosing the laxer of two alternatives
in a case where the external authorities are equal and even in some cases
where the individual's conscience leans in the direction of the more se¬
vere alternative.
If the severer view is always to be followed in all doubtful
cases, the whole direction of morality will pass to the least
human and understanding of men 2
In these matters moral certainity is often not possible. Yet
if one always ties the agent to the severer view, we shall ob¬
tain unendurable resuits.3
Figgis contended that if an issue is doubtful and the person's conscience
is biased inthe direction of severity, the person's temperament should
determine whether that bias should be determining or not.
If he is told that he must treat that bias assthough it were a
certainty, what mil happen? It will depend upon the tempera-
1. Figgis, Some Defects in English Religion, p. 23
2. Figgis, "Jacques Bossuet,"
3. Ibid.
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ament. Persons of one temperament -will grow more and more res¬
tive: and will continue to obey a rule which they only half ap¬
prove and will ultimately become morbidly scrupulous or throw
off the whole of their faith because it is seen to be involved
in so many indefensible positions. Persons of lax temperament
will gain by such a prohibition. For that temperament, given an
inch, will take a mile and will gradually eviscerate the moral
law of all meaning. Is not, then, the true course for a director
to be taken with a view to the temperament of the individual?^
A summary of Figgis's views on probabilism is certainly not
crucial to an appreciation of his contribution to the religious thought
of his period, or even to his "Plea for Otherworldliness" in relation to
his ethical position, but it is interesting and worthy of note as rep¬
resenting the most satisfactory part of bis partially completed and often
referred to work on Bossuet.
Figgis was a man of broad culture who recognized before many
others that not only ethics but culture as well soon disintegrates in
all its finer aspects apart from an "otherworldly" orientation and in¬
spiration.^
Culture in every form is high and noble, but only if it points
beyond. For it turns either to a selfish and fastidious cyni¬
cism, or to a despairing emptiness, unless earthly beauty and
poetic passion are seen as the symbols of the "altogether lovely."
.....It is God we are seeking for; the other world, which alone
can give reality to this, alone can invest duty with enduring
meaning, can find for beneficence a certain value, for knowledge
an ordered place, and flash upon the shows of earthly beauty some
1. Ibid.
2. Figgis's conviction that Christianity and culture go hand in hand
can be related in no small part to the impression Mandell Creighton made
upon him at an important turning point in Figgis's life while still study¬
ing at Cambridge. "Never shall I forget the impression made on me as an
undergraduate by being brought into touch with a great scholar who was abeve
all things a humanist, but the very depth of whose humanism was due to
his Christianity." Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, pp. 133-13^.
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hint at least of the eternal loveliness.^
A civilisation cut off -wholly from God would be a civilisation
without the highest kind of culture, whether aesthetic or in¬
tellectual. It would have no motive beyond fear, immediate
pleasure, and the desire to ward off the terrors of pain or
death to pursue these ends. If indeed there be eternal life,
and man can share it, then indeed the goods of sight and im¬
agination, the treasures of thought, and all the ardours of
spiritual adventure are the outward and visible signs of that
inward and invisible grace which we term the glory of God.2
The higher goods even of human culture will not persist apart
from a spiritual ideal; they will cease to be thought of as
goods, and their value will decay.3
Figgis documented his claim by pointing to the historical evidence of the
church's intimate link with the major cultural achievements of the Chris¬
tian era. Pointing specifically to the thirteenth century, he writes:
There we find the highwater mark of achievement in the greatest
Gothic, like the Sainte Chapelle and all the subsidiaries. Poetry
never surpassed the "Divina Commedia" of Dante j and the intellec¬
tual activity of the universities of those days put ours to shame,
and it was not the possession merely of a class. Every part of
life was claimed for God, but in writers like St. Thorns the in¬
tellect obtains its rights, and in spite of reverence for authority
has rarely been freer. The revival of the spirit of humility and
poverty in the friars went side by side with the development of
a vast system of law founded on the Roman.....^
To those who would say that the intimate connection of Christianity and
culture in the Thirteenth Century is ancient history and offers no guide
for contemporary thinking, Figgis pointed to Prussian militarism as rep¬
resenting the kind of culture that can be expected from those who rule
out supernatural considerations in favour of a purely humanist culture.
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, pp. 133-135.
2. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, p. 51.
3. Ibid., p. 131.
U. Ibid., p. b9»
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His words about the Germans were indorsed and dramatized by virtue of the
fact that they were written and spoken in 1917 as the First World War was
reaching its conclusion.
Can we not look forward to an age of purely humanist culture,
without any disturbing supernatural interest. Ever since the
Renaissance we have been witnessing efforts to produce this con¬
dition. At last we have some glimpse of its naked beauty. The
pre sent "moral" of the Prussian people is the direct result of the
marriage of European scepticism with State idolatry. The sometime
friend and pupil of Voltaire, Frederick the Great, is the symbol
of it all. What has gone on since then is merely the logical de¬
velopment of the philosophy of "sans-souci." People were shocked
and surprised at the bonfire of Louvain, the murder of Captain
Fryatt, the Belgian deportations. They may have done well to be
shocked, but they are foolish to be surprised. Nobody who has
read Busch's Memoirs of Bismarck ought to be surprised at anything
that the Germans have" done. That is the kind of culture for which
all deniers of the supernatural are preparing the way....l
Being a man to whom the gifts of civilization were very precioas,
Figgis despised the Puritan predilection for looking down on the world,
for completely missing the sacramental idea of things. He took the Puri¬
tans to task whenever the opportunity offered itself. *-rt^cl-e o h
■'pv-e /3WT I f~«- i-t 1 p yv
Since pleasure may and often does lead into harm, let us (the
Puritan says) do away with all pleasure. Let us, therefore,
not use it at all. Carried out logically it leads to pessimism
and suicide, for since life is full of temptations it were better
not to live. ...instead of seeing in this world a "veiled
glory," it beholds nothing but a "city of destruction," and so
far from consecrating all the activities of life to God's service
it prohibits many of them altogether, leaving to the individual
the right to comfort, but not to culture, and tending to substi¬
tute a narrow and avaricious spirit for a genial delight in life.
1. Ibid., pp. 130-131.
2. J» N» Figinis, "Persecution by the Puritans," being a reprint from
the National Church of articles on I. "The Puritan Spirit" by Rev. J. N.
Figgis; II. "Persecution by Puritans" by the Rev. H. J. Clayton, (London,
1908), p. 25.
To those who might be blinded to the faults of Puritanism by the
genius of Milton, Figgis said that Milton "was not a natural product of
the Puritan spirit, but a magnificient mistake."
(212)
As has been seen, Figgis's wards leave no doubt as to his
conviction that it would be impossible to preserve a taste for and a
power to create the best in culture apart from a focus on that "light
whose smile kindles the universe, that benediction in which all things
move." Equally strong in his assertion that the church needs to be
intimately involved in culture, not only for the sake of redeeming and
perpetuating good culture, but for the church's sake as well, for the
sake of its making contact with a world crying out for religion but un¬
interested in '"a religious world with its ecclesiastical gossips, its
clerical cliques, its great preachers, and its paraphernalia of fuss..."l
If, however, religion be the foundation of enduring culture,
culture is no less needful to the Catholic Church. The final
truth may not be with intellectualism; we are not on that ground
to despise the intellect, but rather to develop and direct it.
..... Art, if followed on lines of pure naturalism, will lose
its dignity and sweetness. We are not on that ground to turn
aside in Puritan contempt, but rather to do all we can to ele¬
vate artistic motives. So with all human instincts—none of them
but may lead astray if pursued apart from God. But none of them
but enriches the Christian if done in the right spirit. ....
On all hands we see the problem between a spiritual and a non-
spiritual culture. The solution is not to be looked for in any
form of Puritanism—a movement confined to no one epoch and no
one branch of the Church—but always seductive to austere minds;
and always heretical.
If we think to convert the modern world by retiring into a coterie,
we shall make a grievous error. Whatever the man of the present
day accepts, it will not be Puritanism.2
Figgis had no patience with fellow churchmen who indulged in
what he called "The Olympian Attitude":
By this I mean that state of mind which, serene in the admiration
1. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, p. 133.
2. Ibid., pp. 132-133.
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of its ovra opinions, is unwilling to entertain the thought that
to many persons these opinions are unnecessary. The cardinal
instance of this is to be found among our academic theologians.
Interested in critical problems, they seem to take for granted
the postulates which are denied. The fault is the monopoly of
no one school of thought. Its origin lies not so much in opinion
as in the increasing specialism of scholarship. In the old days
everyone was familiar with literature, whatever might be his
special line of study. Now for the most part that has changed.
...We have to live in the world of today. One of our chief
tasks is to try to convert that world. To do that we must take
some interest in its doings.... Possibly the omission of one or
two Teutonic writers from the shelves of our critical scholars
might be compensated by the purchase of a few volumes by Messrs.
Wells, Shaw, Galsworthy, and the like it is of the ideals
and presuppositions of modern novelists and poets that we need
be aware. The Olympian Attitude of rrere contempt will result
only in the alienation from the church of numbers of men and
women in all classes, especially the youth of both sexes.
As can be readily seen here and all through his writings, Figgis
had broad cultural and literary interests. He was an avid reader of con¬
temporary poetry and interested in the poetry of every age. F. J. E.
Raby says of Figgis that "the charm was all in the speaking voice heardA.
at best when, from the pulpit, he was disclaiming Matthew Arnold, Francis
2 ( <?/
Thompson, or with real abandon, Swindburn."^
The Community of the Resurrection Library refers to two items
which, if they could be found, would shed much light on Figgis's literar y
interests. They are: "Manuscript Notes for Lectures on Poetry" and
"Syllabus on Victorian Poets—A Lecture."
Although Figgis's cultural interests were many and varied, he
favoured for himself the cultural pursuit which he defined as "that love
1. J. N. Figgis, "The Olympian Attitude," English Church Review,
VII, (January 1916), pp. 36-37.
2. F. J. E. Raby, Theology, XL, #239, (May 19U0), p. 331.
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of intimacy with human life in every age which we call the historical
sense...
...I confess that I find it hard to respect the man who can re¬
gard as waste of time the inquiry into the causes which have pro¬
duced this varied, brilliant civilisation that we see around usj
who can see no use in tracing the gradual progress from the ancient
to the modern world- to whom no attractions are presented by the
study of the formative influences exercised for all time by Hellenic
culture and Roman government; to whom no lessons are conveyed by
the collision of that civilisation so brilliant and. so weary with
the vigour and mid life of the barbarian races; who looks, with¬
out the hope of learning aught, at that strange picture of the
Middle Age so rich in colour, in fantasy, in childlike charm, and
withal so brutal and unthinking; who does not long to view with
living eyes the breaking up of that world by the forces of devel¬
oping life, and the loosing of the bonds of centuries by the con¬
quering intellectual instinct; to take part, if but for an hour,
in that mad Renaissance carnival when the draught of art and lit¬
erature that poured in with the treasures of Greece had so intoxi¬
cated the minds of men, that all law, all morality, all humanity,
seemed for a time to have sunk submerged in: the waves of a culture
which threatened to be at once the culmination and the close of
the world's life; who vacantly gazes upon the slow recovery of
society from the shock, and its gradual assimilation of the new
food; who contemplates without one stimulating thought the Ref¬
ormation and the Revolution giving birth to this modern world of
ours, a larger and richer life, with all its faults more complex,
varied, fruitful, eager, than any which the earth has seen before;
the man #10 can look upon all this unmoved, and superciliously
describe the study of it as a waste of time, would appear to me to
be singularly lacking in imagination, and characterised by a woe-
ful narrowness of intellectual vision.2
In Chapters II and III of this paper, Figgis's main historical
works were dealt with in considerable detail, the historical works which
provided the context for much of his political thought. But these works
do not represent all of Figgis's historical interests and writings. One
1. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, p. 1±U.
2. J. N. Figgis, "The Value of Historical StudyU-A Lecture—Deliva-ed
before the Kettering Branch of the National Union of Teachers, (January 31,
1895),
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important article of an essentially non-religious and only partially
political nature, "The Value of Historical Study"—A Lecture, has been
referred to immediately above as well as earlier in this paper.A tork
not previously referred to is: English History from Original Sources
(1660-1715), Black's Historical Series, by J. Neville Figgis, 1902,
Adam and Charles Black. This book was one of a series of histories for
schools which were composed of liberal extracts from original authorities
in the hope of increasing the interest of young students in the study of
history. "The Cambridge Review" said of Figgis's volume:
In the volume before us, Mr. Figgis has played his part excel¬
lently. He has selected much that is entertaining without any¬
thing that would be indecent from the historical literature of
the Restoration. Burnett, Pepys, Temple, and Carleton are
judiciously interspersed with extracts from the verse of the
period, from Marvell and Denham, Addison and the Jacobite songs.
It will be a relief to most school boys who have heard so much
of him, and been allowed to understand so little, at last to see
with their own eyes what Dr. Sacheverell's sermon was like.^
The editors chose well in asking Figgis to write this little book, not
only because of his liking for and intimate acquaintance with late Seven¬
teenth and early Eighteenth Century England, but also because he had an
aversion for secondhand judgments on any subject or age, requiring of
himself a labourious study of original sources before presuming to formu¬
late an opinion.3 He had learned his lesson well at the feet of Maitland
1. Supra,, p. 152.
2. "A Review of English History from Original Sources, 1660-1715?"
Cambridge Review, (Thursday, May 7, 190371 p. 263.
3. It is interesting, if not amusing, to read a lecture which Figgis
gave at Glasgow University on February 3, 191U, and which appeared in the
Glasgow Herald for February U, on page 10. It shows Figgis's refusal to
accept judgments of authorities on historical personages without making
his own investigation. The lecture was entitled, "The Super Governess
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and C.reighton, whom Figgis looked upon as masters at the art of repro¬
ducing the atmosphere of the times that -were the objects of their study.
Creighton is especially credited with having performed a much needed
service for the study of history at Cambridge by teaching sound histori¬
cal methods, the science of historical criticism, and by laying great
stress on the study of original authorities.! His influence came to
full flower about the time (the late eighteen-eighties) that Figgis turned
to the serious study of history.
The fact that Figgis was generally recognized as a competent
historian is further indicated by his having served as assistant editor
of the 'Cambridge Modern History from 1900-1901, by his having been
asked by the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge to write the
articles on 'Wyclifef» and "Warburton" in the series published by them en¬
titled, Typical English Churchmen, and also by having been invited to
make a number of contributions to A Dictionary of English Church History
(edited by S. L. Ollard, M. A.j assisted by Gordon Cross, M. A.; London,
A. R. Mowbray And Co., Ltd., 1912). Figgis's contribution to this latter
volume include articles on "Arminianism," "John Henry Newman," "William
and the Super Snob," and in it he asserted that Sf Simon, the author of
the celebrated "Memoires," was the "super snob" who was bitterly preju¬
diced in his estimate of Mine de Marntenon, the "super governess," the
mentor and wife of Louis XIV. Figgis defended her as having stood for
gentleness and moderation and as resenting the Chauvenistic policy of
Louis. Figgis took great delight in discovering and disputing what he
considered to be ill-founded historical judgments. It has been noted also
that he realized the difficulty of and the dangers inherent in changing
the commonly accepted judgment regarding any historical person or event.
Supra., pp. 180-181.
1. See The Cambridge Review, January 2k, 1901, page 132, "Professor
Creighton's Work in Cambridge" by H* M. Gwatkin.
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of Ockham" and "Puritanism," "Calvinism," "Erastianism," and "Toleration."
In the little volume, Christianity and History, while trying,
by and large, to avoid an expression of his own Christian philosophy of
history that would turn the non-Christian away from a consideration of
what he is trying to say, Figgis strives to show the importance for an
understanding of the Christian era of a keen appreciation of the influ¬
ence upon history of Christianity's Founder and the institutions giving
expression to the Christian faith.
Such are, it seems, to the writer, some of the reflections which
in those who seek to master the meaning of historical study, the
phenomenon of Christianity is bound to excite. Firstly it de¬
mands attention, it cannot be ignored. Secondly it shews us
the futility of treating human life in water-tight compartments,
or in trying to separate arbitrarily, sacred and secular history.
Thirdly, it shews us how, for a long period at least, Christianity
was inwoven with the politics, the art, and the thinking of the
civilised world, so that without some knowledge of, and even sym¬
pathy with this many sided institution, culture, as modern
Europe understands it, is impossible. Fourthly, it demonstrates,
as nothihg else does, the unity of past and present, and shews
that, however convenient for temporary purposes may be the hard-
and-fast divisions of history they are merely relative and inade¬
quate} acove all, it shews the error of judging the whole of
human life by a part. On the other hand Christianity is the
most impressive of all the social institutions which teach us the
fallaciousness of the mechanical view of human life; for again and
again in the life both of its founder and its greatest exponents
it brings out the importance of personality as a factor in his¬
tory, and the futility of supposing all events to be the inevita¬
ble and unalterable result of the clash of impersonal forces. In
this sense—apart from any question of the truth and merits of
its theology—Christianity, as a fact, enforces, though it does
not demonstrate, the spiritual view of human life, which allows
us to say,
I think we are not wholly brain
Not merely cunning casts in clay
Magnetic mockeries—not in vain
Like Paul with beasts I fought with death.
This fact and not any special pre-dilection in favour of a particu¬
lar political theory is at the basis of the claim, that Christianity
has done more than any other influence to bring about freedom be-
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cause it recognises, and by recognising enhances the dignity
and worth of human nature. Finally, its history guards us
against the danger inherent in mankind of paying too much regard
to machinery and too little to ideas, of mistaking the temporary
applications of truth for its eternal reality. On these grounds,
it may fairly claim, that those who desire to attain the histori¬
cal mind, those who are disinterestedly endeavouring to seek from
history its answer to the question what is the best that has been
known and thought in the world are (so far as their historical
studies are concerned), free to adopt any attitude they please
to the system of Christian doctrine or the forms of the Christian
organization, but that only at the risk of losing that which they
seek, and of acquiring notions false to the whole truth of human
life or viewing out of perspective the panorama of human develop¬
ment, can they either ignore the fact of Christianity, or refrain
from devoting to it a large, though never an exclusive, attention.
In his closing remarks in elaboration of his insistence that secular his¬
tory cannot be studied in abstraction from Christianity, Figgis is the
more bold to present his own Christian view of history. It shows him
here, as in all of his major emphases considered in these pages under
the heading of "Figgis as a Theologian," pleading a supernatural view as
the only one which gives rise to true understanding and to hope.
Only in so far as we include in our survey the eternal mystery-play
of the gospel and its appeal to the human heart, shall we gather
hope instead of despair from the spectacle. Only so can we catch
the glimpses of romance behind the sordid and squalid representa¬
tion of greed and selfishness which is too often in the foreground
of our picture; only so is it possible even in the spectacle of
shipwrecked nations, and fleeting glories to discern the true
dignity of man's destiny and the splendour of his undying aspira¬
tions, for only so through the twilight of social insincerities
and individual iniquities shall there dawn for the patient watcher
the vision and the wonder of the past.
The lesson of history to the patient seeker after truth, is when
all is said, one and the same with the supreme message of the gos¬
pel. The picture of human life in the past tends to produce weari¬
ness and despair, except in so far as it be illuminated by Hope and
1. Figgis, Christianity and History, pp. 72-7!;.
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transfigured by Love."*"
It is an easy transition in the final stages of the study of
"Figgis As a Theologian" from a consideration of his views on history to
a consideration of his thoughts on the church. Just how natural this
transition is is suggested by these words:
A man who takes part in a high celebration of the Eucharist
is a witness and a sharer in the unity of history. In this wor¬
ship he is carried far back through many ages, breathing climates
older than the Christian, and he, a modern, is at one with primi¬
tive man and also has the promise of the future. It is then, as
gathering in itself the religious experience of mankind, that the
Christian Church makes its appeal....^
Figgis's conception of the church was typically "high Anglican," includ¬
ing a high doctrine of the sacraments, an insistence that the Bible can¬
not be studied in abstraction from the life of the society which pro¬
duced it, and a doctrine of authority, which, considerably under the in¬
fluence of Newman's writings, steers a middle course between the false
ultramontanisra of Home and what Figgis felt to be the excessive individu¬
alism of Protestant groups, replete with the dangers of self-dependent
piety.
Considerable space has already been given to Figgis's assertion
that real authority "exists diffusively in the whole 'communitas fidelium'"
as opposed to any polity which concentrates authority in one or several
individuals or in the clergy to the exclusion of the laity, and to his
conviction that the Anglican church's relation as a national church to
the rest of Christendom justifies the claim of the English church to an
1. Ibid., pp. 75-76.
2. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, p. 213.
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undeniable place in the stream of the church's Catholicity.In this
latter thought he indicated by emphasis a preference for basing the
Catholicity of the English church on a federalistic social principle
rather than on the traditional view of Apostolic succession.
Although Figgis was critical of much of Protestantism for an in¬
adequate theology of the church, for weak principles of authority, and
for a tendency to require of its adherents certain feelings of which all
men are not capable, he nevertheless took frequent occasion to say that
the Evangelical spirit had much to contribute to Catholic Christianity.
If, as we hold, Evangelicals have much to learn from the greater
fulness of the Catholic life and its insistence on the social
and sacramental aspects of religious experience, we need not
deny that marry who glory in the name of Catholic have little
less to learn from the real faith in the Cross and personal de¬
votion to our Lord of the true Evangelical. Perhaps there is
no more soul-destroying superstition than the dilettante Catholi¬
cism to which religion is no more than ritualp
As may be seen from the above, Figgis, for all of his loyalty
to the Church of England in general and to its High Church School in par¬
ticular, was still one of the Anglican Church's severest critics.^ He
felt that for the most part his church was insensitive to the continuing
growth of forces hostile to the church and the beliefs and values for which
she stands.
If you take the atmosphere of a provincial cathedral close, or
of most rural deaneries in country districts, it may be doubted
1. Supra, p ./3A-/JV
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the mystery, "John Henry Newman," p. 25U.
3. For an appreciation of Figgis's conviction that his church was
blind to the plight of the poor, supra., p
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whether its tone of complacent optimism would think that there
was anything worthy of serious thought in modern infidelity.
Unbelief in such a view is a sort of freak, a fad—like wear¬
ing sandals—so far as practical work goes, a pheomenon so
rare as to be negligible. Even among those who ought to know
better, problems of Church policy and even of faith are often
treated as though it were all a sort of squabble in the family,
and there were no Goths thundering at the gates.^
He was never more critical of his church than in a series of sermons
preached in 1916 at Grosvenor Chapel, Mayfair, and published under the
title of Some Defects in English Religion. The titles of the first
four sermons are: "Sentimentalism," "Legalism," "Cowardice," and "Com¬
placency." In the last of these, certain scathing remarks appear, some
of which became famous and are still remembered among Figgis's associates,
and some of which give rise to the accusation by his reviewers of his be¬
ing rather theatrical in his criticism.
The Church of England has become more and more a society of
respectable people. Its standards are those of good form,
though it likes to dress its window's with the bones of martyrs.
But as I said three weeks ago, the last'thing you will say of it
is that it is a society of penitent sinners.^
One super-eminent quality of English religion is its dislike of
the heights and depths. It cannot understand either saints or
sinners. .... If S. Francis of Assisi were to appear to-day he
would be locked up, and S. Mary Magdalene would be turned out of
the Girls' Friendly Society.3
...there are many churches which seem to have sunk down into a
sort of religion which was described once as "auntism," a
religion suited for people who gave up all hopes of matrimony
in the 'seventies and 'eighties.^
But Figgis only censured the church because he loved it and be-
1. Ibid., pp. 250-251.
2. Figgis, Some Defects in English Religion, p. 1|2.
3. Ibid., p. It5.
U. Ibid., p. U7.
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cause he believed so strongly that the "Plea for Otherworldliness," which
has here been described as constituting Figgis's main theological emphasis
and contribution, could be heard and the challenge met onlywithin the con¬
text of the life of the church, the otherworldly society, The Fellowship
of the Mystery, the latter being the title of Figgis1s Bishop Paddock
Lectures on the Church, delivered at the General Theological Seminary in
New York, during Lent, 1913.
In these lectures, as elsewhere, Figgis lays stress on what he
called "the democracy" of the Catholic church, by which he meant that
Catholic worship with its stress on the Eucharist has a universal appeal,
circumventing what he saw to be the danger among certain individuals and
groups of a kind of exclusiveness which predicates a knowledge of and
communion with God on the enjoyment of a certain kind of temperament or
feeling or emotion, the history of a conversion experience, the posses¬
sion of certain intellectual insights, or the capacity for mystical ex¬
perience .
The Gospel is as universal as life, and no less mysterious.
The worst criminal can find his Saviour in the Cross; and the
most highly educated man or woman has not exhausted the mean¬
ing of the words, "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life."
...it is in the matter of worship that the universal character
of the Catholic religion is most strikingly vindicated.
With the sacramental view of religion, the layman comes into
his own; The coster in the East End can enter into the
highest act of Christian worship and receive its crowning grace;
provided his will be right, it matters no whit whether he feels
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, p. 167.
2. Ibid., p. l6lT
3. Ibid., p. 169.
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much or little."1"
More and more as I muse upon it, more and more as the wonder
and beauty of the Catholic experience of all ages come into my
soul, do I feel that the more rich and strange is the experience
that may be ours, and the sense of praise and worship and of God's
Presence given to us in our Eucharistic worship; and more and
more am I convinced that for the majority of men and women, not,
perhaps, capable through time or temperament of high speculation
or of any great powers of religious rapture, the system of ex¬
ternal ordinances and of Sacramental means is the one truly demo¬
cratic system in religion which gives them each and all their
place and their rights independent of their temperament, their
education, and, if I may say so, of their character.^
In concluding this chapter, perhaps it would be valuable, by
way of summary and by way of emphasizing the important role that the
church played in Figgis's thinking, to document, however briefly,
Figgis's conviction that each of his major "otherworldly" emphases would
live and thrive only as they were inspired and nourished by the life of
the church.
Reflecting his conviction that civilization is doomed apart
from a renewed allegiance to the supernaturally inspired values for which
the church stands, he says:
A civilisation to endure will have to mean something, and
"projected efficiency" will not satisfy any race which con¬
siders its latter end. Against this dissolution which is
otherwise in store for us, there is nothing to stand but the
life of the Christian Church.3
...the world, as it now is, bears on the face of it the marks
which call for redemption; ... Christianity comes to us alone
professing to have this power from beyond, and alone able to
meet the universal need of deliverance. If the aivilised world,
saved by a remnant of faithful, accepts this evangel, it may
rise to heights undreamed of. If, as many indications suggest,
1. Ibid., p. 169.
2. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, pp. 1*1-14.2.
3. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, p. 62.
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the world at large rejects it, then civilisation may proceed
on its course of God-denial for some generations or even cen¬
turies, but it is doomed like the ancient worldj for no culture
can go on existing without faith, and the forces of materialism
already looming as a cloud will gather volume, until the land
of the spirit is overshadowed.^
Striving to make clear his conviction that the task of modern
theology to declare the uniqueness, the distinctiveness of the Christian
faith, while at the same time recognizing the problems raised by modern
thought, must be done within the framework of loyalty to the living
spirit of the church he writes:
...when we are invited, on the strength of certain dubious
theories, to repudiate that experience (the 2,000 year history
of the church) and to try an entirely fresh start, we reply
first, that this is impossible, and secondly, that such a pro¬
ceeding, if not impossible, would be blasphemy—a denial of
God's Providence, and of the whole meaning of a historical
religion. Are we to believe that, though the gates of hell
are not to prevail against the Church, yet its whole scheme,
alike of thought and practice, of worship and sacrament, the
doctrines of the Incarnation and the Atonement, are to go for
nothing, while still we are to call ourselves Christians?
Such a view of history would need absolute demonstration be¬
fore a wise man could accept itj and, so far from its being
demonstrated, the contrary can be seen to be very probable.
In his stress on the importance of religious experience and
the necessity of approaching and interpreting the details of the Christian
life and story against the whole background of this essentially super¬
natural experience, Figgis, as seen from the above quotation as well,
placed great emphasis on the Christian church "as at the centre of the
religious experience of the human race."^ He insisted upon the necessity
1. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
2. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, p. 75.
3. Ibid., p. 56.
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of the individual's religious experience being thought of as a part of
and subject to the scrutiny of the church's great living tradition of
"otherworldly" experience, an experience not confined to nor adequately
comprehended in rational categories, an experience essentially mysterious
in nature. Describing Newman's views on these related thoughts, Figgis
succeeded in summarizing his own views as well:
He saw that individualist religion would soon become merely a
subjective sentiment} that a strong, collective authority was
needed, instinct with the Holy Spirit imparted at Pentecost.
He felt that Christianity, as being a life, not a theory, was
a distinct thing, and must be judged as a whole, not by the
meticulous criticism of details. He discerned that the real
problem concerns the total nature of that religious fact (or
experience) which stretches from the priest at the Eucharist
(for we must begin there) back through the Church to the New
Testament experience.1
Regarding Figgis' stress on the miraculous element in Chris¬
tianity and his conviction that miracles are the most typical expression
of the nature of the Christian experience, he said that the very survival
through the ages against tremendous odds of an institution whose life is
predicated on the validity of certain significant miraculous events pre¬
sents a strong case in favour of accepting these miracles as factual.
The uniformity of nature would be violated by such facts as Our
Lord's Birth and Resurrection, only on these conditions; either
that these were mere freak events without any adequate cause, or
that they had produced no corresponding results. Precisely the
contrary is the case. That is why the existence of the Christian
Church must ever play a large part in the argument.2
As for Figgis's Christology and his insistence that both the
Docetism which robs Christ of His true humanity and the Modernism which
1. Ibid., "John Henry Newman," pp. 260-261.
2. Ibid., "Modernism versus Modernity," pp. 277-278.
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robs Christ of His true divinity are in error, he points yet again to
the church as the only source of an understanding of the Person of Jesus
Christ which is according to the truth.
Our Lord may speak to the soul alone, it is true;but we cannot
proceed to identify His voice with that of Jesus Christ without
the use of historical knowledge, and that will be found to im¬
ply the Church.
Whatever our religion is to mean to us after we have it, we can¬
not gain even a minimum acquaintance with Jesus except through
the institutions that issued from His life, Since He no
longer walks the earth, all knowledge of His historical life can _
come to us only through institutions which express His spirit, ....
...we are driven, however reluctantly, to approach our Lord Jesus
Christ through those social institutions of which His life was
the originating principle.^
The church, the supernatural society, also plays an ever im¬
portant role in providing the necessary supernatural, "otherworldly" ori¬
entation for high ethical values and a keen social conscience.
All high ideals ultimately have their sanction in the Christian
Church, and without that support will soon decay; ...3
And finally, as part of his assertion that religious or super¬
natural values are the sanction and inspiration of all manner of cultural
achievements, Figgis, having documented the historical role of the church
in cultural progress, points to the church as continuing to be the most
important patron of cultural achievement.
Our hopes for the Catholic religion at this stage rest upon our
faith in its power to stimulate every living and wholesome in¬
terest of human life and society. We claim that in the Christian
Church each man in the degree and measure of his capacity can
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, pp. b3-Uk*
2. Ibid., p7~C5.
3. Figgis, Hopes for English Religion, p. 2l+.
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have not less but more of the love of beauty, as shown in art,
letters, and music, or the sense of order and the desire for
truth in the investigation of natural phenomena, or that love
of intimacy with human life in every age which we call the his¬
torical sense, no less than he can in the growth of all bodily
powers and courage, and the readiness for adventure, mental and
physical.
In a word, Christianity is the sanction of Humanism in its best
sense, and the Church is the true home of the soul and the body.
Words which appear at the end of the preface to Figgis's little
book, Religion and English Society, provide an excellent summary of the
special role which Figgis felt that the English Church was called upon
to play in his time, They also constitute a fitting conclusion for
these chapters on; "Figgis as a Theologian."
...I do think that upon us (of the Church of England) is laid
the burden, heavy, but still to be borne, of finding some syn¬
thesis between "the faith that was once delivered to the saints"
and all that is of enduring worth in the modern world. In a
different sense from that common, ours is indeed a "via media."
The Church of Rome, on its official side, has adopted the policy
of sitting on the safety-valve; while the modernists on the whole
are guides rather stimulating than safe. "Liberal" Protestantism,
as the more candid observers (like Professor Surkitt) are now ad¬
mitting, is bankrupt. The older Evangelical view, unrivalled for
its individual sincerity and its hold on the Cross has always suf¬
fered from a lack of the corporate vision, while it leaned for
support on a view of the Bible which is daily becoming more un¬
tenable. There are indeed not wanting signs, that all those,
who hold on the supernatural is real, are being drawn together.
This "rapprochement," however, cannot mean the surrender of any
one vital element in our Catholic heritage. A solemn duty is
laid upon us of the English Church, for whom the sacramental
gift and the Evangelical faith are alike integral parts of one
living religion—the duty of bringing forth from the treasure-
house of the Spirit things new and old.2
1. Ibid., p. liU.




Figgis's "Plea for Otherworldliness" was made as a member of
that Liberal wing of Anglo-Catholicism, whose scholars have continued
in the best tradition of the Oxford movement and who have stood on the
side of learning, for the acceptance of Biblical criticism, and for the
full use of art and knowledge in the service of faith. As has been seen,
he singled out the expression, "Mediating liberalism" as best describing
his own position within this general movement.
«
While holding fast to the "Eternal Gospel," there is before us
in this age the task, not yet accomplished, of adjusting to a
theology framed in another intellectual climate, a new view of
the Bible, ""enlarged conceptions of history, and deeper knoxtfledge
of the natural world and of the mind of man. "Mediating liberal¬
ism" is perhaps the best term in which to describe the attitude
of wisdom; for that implies a real reverence for the heritage
that is ours, together with an alert openness to what is new. Do
not, however, let us suppose there is no problem, or deny changes
which are real.-*-
Figgis was essentially in agreement with the authors of Lux,
Mundi, which book was published in 1890, while Figgis was still at Cam¬
bridge and just beginning to feel the full impact of Creighton's person¬
al
ality and Christian humanism on his own college-bred agnosticism. In iden¬
tifying Figgis with this key group of "second generation Tractarians,"
it must be added that he was not completely of them, and that because of
a number of distinctive emphases which have been singled out in the pages
of this thesis.
1. Figgis, The Fellowship of the Mystery, pp. 96-97.
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By his emphasis on a theology of Christian experience (Chris¬
tianity is not a system but a life"), and his insistence that Christian¬
ity must be defended from the whole experience of it and that "we are
dealing not with a number of isolated events apparently marvellous, each
to be discussed ®in vacuo,1 but with the great experience of human life
extending from the converted sinner of today right back to 'that strange
man upon the Cross'and all that He implies," Figgis distinguished him¬
self in general from the "Lux Mundi" school where the argument from ex¬
perience is only occasionally used to reinforce other arguments and where
it is generally supposed that the facts of history or the dogmatic sys¬
tem of Christianity are the grounds from which belief follows.
Figgis' strong emphasis in his Christology upon Christ's re¬
demptive act provides another reason for not identifying Figgis completely
with the'ffiux Mundi" school; although it would be in error to say that
Christ as a Redeemer did not play an important part in "Lux Mundi" think¬
ing in general. E. G. Selwyn singles out this emphasis as a very signifi¬
cant part of Figgis's impact and total contribution.
The effect of Figgis' personality and preaching was to give a
marked orientation to the thought of my generation in Cambridge.
Its Evangelicalism, no less fervent than that of his contemporary,
the Nonconformist divine, Dr. Forsyth, was bound up with an equally
fervent hold upon sacraments; and he showed us a religion that was
at once vital and critical, orthodox and up to date, Catholic and
non-Roman, Anglican to the core. And men found themselves impelled
to a fresh study of the Bible as the story of redemption, of the
Eucharist as the showing-forth of the Cross, ....2
1. Figgis, Civilisation at the Cross Roads, p. 199.
2. E. G. Selwyn, "The Outlook for English Theology," Theology, XL,
(January 19U0), p. 7.
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Figgis' strong insistence on the essentially mysterious nature
of the Christian experience and his conviction that "you cannot search
for religion mainly from the side of intellectual inquiry and arrive at
a Christian result"-'- served to distinguish him from the Oxford men of
the "Lux Mundi" movement wherein an element of idealism figured in their
thinking. Such are some of the main considerations which give Figgis
an identity of his own within the main stream of "Lux Mundi" thought.
The student's estimate of the past or continuing validity of
the Liberal Catholic position will largely determine his estimate of the
value of the study of "Figgis as a Theologian." If he believes, as does
L. S. Thornton,*that Essays Catholic and Critical, published in 1926,
constitutes the swan song of the Liberal Catholic movement, then he will
feel that the study of Figgis is only important for a better appreciation
of the history of a movement which has now outlived its usefulness and
the contribution to that movement of a man, the general neglect of whose
contribution (save for some recognition given in recent years in several
religious journals and M. G. Tucker's little book, John Neville Figgis)
*)
leaves a gap in the account of recent English Church history. If, on the
other hand, the student believes, as E. G. Selwyn seems to believe, that
Liberal Catholicism continues to speak in a significant way to the re¬
ligious needs of modern man, then he will point to Figgis as worthy of
study because of his share in the early nurture of a still important em¬
phasis. It is of no small interest to read Selwyn's reference to Figgis
1. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. 33.
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in his refutation in Theology for January, 19^0, of articles appearing
in immediately preceding issues of that journal by the Archbishop of
York and Mr. Mascall, which claimed that a marked feature of the time
,i® "a sense of divergence between older and younger theologians."
To these men who assumed that it is peculiar to the younger men to feel
that the philosophical expression of Christianity is spiritually and e-
motionally unsatisfactory and who affirm that a distrust of Liberalism
and a desire to return to dogma is peculiar to the young man's outlook,
Selwyn has this to say:
For those of us who were at Cambridge during the decade before
the last war, the "habit of security" to which the Archbishop
alludes was already subject to some rude shocks. On the one
hand, agnosticism was militant, and no freshman could be in the
University for a week without being aware of it: if he came from
a Christian home and school, he would soon have to give an answer
for his faith. On the other hand, there came into this academic
world a vigorous connter-challenge in the person and from the
lips of Neville Figgis. The "bon caseur" from Marnhull had now
become the monk from Mirfieldj and he added to an unquestioned
reputation as an historian and man of learning the spiritual
power of a newly re-converted life. He came with the message
of the Cross in his life and on his lips, and he electrified
us. In his Hulsean Lectures of 1908-1909 he confronted us with
the whole issue between faith and un-faith, insisted that it was
moral no less than intellectual, and showed that the foundations
on which Western Society had been built were alreacty- deeply un¬
dermined. And his recall to the Cross as the true way of life
no less than the true centre of thought filled the University
church to overflowing on every Sunday that he preached.
Whatever one's views about Liberal Gatholicism, the very least
that can be said in Figgis's behalf is that his writings performed an
important service in challenging the mechanistic assumptions and unhis-
torical approaches of the turn of the century movement in Roman Catholic
1. Selwyn, "The Outlook for English Theology," pp. 6-7.
(232)
circles known as Modernism and labelled in Protestant circles as the
New Theology. The fact that he was ready to recognize in these move¬
ments whatever legitimate insights they enjoyed (such as Modernism's
instict for approaching the subject of religion from "the whole"), the
fact that he did not minimize the problems which they raised, served
to add a note of sincerity and authority to his impassioned denuncia¬
tion of what he rightly saw to be certain unwarranted mechanistic as¬
sumptions about the nature of the universe made by Modernist and
New Theologian, assumptions which he said involved as much an act of
faith as to the nature of the universe as does the spiritual view of
the universe which looks upon miracles as an expression of God's free¬
dom in a spiritually ordered world.
It has been noted in the preceding pages that Figgis's wealth
of historical information and his knowledge of historical procedures
played a part in most all of his finer theological insights. His ex¬
perience as a historian not only gave him an audience among historical
circles and a following among students of history which he might not
otherwise have had, but also equipped him to expose the fallacies in¬
herent in the willingness to accept without question the radical criti¬
cism of the New Testament. The fact that for the most part the issues
raised by the Modernists and the New Theologians are no longer the crucial
issues, their weaknesses having been exposed, takes nothing away from the
reputation of a man who shared significantly in the reduction of these
issues to something less than a continuing serious threat to orthodox be¬
liefs. Neither does the fact that Figgis's conservatism would not be con-
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sidered very conservative as compared with more recent theological trends
on the Continent and in Great Britain take away from the fact that he
served his period nobly in challenging the extreme Liberalism of his own
day.
It is not to be supposed, however, out of an effort to estab¬
lish the thesis that The Contribution of John Neville Figgis (1866-1919)
to the Religious Thought of His Period was a significant one, that his
was the one voice to make "A Plea for Otherworldliness" in the face of
strong forces which thought that the only way to preserve religion in a
modern, scientific age was to minimize its supernatural aspects. Simply
to mention the names of Frederick von Hugel, who although best described
as a Modernist yet insisted on the necessity of belief in the transcend¬
ence of God, and P. T. Forsyth, the brillian Nonconformist divine, and
Will Spens, one of an appreciable number within his own High Anglican
family whose views were more like than unlike Figgis's views, is to sub¬
stantiate the fact that Figgis was not alone in his stand against the
idols of both the study and the market place. On the other hand, not to
recognize Figgis's voice as one strong voice among several (and yet with
its own distinctive quality) which sounded a battle cry against these
idols is to do injustice to the man and to expose an unwarranted omission
in one's knowledge of the history of religious thought and English church
life during the first twenty years of this century.
Whereas many of Figgis's co-religionists would agree that in
regard to religious thought in general Figgis said what they were trying
to say, only in a more interesting and convincing way, they would be
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equally quick to agree in regard to the idea of the group personality in
the nature of the church that Figgis not only expressed the idea better
but made it a more central conviction in the minds of his fellows. This
is no small part of the reason why so many pages of this thesis are given
over to an effort to understand "the nature and progress of Figgis's po¬
litical and social theories. They form an indispensable background to
an understanding of Figgis's views on the nature of authority in the
"Fellowship of the mystery" and of his belief that the Church of England,
representing the best realization of the ideals of the Council of Con¬
stance, enjoys a most authentic place in the tradition and ongoing life
of the Catholic church.
An insight into Figgis's progress away from Austinian "single
society" thinking and his growth in "Genossenschaftsrecht," "group per¬
sonality," "two society," "communitas communitatum" thinking has also
been a necessary prerequisite to an understanding of Figgis's contribu¬
tion to thought regarding the relations between church and state and the
larger problem of the relation of the state to all the social units
(group personalities) within the state, of which the church-state p roblem
is an aspect. For whatever issue might be taken with that development of
Figgis's thought which says that a Christian should not make a decision
on Christian grounds which will affect non-Christian citizens; yet the
fact remains that Figgis's efforts to champion the "inherent rights" of
the real "group personality," whether civil or ecclessiastic, has had
condiserable effect and vogue over a period of many years. In this paper
men as different from one another as Gore, Forsyth, and Laski were seen
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to have been duly influenced by Figgis's thought.
Yet again, Figgis's political thought, as studied within the
context of his political-historical works, has been important to an ap¬
preciation of the background which prepared him to be such an astute
critic of modern civilization. Not a few of those who think that some¬
thing of what Figgis had to say is still important look upon him as a
prophet, and that because of his tragic sense, developed well before
19lUj of a world rushing towards catastrophe. F. J. E. Raby wrote of
Figgis in 19^0 just as the civilized world was stepping up the pace of
the second global conflict of the century,
My chief aim in compiling this summary of the main ideas which
guided the thought of J. N. Figgis js to show the prophetic ac¬
curacy with which he read the signs of the times and disentangled
from the confusion of the contemporary world just those issues
which were to face the following generation.
No appreciation of "Figgis as a Political Thinker" or of "Figgis
as a Theologian" is complete without an appreciation of"Figgis as an
Man." These words appeared following Figgis's death in the Cambridge
Review for May 9, 1919:
But by his many friends Figgis will be remembered not so much
as a historian or divine but as a delightful human being who
was delightful because he was so human. With a genius for
friendship he knew how to receive as well as how to give af¬
fection: and not a little of his charm was derived from his
interest in his fellow creatures. Ever ready to sympathize
with, and, if possible, to understand alien points of view, he
could be annoyed but never shockedj and life for him never
ceased to be an adventure, sometimes happy and sometimes un¬
happy but never uninteresting he had friends and admir¬
ers in many different sections of Cambridge society. Agnostics
1. Raby, "John Neville Figgis, Prophet," p. 331-
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forgave him for being a clergyman, evangelicals forgot that
he was like a monk, and undergraduates overlooked the fact that
he was no longer young.
Because he had known and was perhaps never completely free from the chill
of the agnostic temper ("lb others faith is the bright serenity of un¬
clouded vision; to me it is the angel of an agony, the boon of daily and
hourly conflict.")^11® could sound his "Plea for ^therworldliness" with
a keen sensitivity to those in his listening or reading audience who
found it difficult to believe. E. K. Talbot says:
Certainly it was his own experience which was blood under the
skin of all his religious writing—and which gave it such ani¬
mation and even exhile'ration. 3
There was a seal on the voice which came from Figgis's corpu¬
lent, clumsily built figure as he preached from the pulpit of Great Saint
Mary's, Cambridge, in 1908, and from that pulpit and many others until
his death, because of his dramatic act of self-abandonment in giving up
his rich living in Marnhull for the comparative hardships of the life of
a monk at Mirfield.
Not a few of Figgis's contemporaries had a very high estimate
of his contribution to the religious thought of his period:
It is hardly exaggerating to call (Fr. Figgis) the most powerful,
intellectual influence in the English church at the present day
The Rev. J. N. Figgis...is one of the keenest apologists of our day.^
1. Cambridge Review, (May 9, 1919)> pp. 295-296.
2. Figgis, The Gospel and Human Needs, p. 15.
3. Keble Talbot, The Quarterly Chronicle of the Community of the Res¬
urrection, (Christmas, 19l|.o71
in R. A. Knox, "Enfant Terrible—A Review of Some Loose Stones,"
Church Times, (November lii, 1913)? P» 683.
Expository Times, XXVI, (January, 1915)> p. 162.
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Although these claims have a strong element of truth in them, yet it
must be said again that Figgis's impact on his period can never be cal¬
culated apart from a consideration of the personal impact of the man.
His odd physical appearance, his childhood spent in an Evangelical home,
his brilliant mind, his many years spent at Cambridge although possess¬
ing a temperament which might have been more at home at Oxford, his
stormy spiritual history, and his little winning though odd mannerisms
all combine to present the picture of a most interesting person whose
contribution to religious thought bears the distinct stamp of his unusu¬
al combination of qualities.
This writer visited and enjoyed the kind hospitality of the
Community of the Resurrection for several weeks during the Winter of 19h9,
in an effort to search out information about Figgis from the men in the
Community and from the Community library. Father B. Horner, C. R., who
was a member of the Community when Figgis was living, in response to the
question, "How would Neville Figgis react to being shown a paper about
him, written by a young theological student?" replied, "He would read it
eagerly and say, 'My word, this is very interesting. And at the end, I
discovered you were talking about me.'" It is hoped that Neville Figgis
would indeed recognize well before the last leaf that these pages, written
under the heading of "The Contribution of John Neville Figgis (1866-1919)
to the Religious Thought of His Period, are an effort to appreciate the
background, the content, and the personal flavour of the writing, preaching,
and teaching of a man whose thought, especially during the last decade and
more of his life, constituted a distinct contribution to the religious
thought of his time.
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THE WRITINGS OF JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS
Listed as Accurately as Possible in Chronological Order
"The Value of Historical Study"—a lecture—delivered before the Ketter¬
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2nd ed., Cambridge: University Press, 1911*.
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Royal Historical Society, Volume XIC, Book I, 1897.
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cal Society, Volume XIII, 1899.
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pended to The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.)
"William Warburton," Typical English Churchmen, Series I, London: So¬
ciety for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1909; delivered first
April 23, 1901.
English History from Original Sources 1660-1715, Black's Historical Series,
London: Adam and Charles Black, 1902.
"John Wyclife," Typical English Churchmen, Series II, From Wyclife to
Gardiner, London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 1909;
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"A Puritan Utopia," The Church Quarterly Review, LVII, (October 1903-
January 190i*), 101.
"Bartolus and the Development of European Political Ideas," 1905• (Ap¬
pended to The Divine Right of Kings, 2nd ed.).
Christianity and History, London: James Finch & Co., Ltd., 1905.
"The New Theology and Bishop Butler," The Church Times, September 27, 1907.
(Appended to The Gospel and Human Needs).
"A Plea for Other-Worldliness," a sermon preached before the University of
Cambridge, November 10, 1907. (Appended to The Gospel and Human Needs).
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THE WRITINGS OF JOHN NEVILLE FIGGIS
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"Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century," Cambridge M0dern History,
Volume III, 1907.
Studies of Political Thought From Gerson to Grotius 11LLU-1625>, 1st ed.,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1907. 2nd ed.,
London: Cambridge University Press, 1916.
"Three Cambridge Historians: Creighton, Maitland, and Acton," Guardian,
1907. (Appendix II in Churches in the Modern State.)
"The Puritan Spirit," Article I of "Persecution by the Puritans," being
a reprint from the National Church, London, (1908), 25.
Acton, J. E. D., The History of Freedom and Other Essays, London: Mac
Millan, 1909. Edited by~7. N. Figgis and R. V. Lawrence.
"A Review of Christianity at the Cross Roads," The Quarterly Chronicle of
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"Petrus Canisius and the German Counter Reformation," English Historical
Review, 1909.
Acton, J. E. D., Lectures on the French Revolution, London: Mac Millan,
1910. Edited by J. N7"~Figgis and R." V." Lawrence.
The Gospel and Human Needs, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1910.
"A Review of The Church and the World, Being the Bampton Lectures for 1908
and 1909" by Walter Hobhouse, The English Church Review, I, (Septem¬
ber 1910), hOO.
Mason, Agnes, Pain and Gladness, preface by J. N. Figgis, London: Longmans,
Green and Co., 1911.
Religion and English Society, tondon: Longmans, Green and Co., 1911.
"The Gospel of Freedom," The Guardian, (December 20, 1912), 1686.
"John Nenry Newman," English Church Review, (March and April 1912). (Ap=
pendix "A" of The Fellowship of the Mystery.)
"Letter-to-the-Editor," London Times, (November 21, 1912), 13- (Subject:
Should agnostics be allowed to take the D. in D.?)
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Civilisation at the Cross Roads, New fork: Longmans Green and Co., 1912.
"King Richard The Third and The Reverend James Thompson," (Appended to
Civilisation at the Cross Roads).
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Antichrist and Other Sermons, London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1913.
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"Ideal Politics," The English Church Review, V, (1911;). (Also delivered
as a lecture at the vacation term of Biblical Study for Women on
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10.
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"The Holy Catholic Church, New Tracts on the Creed," The Church, XI,
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£A. q.k.A. £ctl
"Modernism Versus Modernity," (Appendix B of The Fellowship of the Mystery)
Times of Refreshing, London: Francis Griffiths, 1915. (A book of sermons)
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Figgis and R. V. Lawrence.
Some Defects in English Religion and Other Sermons, London: Robert Scott,
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